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Abstract 
 
 In Switzerland the issue of immigration and the status of the “foreign other” 
has been much debated at the national level, with recent policies becoming more 
xenophobic.  Previous studies have shown that attitudes towards immigrants are 
influenced by the conception of the nation; therefore, this study uses a discourse 
analysis of the hegemonic narratives to analyze the competing conceptions of a Swiss 
National Identity and how these are mobilized in political campaigns. I find that 
besides the commonly accepted political conception of the nation, both cultural and 
ethnic constructions are also pervasive. The political far right has mobilized these 
narratives to support their anti-immigration political campaigns. Therefore, the Thesis 
recommends that there should be an effort to shift the discourse of a “Swiss” national 
identity to promote a culture of peaces. Furthermore, the concept of nationality should 
be questioned as a privileged identity and space should be opened for alternative 
frameworks. 
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Do I contradict myself? 
 Very well then I contradict myself,  
(I am large, I contain multitudes.) 
 
 
 Walt Whitman, 1855 
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Introduction 
My Story 
 
I am Swiss - that is an identity I was born into,, but one that I have spent the 
last twenty years trying to understand. When I was living in Switzerland as a little 
girl, everyone around me identified with the same national identity, and I never 
thought about what being “Swiss” meant – I was living at point zero. But when I was 
six years old, my family moved to China, and all of a sudden my “Swiss-ness” 
became very salient to my daily life. I found myself in a place where almost 
everything was different, the climate, the food, the eating utensils, the toilets, and 
probably most importantly the language. 
Since those days I have lived and traveled around the world, and the questions 
of what it means to be Swiss and how I fit into the world have followed me from 
place to place. The simple answer is that I am Swiss: I have a Swiss passport; I can 
trace my family tree back for generations in Switzerland; my hometown of Zeiningen 
has a significant population of other “Freiermuths.” However, like many Third 
Culture Kids, my identity is more complicated. I have homes all around the world, 
and I feel connected to many different places. Yet I do not have deep roots that tie me 
to any single place; in someway I am always on the outside – the foreigner. Moreover, 
I am open to the possibility of a “Third Culture,” a mixing of cultures that leads to a 
Third Culture that is not just a mix of other cultures but a step toward an entirely new 
consciousness.1 Therefore, I am naturally drawn to topics of identity as well as 
migration. And in the context of Switzerland I feel that I have a unique perspective: I !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 As David Pollock and Ruth Van Reken  (2009) explain in their book Third Culture 
Kids: Growing Up Among Worlds, the “third” culture refers to an interstitial culture 
or “culture between culture” which contains elements of but does not resemble either 
the home nor the host culture.  
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am the insider-outsider, the local-foreigner, a walking paradox that has spent a 
lifetime learning to bridge the gap and to be comfortable living in ambiguity.  
Furthermore, as a student of peace I am very interested in questions of 
privilege and power. The idea of intersectionality considers the interaction of various 
privileges associated with gender, sexual-identity, ethnicity/race, and class (Allen, 
2011). Therefore, although I am a woman I am nevertheless quite privileged as I am 
able-bodied, white, heterosexual, and from a well-off family. However, what is rarely 
discussed, at least by theorists from the “center,” is the privilege of state/nation-hood.  
Although many Swiss2 people have a general sense of feeling lucky to live in 
Switzerland (an idea related to the Swiss concept of the Sonderfall)3, it is not until 
they leave that they realize the true power of possessing a little red passport. For one, 
having a Swiss passport makes crossing borders very easy. There are many countries 
that allow Swiss citizens to enter without a visa, and within the European Union it is 
even possible to live and work without any special permit. Even when a visa is 
required, it is usually considered a simple matter of formality. Given these 
considerations, the Swiss passport was recently ranked as one of the most powerful in 
the world (Linn, 2014). The reality of this privilege really hit me when I was working 
in China. There, I had many co-workers who dreamed of travelling or working 
abroad, but faced a lot of red-tape in order to do so. Even more revealing was a 
conversation about our futures with a Cuban friend. While I was free to look at 
universities and jobs anywhere I pleased, his freedom of movement was much more 
restricted. An intersectional analysis of his privilege based on race, gender and class 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 I dedicate Chapter 2 of this thesis to problematizing and deconstructing what it 
means to be Swiss. In this section I use “Swiss” to refer to Swiss citizens (holders of a 
Swiss Passport). 
3 The Sonderfall is a conception of Switzerland as a special of exceptional case, an 
idea I explore in more depth in Chapter 2.!!
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would indicate that he should be quite privileged; nevertheless, his national identity 
greatly limited his freedom of movement.   
Beyond the ease of movement, the Swiss are usually quite well received in 
foreign countries because most of the stereotypes/hegemonic discourses on being 
Swiss are quite positive. The most common perceptions I have encountered include 
that we are rich – we are bankers, good with money, and generally trustworthy. We 
wear Swiss watches and are accordingly punctual, detail oriented, and reliable. And of 
course, we are neutral. The only somewhat negative response to my “Swissness” I 
have ever confronted while travelling was when people pointed out all the “black 
money” that corrupt politicians were storing in Swiss banks. But even that was never 
held against me personally.  
Finally, this idea of privilege also relates to the way we conceptualize people 
living outside their country of citizenship. Even though I pass through immigration at 
every airport, I have never perceived myself as an immigrant. Instead, I have been 
regarded by others and have viewed myself as an expat. However, although an expat 
is generally defined as a person who is residing in another country (either temporarily 
or permanently), it is actually a privileged status that is linked to socio-economic 
status, ethnicity, and country of origin (Dewolf, 2014; Koutonin, 2015).  
Although I became aware of this privilege while I was living and travelling 
outside the Swiss context, the privilege of “Swissness” is also present in Switzerland, 
especially since more than a fifth of the population is considered as “foreign.” 
However, it is often quite difficult to recognize one’s privilege when living at point 
zero, and so far  “nationalism” is rarely discussed in the same way as racism or 
sexism. Therefore, I believe that it is important to critically reflect on the power of a 
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“Swiss” identity within Switzerland. How do hegemonic discourses about being 
Swiss influence the relationship between the Swiss and the “other” within 
Switzerland? More specifically, how are these myths mobilized in political debates 
about migrants and the “other?” 
 
 
Background 
 
Immigration and Switzerland 
 
Millions displaced by the war in Syria, thousands of Rohingya pushed around 
in South East Asia, boats filled with refugees sinking in the Mediterranean – the News 
headlines all over the world indicate that migration and refugees are among the 
central topics of our time. Moreover, globalization means that the world is becoming 
more connected than ever, and the flow of ideas, things, and people is reaching new 
levels. In 2013, there were more than 230 million migrants and 15 million refugees 
globally, with more than two million migrants, representing around a fourth of the 
total population, in Switzerland (UNDP, 2013). Therefore, it is no surprise that the 
issue of immigration is a hot political topic and that over the last few years there have 
been a number of popular referenda and initiatives relating to foreigners in 
Switzerland.  
Switzerland is often considered as a model nation: the Better Life Index 
ranked Switzerland first in terms of Life Satisfaction, rate of employment and life 
expectancy (OECD, 2013); the Social Progress Index, which measures basic human 
needs, foundations of wellbeing and opportunity, ranked Switzerland third out of 50 
countries analyzed (The Social Progress Imperative, 2014); and the country is ranked 
seventh (out of more than 150) in average life satisfaction by the World Happiness 
Report  (Helliwell, 2013). Moreover, Switzerland is currently ranked fifth globally by 
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the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014). However, the recent 
discussions and political debates have revealed some deep underlying tensions. 
Although direct violence against immigrants has been limited, structural and cultural 
violence do mark the lived experience of foreigners, usually in the form of 
discrimination. Of course the relations between the local community and the 
immigrants is highly complex and every individual has a unique experience 
influenced by a number of different factors. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the 
general status of immigrants and foreigners in Switzerland.  
Switzerland has one of the relatively highest immigrant populations in Europe, 
with over 1.8 million foreigners (representing 23 percent of the population) living in 
the country in 2013. According to the statistics released by the Bundesamt Für 
Migration4, the vast majority of foreigners entered Switzerland to work, about a 
fourth moved for family reunification, a tenth came for educational purposes, and 2.7 
percent were recognized refugees. About 68 percent of foreigners originate from EU-
28/EFTA states (with the largest numbers coming from Italy, Germany, and 
Portugal), benefiting from the free-movement of persons agreement between 
Switzerland and the EU.5 Furthermore, Switzerland is also a sought after destination 
for asylum seekers and in 2013 alone there were a total of 21,465 new asylum 
requests (BFM, 2013).   
Despite this high level of immigrants, Switzerland doe not recognize itself as 
an immigration country, and at the federal level has no real immigrant policy 
(European Forum for Migration Studies, 2001: 12). In 1970, the government did 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4!Federal Bureau for Migration 
5 In 2014 the Swiss people voted to limit this free-movement agreement. 
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create the Eidgenössische Ausländerkommission6; however, its function is purely 
consultative and has very limited resources (Mahnig and Wimmer, 1999). Since the 
1990s many cities and cantons have developed their own Intergrationsleitbilder7, but 
also continue to lobby the federal government for a stronger commitment to 
immigration policy (European Forum for Migration Studies, 2001: 38).  In 2000, the 
federal government finally issued the Decree on the Integration of Foreigners, which 
shifted the focus from assimilation to creating an adequate climate of equal 
opportunities (Riaño and Wastl-Walter, 2006: 13).  
Legal Status & Naturalization 
 Currently there are different ways to legally enter Switzerland. At least until 
the government implements changes in response to the 2014 initiative to limit mass-
immigration, citizens of the European Union are free to enter Switzerland under the 
Free Movement of People agreement. Any stay over 90 days requires a residency 
permit, which can easily be obtained but is conditioned on either being employed or 
having the means to sustain oneself, enrolling in mandatory health and accident 
insurance, and not posing a security threat. After continuously residing in Switzerland 
for five years they are eligible to apply for a “Permit C” which grants them the right 
to permanent residency (FDFA, 2015).   
Unlike nationals from EC/EFTA countries, citizens from so-called Third 
States have it a little more complicated. In order to obtain a work and residency 
permit, they must gain governmental approval. Authorization is only granted if quotas 
have not been filled and is generally only granted to managers, specialists, and other 
qualified workers as long as no one of equivalent qualifications can be found within 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Federal Commission for Foreigners!
7 Integration schemes 
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Switzerland or the EU/EFTA member states. Furthermore, they must continuously 
live in Switzerland for ten years before becoming eligible for a “Permit C” (Wise, 
2012).  
Finally, asylum seekers fall into a separate category. Once they apply for 
asylum, they are granted a “Permit N” which allows them provisional residency status 
and in some cases permission to work. Once a request is approved, they receive a 
short-term residence permit (“Permit B”), which must be renewed annually. After ten 
years they are then eligible for the “permit C” and permanent residency status (Wise, 
2012).  In general, very few asylum requests are approved. For example, in 1995, only 
26 out of 4,557 (0.6%) cases were decided in favor of the applicant (Holzer and 
others, 2000: 253). The success of an application is largely dependent on the country 
of origin as well as the canton in which the request is processed (Holzer and others, 
2000).  
Whereas foreigners in Switzerland are generally given equal civil and social 
rights, they are mostly excluded from political rights. With the exception of the 
cantons of Jura and Neuchatel, which grant foreigners local voting rights, foreigners 
are completely excluded from the political decision making process (European Forum 
for Migration Studies, 2001: 96). Therefore, in order to obtain full rights as a citizen, 
foreigners must apply for naturalization as Swiss citizens.  
 The naturalization process is reflective of Switzerland’s unique federal 
composition. In Switzerland, there are three levels of citizenship – the municipal, 
cantonal, and federal levels. While the federal government issues the passport and sets 
the general parameters, citizenship is actually granted at the municipal level. At the 
federal level, the basic requirements are a minimum of twelve years of residency in 
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Switzerland8, social and cultural integration (which generally includes speaking at 
least one national language), respect for the law, and not posing a threat to both the 
internal and external security of Switzerland. Furthermore, Cantons can decide their 
own residency requirement, ranging from two to twelve years (Wise, 2012).  
 However, how these requirements are assessed is dependent on the 
municipality. Eligible immigrants need to apply for citizenship at the municipality in 
which they reside. Then, following a processing period which can last anywhere from 
three to five years their applications are put to a vote. Each municipality is allowed to 
set its own procedure; some prefer direct democracy in which the citizens of the 
municipality vote directly on individual cases, while others defer the decision to an 
elected municipal council. Some municipalities have had to change their process 
following a ruling by the Swiss Federal Court in 2003, which has made it 
unconstitutional to vote by secret ballot, as it denies the applicant a justification for 
rejection. Voting in town hall meetings remains a legally gray area  (Hainmueller and 
Hangartner, 2014).  
Economic and Social Integration 
Foreigners in Switzerland are generally expected to assimilate to the local 
culture and integration in society is a key measure in determining eligibility for 
naturalization. In their analysis Mahnig and Wimmer find that at least in the 1970s 
“Swiss welfare organisations and churches remained aloof from any formal 
involvement with the predominantly Italian migrants” (1999: 21). However, the 
possibility to organize freely enabled migrants the opportunity to auto-organize, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The residency requirement can be modified for different applicants. Years spent in 
Switzerland for youths between 10-20 are counted as double, and marriage to a Swiss 
citizen also reduces this requirement. 
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which allowed them to create intermediary institutions between the country of origin 
and the country of settlement and eased the transition (1999: 21-22).  
One of these organizations is Second@s Plus, which is a national group 
fighting for citizenship and equal opportunities for foreigners (Swiss Info, 2009). 
However, there are also a number of extreme right-wing organizations, such as the 
Party of Nationally Oriented Swiss, that are hostile towards all foreigners. In 2010 the 
police estimated that there were approximately 1,200 extremists in Switzerland, and 
in 2009 there were a total of 112 reported incidents against foreigners and minorities. 
The majority of these attacks were verbal and written, and most of the violent 
incidents occurred between right- and left-wing extremist groups  (U.S. Department 
of State, 2010).  
In terms of economic integration, the main factor is inclusion in the job 
market. Statistics measuring the actual annual work volume (measured in million 
hours) provide some interesting numbers. Foreigners contribute 32% of the total 
working hours, although they only represent 23% of the population. This indicates 
that on average they work more hours than their Swiss counterparts9 (BFM, 2013). An 
OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper on “The labour market 
integration of immigrants and their children in Switzerland” also finds that overall 
integration works well in Switzerland, with immigrant men, women and their children 
having a higher employment rate than in other OECD countries. This is in part due to 
the strong labor-market in general as well as Switzerland’s admission policy, which 
has resulted in a significant degree of over qualification for migrants from non-OECD 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Although to verify this it would be important to take into consideration the 
percentage of foreigners of working age.  
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countries. The strong role of apprenticeships has also contributed to the inclusion of 
the children of immigrants (Liebig and others, 2012).  
However, there are also a number of issues. Particularly immigrant women 
with young children and recent humanitarian migrants (refugees) have a hard time 
participating in the labor market. Furthermore, Switzerland lags behind other OECD 
countries in terms of anti-discrimination policies, and a number of studies have shown 
that certain immigrants (particularly those from former Yugoslavia) are being 
discriminated against in the recruitment process (Liebig and others, 2012).  
Health Status 
In an article entitled “Health monitoring of the immigrant population in 
Switzerland,”10 Weilandt and others (2006) find that migrants from Western Europe 
generally reported similar health to native Swiss, but that all other migrants reported 
worse health. They were more likely to feel “bad”, reported less emotional balance, 
and visited doctors more frequently.  In their study on “Health Status Inequality 
among Immigrants in Switzerland,” Volken and Rüesch (2014) found that particularly 
nationals from Kosovo and Turkey are substantially more likely to report ill health. 
Furthermore, health is also a gendered phenomenon as there was no main effect of 
nationality for men, but there were some differences with women. In particular, 
Portuguese women were more likely to report ill health than Swiss women, whereas 
German women were less likely to do so. 
Grossman and others (2010) looked specifically at cardiovascular risk factors 
in immigrants and Swiss nationals, and found that there were significant differences 
between the two.  Besides differences based on individual countries, they found that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 My translation. Original title: “Gesundheitsmonitoring der Migrationsbevölkerung 
in der Schweiz” 
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women from Italy, former Yugoslavia, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey were all more 
likely to show physical inactivity. These findings are consistent with a study by 
Caperchione and others (2012) who also found that physical inactivity was common 
in culturally and linguistically diverse migrants to Western society. These migrants 
were at increased risk of hypertension, diabetes mellitus, obesity and cardiovascular 
disease, yet they were less likely to be proactive in accessing health care or 
undertaking preventative measures.  The researchers identify a number of challenges 
and barriers that limit participation in physical activity, including cultural and 
religious beliefs, issues with social relationships, socioeconomic challenges, 
environmental barriers, and perceptions of health and injury.  Interestingly foreign 
women are less likely to utilize inpatient treatment in a mental hospital than both their 
Swiss and male counterparts. However, this gender inequality in the use of psychiatric 
services does not necessarily indicate that immigrant women are suffering from fewer 
mental disorders.  Instead, it simply means that further research is needed to 
understand the reason why immigrant women are not using psychiatric services (Lay 
and others, 2007). 
Gender 
Migration is a gendered phenomenon: “It positions and affects men and 
women differently, and it produces new modes of gender power and disadvantage” 
(Hawkesworth, 2006: 2). In the previous sections, I noted how there are significant 
gender differences in both access to the labor market and in health status. 
Furthermore, a study on the social integration of immigrant women notes that 
migration has become increasingly feminized in Switzerland, especially for 
immigrants arriving from outside the EU. For example, in 2003, 64% of Latin 
!12!
American immigrants were women, compared to 48% in 1980 (Riaño and others 
2006). Riaño and her colleagues found that skilled women are still largely excluded 
from the labor market due to three main factors: government policies and regulations 
on immigration, the conditions of the labor market, and public discourses and social 
attitudes toward immigrants from non-EU countries. Specifically, employers tend to 
undervalue the personal and educational qualifications of non-EU immigrants and 
also harbor patriarchal attitudes regarding the role of child-rearing among immigrant 
women.  Immigrant women are still being cast in a negative light, viewed as 
uneducated, victims of exploitation, or having migrated simply to improve the 
material quality of her and her family’s life.  
Beyond general gender discrimination, foreign women also face other 
gendered-specific issues. One of these is that women form the vast majority of sex-
workers. Prostitution is legal in Switzerland and sex workers are supposed to register 
and pay tax, in return for which there are a number of measures to protect them. This 
situation, combined with the relatively strong economic situation, makes Switzerland 
quite an attractive destination for foreign sex workers; however, the reality is still 
very harsh and exploitation is quite common (BFM, 2014). Most vulnerable are the 
illegal immigrants who are generally excluded from the higher levels of the sex 
industry and are afraid to seek medical attention out of fear that their status will be 
discovered (Pierson, 2012). Also of particular interest is the Cabaret-dancer statute, 
which in the past years has granted about 1,000 women from outside Europe 
permission to work in Cabarets for eight months at a time (BFM, 2014). Finally, the 
Federal Police estimate that there are 2,000-3,000 victims of human trafficking (with 
the vast majority being women) in Switzerland, many being forced into prostitution 
while others work as domestic laborers (US Department of State, 2013).  
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A number of immigrant women also face the challenge of balancing 
competing gender norms, especially when they come from cultural backgrounds that 
dictate stricter gender rules than general Swiss society does. Of particular concern are 
the issue of forced marriages and honor killings. A 124-page study on “Effective Help 
for those Affected by Forced Marriages”11 uncovered an estimated 1,391 - 1,919 
cases of forced marriage, with over 90% of these affecting women. The vast majority 
of the victims were foreigners with approximately 20% having Swiss citizenship 
(either by birth or naturalization) (Neubauer and Dahinden, 2012). There have also 
been a number of reported honor killings, with two particular cases making national 
news (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2006; Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2012). Switzerland’s law 
enforcement and judicial system are slowly trying to adapt to the issue of honor 
killings, and in 2013 the federal court set a legal precedent by deciding that the killing 
of a woman in the name of family honor should be qualified as murder (instead of 
intentional homicide) (Felber, 2013). 
Mass Media 
 In their study on “How Migrants Perceive Their Representation in Swiss 
Public Television” Trebbe and Schoenhagen find that all the participants in their six 
study groups felt that migrants were being marginalized in the media. In particular the 
participants stated that the “well-integrated migrants who have adopted the Swiss way 
of life and have been living in Switzerland inconspicuously for years” were under-
represented on television (2011: 419). As one participant put it “we’re just no 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11My translation. The original in German is «Wirksame Hilfe für die Betroffenen bei 
Zwangsheirat»  
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sensation because we’re ordinary, because we integrate ourselves or are integrated. 
That’s why we’re just not of interest for the media” (2011: 419).  
Instead, the only migrants who are deemed newsworthy are those garnering 
negative headlines, and these are usually presented in the context of specific thematic 
frameworks. For example, immigrants from Turkish and North African origin felt that 
they were consistently depicted in association with Islam and often linked to 
fundamentalism or oppressive practices. Other Africans felt that they were usually 
discussed in connection to drugs or asylum seekers, and immigrants from the Balkans 
usually were linked to speeding and drugs as well as other criminal offenses (2011: 
420).  
Immigrants also noted a hierarchy in media representation, with migrants from 
outside the European Union generally being depicted in the most negative light. In 
this group people from the former Yugoslavia (in particular Serbs and Kosovo 
Albanians) were presented most negatively, followed by Turks and Africans. 
Immigrants from EU countries, in particular Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian people 
were presented in a slightly less negative frame. As such participants in the study 
“perceived a distinction between good (useful) and bad (less useful) foreigners and 
were aware of a hierarchy of ethnic groups” (2011: 422).  
Finally a complaint across all migrant groups was the feeling of being 
objectified by the media: “the media would talk about them instead of allowing them 
to speak for themselves” (2011: 421). Being excluded from the media as a major form 
of communication means that immigrants are being excluded from “the collective 
construction of social reality” (2011: 412). Therefore, the most common request was 
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to demand the opportunity to actively participate in the media, by helping create TV 
programs both in front of and behind the camera (2011: 423).12  
Identity and Immigration 
While many factors affect the immigrant experience, one important factor is 
how people understand identity – both their own and that of the other. The situation 
currently unfolding in the Dominican Republic with the revoking of citizenship and 
potential deportation of thousands of Haitians illustrates how questions of identity can 
lead to violence (Stephen, 2015). In the case of Switzerland questions of identity are 
highly complex as people identify according to their language region, canton, political 
party, and along a myriad of other personal factors. The situation with “foreigners” 
may be even more diverse, as immigrants come from different world regions, 
countries, religions, language backgrounds, education, professional experience, and 
more. Furthermore, they differ in their legal status and in the length of time spent in 
Switzerland, ranging from those who have newly arrived to those who were born and 
raised in Switzerland.  
Identity, particularly social identity, can be understood intersubjectively, 
meaning that representations (identities) are unstable and co-constructed; in other 
words “it is only through relations that meanings occur” (Dervin, 2011: 9). Gallagher 
(2014) draws on Husserl to explain how “certain forms of self-consciousness are 
intersubjectively mediated, and may depend on one's social relations to others.” This 
means that a “national” identity can only be understood in the context of the social 
relations with others, both those considered as part of the “in-group” as well as those !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 It is important to note that despite these critiques, the Swiss media still had a good 
reputation among the participants. Since they in general felt well accepted, they did 
not want to criticize Switzerland and furthermore acknowledged that there were 
indeed “good” as well as “bad” migrants (Trebbe and Schoenhagen, 2011: 423). 
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perceived to be the “outsider.” My “Swissness” depends not only on my personal 
perception of myself as Swiss, but also on whether others perceive me to be “Swiss.” 
Moreover, the social construction of who “belongs” is manifested in (and reinforced 
by) hegemonic discourses. Therefore, I am interested in identifying some of these 
discourses and analyzing how they affect the relationship between the Swiss and the 
“other.” Once I have identified these discourses the next step is to find ways to 
transform the discourses contributing to a culture of violence in a way that they can 
promote a culture of “peaces”13. 
Although I have chosen to explore Switzerland as a case study, the general 
findings can be applied in many other situations. Everyone has an identity and must 
come to terms with how they define themselves and how they are defined within their 
local context and the world. Especially with the increase in international migration, it 
is important to understand how groups imagine themselves and use that to define the 
“other.” Furthermore, our current world system is predicated on the notion of the 
nation-state; therefore, the question of national identity is of particular relevance. As 
Alfonso Alfonsi argues “The hostility of the governments and populations of many 
European countries towards immigrants from developing countries has made it 
imperative to again discuss the link, too often taken for granted, between citizenship 
and national identity” (Alfonsi, 1997: 64-65). Many of the conflicts in the world 
today, although not reducible to a solely nationalist agenda, do invoke nationalist 
imaginations and discourses. Therefore, if we are able to reimagine the nation in 
terms of a culture of peaces, perhaps we can transform the violence perpetuated by the 
current system.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Here I use the concept of “peaces” emerging from the Austrian School of Peace 
Studies to indicate that peace is not a stable, well-defined ultimate principle, but 
rather an ongoing process of transforming the omnipresent conflicts of daily life.  
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Research Question  
 
The central research question guiding my thesis is: 
How are the hegemonic discourses of a “Swiss” identity mobilized in political debates 
about immigrants in Switzerland, and how can these discourses be transformed to 
contribute to a culture of peaces? 
 
Objectives and Structure 
 
In order to answer this question I focus on a few related objectives. First, in 
Chapter One, I set the theoretical framework, considering both my peace studies lens 
as well as providing a theoretical overview of the nation, nationality, and nationalism.  
In Chapter Two, I deconstruct Swiss nationalism, exploring the different ways Swiss 
nationality has been constructed and identifying the dominant discourses that frame a  
“Swiss” identity. Then, in Chapter Three, I analyze the link between a “Swiss” 
identity and attitudes towards immigrants. In particular, I focus on a discourse 
analysis of recent initiatives related to immigration. Finally, in Chapter Four, I 
propose ways to transform this situation, either by re-imagining the national identity 
to contribute to a more peaceful culture or by taking a more radical stance and 
questioning some of the fundamental underlying assumptions of national identity. 
 
Limitations 
 Given both time and space limitations, this research is primarily theory 
seeking, and the focus is not on providing new empirical data. Furthermore, my 
research is limited to German and English sources, and so it is possible that I may 
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miss some of the nuances expressed in French, Italian, or some other language spoken 
by immigrants. Moreover, it only focuses on one piece of a more complicated puzzle. 
Earlier, I mentioned that identity is best understood intersubjectively, meaning that 
identity is co-constituted by different subjects. While I try to include a multitude of 
voices, the focus of my thesis is mainly on the construction of a “Swiss” national 
identity within the Swiss context and how this discourse is used to define the other. 
Of course the “other,” the foreigners and immigrants living in Switzerland, are not 
passive subjects, but are also actively constructing their own identity and co-
constituting the Swiss imagined community. Therefore, it would also be interesting to 
research the agency of the “other” and to study how they are negotiating and 
transforming the dominant discourse on their terms. However, an analysis of the 
subaltern response is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 As I am writing a thesis in the context of Peace and Conflict studies, my 
methodology is strongly influenced by this field of study. However, Peace and 
Conflict studies does not have a commonly accepted methodology per se, but rather is 
characterized by its interdisciplinarity. Therefore, I draw on sources as well as 
methodology from various fields, including International Relations, Philosophy, 
Psychology, Sociology, among others.  
Critical in writing this thesis is a clear understanding of how I understand 
knowledge.  In general I favor a constructivist, rather than an empiricist, idealist or 
rationalist approach to knowledge. Although I do not deny the existence of a “real” or 
“true” world, the fact is that knowledge about this world is produced by humans who 
are never completely neutral. Therefore, individuals interpret and explain the world in 
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a way that makes sense to them according to their experiences. Rather than 
understanding the world objectively, I understand it intersubjectively and relationally. 
This means that the world consists neither of universally true knowledge, nor is 
knowledge relative to each individual, but instead truths are established in relation to 
one another. This intersubjective understanding can take place between two 
individual, but often is based on “thought communities” which are connected by a 
common interpretation of the truth, such as religions, political parties, and nations.  
As Alexander Wendt explains, constructivism is based on the two tenets that 
“the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather 
than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are 
constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature" (1999: 1). Such an 
understanding is crucial to this thesis, because it allows for the possibility of 
reimagining reality. This means that if we change our intersubjective understanding, 
we can change the very structure of human association. An intersubjective perspective 
also highlights the importance of both “knowledge that” and “knowledge how.” That 
is to say, I find it insufficient to simply know that a “Swiss” national identity is 
constructed, but it is also important to attempt to understand how this affects real 
world policies. Gaining access to this understanding of “how” can be quite difficult 
and is never complete, but I will at least make an attempt to integrate some “how” 
knowledge into my analysis.  
Related to intersubjectivity is the concept of the “situated knower” an idea 
stemming from Feminist epistemology. According to Elizabeth Anderson (2011), 
‘situated knowledge’ considers “how people may understand the same object in 
different ways that reflect the distinct relations in which they stand to it.” This 
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relationship is dependent on our emotions, attitudes, and interests, as well as our 
embodiment, first or third person perspective, personal knowledge, know-how, 
cognitive style, background beliefs, and relation to the other inquirers.  
Both Feminist and Peace studies also highlight the importance of considering 
the nature of power in determining what knowledge is accepted.  Here a 
poststructuralist perspective may be useful. Basing his insights on the writings of 
Foucault, Robbins (2012: 70) argues that: 
 
Poststructuralism takes as its concern the instability of many of the categories 
we usually take for granted, including self, truth, and knowledge. Of 
Foucault’s many influential theses, one of the most central was that truth is an 
effect of power, one that is formed through language and enforces social order 
by seeming intuitive or taken for granted.  
 
If the truth is to be understood intersubjectively, then it makes sense that subjects 
(whether they be individuals or thought communities) with more power are able to 
promote their own truth as the only truth. Therefore, when examining knowledge, it is 
important not to just see who produced this particular knowledge but also to 
understand the power structure in which the knowledge is embedded.  
In line with this understanding of knowledge, I am fully aware that what I am 
presenting here is based on my own “situated knowledge.” As part of my 
methodology, I try to be as self-reflective as possible, and disclose my personal 
relationship to the subject matter. That is one of the main reasons why the very first 
section of the thesis is “My Story.”  However, I am sure there are subjective aspects 
that I will miss. Therefore, rather than claiming that I have discovered the ultimate 
answer, I am simply presenting my own perspective in the hopes of critically 
engaging with other subjects and thereby modifying the intersubjective understanding 
of the world I am a part of.  
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A constructivist, intersubjective approach to epistemology also influences my 
understanding of what entities exist and how they relate to each other or how they can 
be grouped. As such, I reject a realist ontology, as I believe that certain concepts 
(such as the Nation), do not exist independently of the imagination of people. Instead, 
I take a relativist approach to the subject within the context of this thesis. However, 
such an ontology makes defining clear cut categories a challenge. 
Since I believe that neither the “Swiss” nor the “foreign other” are objective, 
real categories, I dedicate the first part of the thesis to teasing out how these terms can 
be understood from a relativist perspective. As simplified categories, I consider as 
Swiss those who belong both to the nation (perceiving themselves as part of an 
imagined community) and the state (having proof of juridically sanctioned 
citizenship) and the “other” as those who belong neither to the nation nor the state. 
Furthermore, I explore where and how those who are in-between (citizens who do not 
identify with the nation or those who imagine themselves as part of the nation while 
not having citizenship) fit. However, given the limitations of this thesis, I only 
consider residents of Switzerland and those seeking residency, for example, asylum 
seekers, and exclude temporary visitors such as tourists.  
While I am discussing concepts such as “the self” and “the other,” I reject 
Descartes’ Cartesian certainty in their existence. Rather, I lean towards the claim 
made by Mead that "we do not assume there is a self to begin with. Self is not 
presupposed as a stuff out of which the world arises. Rather, the self arises in the 
world" (Mead in Hyde, 1994: 187). Furthermore, I also find some merit in Hyde’s 
argument that “to arise in the world is to arise in language,” and that the world as well 
as our selves are “created in linguistic interaction” (Hyde, 1994: 187). I do not follow 
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this claim to the same conclusion as Hyde, but I find it useful in understanding that 
the self is created in juxtaposition to the other (and vice versa), and that language and 
the stories we tell play a crucial role. Therefore, in examining the identity of the 
“other” in Switzerland, I start by looking at how the “self” is imagined. Furthermore, 
such an understanding justifies my focus on a discourse analysis in Chapter Three of 
this thesis.  
 Finally, Switzerland is an interesting case because as a direct democracy the 
line between the government and the people is very blurry. Although there is an 
elected government and officials that can be distinguished from the people in general, 
most major policy decisions are made by the voting populace. Therefore, I do not 
focus specifically on the government, but instead focus primarily on political acts of 
the state that are determined by the people - namely referenda and initiatives.  
Given these philosophical considerations, I find myself drawn to a feminist 
research ethic. In their Doing Feminist Research in Political and Social Science 
Ackerly and True (2010) outline the four key elements of such an approach: 
attentiveness to power, attentiveness to boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, 
attentiveness to relationships, and commitment to self-reflection. Since I explore the 
influence of different discourses in determining the relationship between the “Swiss” 
and the “other,” these are perfect guiding principles. Furthermore, a critical feminist 
perspective uses “critical inquiry and reflection on social injustice by way of gender 
analysis, to transform, and not simply explain, the social order” (Ackerly and True, 
2010: 2). Although I do not focus directly on gender, the call for transformation 
(rather than simply explanation) fits well into my peace studies approach, which seeks 
to transform (rather than resolve or manage) conflict. Committing to a Feminist 
research ethic also provides guidance to my research tools and methodology.   
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First of all my research is dancing on the fine line between relativism and 
essentialism. In the hope of not falling off this tightrope, I am integrating what 
Ackerly and True call “deliberative moments,” which are moments of critical 
reflection based on the four guiding principles. Throughout the research process I 
return to consider the questions they have outlined (Ackerly and True, 2010: 51-52): 
1) Consider the ways in which power makes apparent or conceals my 
considerations, enables or inhibits my ability to attend to these, and the 
power my epistemology exerts over my project. 
2) Consider whether the boundaries, including the disciplinary boundaries 
related to the question, theory, research design, analysis, etc., are 
appropriate or if they inhibit or mask aspects of my research.  
3) Consider the relationship between myself, the subject-participant, non-
participants, and other researchers, as well as the intrasubjectivity of 
each 
4) Consider my situatedness: how to others see me, how does my 
epistemological perspective influence my research.  
 
Constantly questioning and returning to the foundations makes the feminist research 
methodology dynamic rather than linear, and I find this to be the case in my research 
as I find myself advancing in spirals rather than in a direct line.  Moreover, although I 
am working within several broad theoretical paradigms, I do not have a specific 
theory I plan to test.  
 The focus of the first part of my research will be on a discourse/frame analysis 
of texts related to the understanding of identity in Switzerland. In line with a feminist 
approach, the discourse analysis is paired with a look at the practice (for example,i.e. 
the real life effect that the discourse has). Therefore, Chapter Three focuses on the 
political implications of the hegemonic discourses identified in the first chapters. In 
particular, I analyze how these discourses were used to frame the debate over two 
recent popular initiatives related to the status of foreigners in Switzerland. Finally, 
since a feminist research ethic is not satisfied with simply explaining, but also calls 
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for transformation, the final chapter is dedicated to possible ways of transforming and 
re-imagining the discourse and the frame.  
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Chapter One: Theoretical Framework 
1. 1 Peace Foundations 
 
Before I jump into the main body of my thesis, it is important for me to take a 
moment to situate my research within a Peace Studies context. Although, as I have 
noted earlier, Peace Studies is marked by its inter- and trans-disciplinarity and does 
not present a unified methodology. These are key concepts that strongly frame my 
way of thinking.  
First of all, it is important to define what I understand by peace. However, to 
do so it is easiest to start with my conception of violence, which I understand 
according to Johan Galtung’s postulation of three forms or levels of violence. The 
most obvious kind is direct violence, which is what is commonly understood as 
violence such as murder, rape, and abuse. Less visible but equally pernicious is 
structural violence which refers to the injustices built into our social systems. A 
person starving or dying of a curable disease has not been killed by a specific agent, 
but rather falls victim to a structure of exploitation and discrimination (Galtung, 
1990). Finally there is cultural violence or the attitudes and beliefs that underlie and 
justify structural violence. Feelings of superiority and unrecognized privilege (based 
on gender, race, class, religion, etc.) are embedded in and perpetuated by culture and 
form the foundation for both structural and direct violence.  
My conception of peace then mirrors this three-tiered understanding of 
violence. The most basic level of peace is often called “negative” peace, meaning the 
absence of direct violence. When a country is not at war, it is in “negative” peace. 
However, such a country may still be ravaged by poverty or discriminatory practices 
and its inhabitants may lack formal education, healthcare, and other tools for living up 
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to their full potential. Therefore, we must also work towards a “positive” peace, 
which according to Galtung (1967: 14) includes ten key ideas: cooperation, freedom 
from fear and want, economic growth, absence of exploitation, equality, justice, 
freedom of action, pluralism, and dynamism. The final step is to replace the Culture 
of Violence with a Culture of Peace, which is defined by the UN Declaration on a 
Culture of Peace (1999) as “a set of values, attitudes, traditions, modes of behavior 
and ways of life” based on a respect for all life and human rights, rejection of violence 
and a practice of non-violence, a commitment to full participation, promotion of equal 
rights, and devotion to a number of ideals including freedom, justice, tolerance, 
solidarity, and pluralism. 
Although the idea of a “Culture of Peace” is a good starting point, the concept 
can be combined with the ideas of Francisco Muñoz and Wolfgang Dietrich to form a 
“Culture of Many Imperfect Peaces.” Francisco Muñoz coined the term “imperfect 
peace” as a means of expressing that peace is an unfinished, never-ending process. As 
such I do not believe in an ultimate, static world peace, but instead agree with Muñoz 
that “the future should be desirable, lasting, just, peaceful, but also imperfect.” Often 
times peace workers are thought to be idealists with their heads stuck in a utopian 
cloud. Therefore, I believe that the idea of imperfect peace: 
could be used to provide an intermediary path between maximalist utopianism 
and conservative conformism: it is a matter of changing our reality based on 
our knowledge of human limitations and present scenarios (knowledge 
provided by the different sciences, forecasting and future studies), yet without 
having to renounce making plans for the future or having a goal. (Muñoz, 
2001)  
 
Moreover, I pair this understanding of an imperfect peace with Wolfgang 
Dietrich and Wolfgang Sützl’s call for “many peaces.” Similar to Muñoz, they also 
argue that the idea of “the one (perpetual) peace in the one world... is, at least, sheer 
intellectual violence vis-à-vis those who cannot share this idea” (1997: 15). Instead, 
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the world needs different peaces “for concrete societies and communities to be able to 
organise themselves” (1997: 15). Wolfgang Dietrich further explains that the key to 
many peaces is plurality, but that plurality cannot be understood as synonymous with 
‘anything goes.’ Instead, while the plurality is too vast for human perception, it is 
nevertheless limited to the totality of human relations. Moreover, it is not a value that 
can or should be achieved (such as ‘reason’ or ‘truth’), but can rather be understood in 
the context of the post-modern idea that “many forms of morality always exist 
simultaneously and at the same place” (2011: 8). These considerations lead Dietrich 
to understand peaces as “trans-rational” meaning that they “transgress the limits of 
modernity and post-modernity by recombining the rational and modern with energetic 
elements and recognizing the importance of energy flow for the perception of peace” 
(2011: 13).  
 A trans-rational understanding of many imperfect peaces also denotes that 
peace cannot be “made.” Rather it fits with John Paul Lederach’s philosophy of 
“elicitive conflict transformation.” Unlike earlier approaches, which sought to resolve 
or manage conflict, “conflict transformation” does not view conflict as inherently 
negative. Instead, conflicts can present an opportunity for transformation that can lead 
to growth, development, and positive interactions. In his Little Book of Conflict 
Transformation, Lederach (2003: 14) provides a brief definition of what he means by 
conflict transformation:   
Conflict transformation is to envision and respond 
to the ebb and flow of social conflict 
as life-giving opportunities 
for creating constructive change processes 
that reduce violence, 
increase justice 
in direct interaction and social structures, 
and respond to real-life problems 
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in human relationships. 
 
Finally, as a student of the Master in Peace, Conflict, and Development at the 
Universidat Jaume I, I have also been influenced by the philosophy of the founder of 
the program, Dr. Martínez Guzmán. In talks he had with us in class he explained his 
alternative conception of who the “realists” are. Rather than accepting the dominant 
understanding of a “realist” perspective in the terms of international relations theory, 
he argues that the true “realists” are the ones who understand that people have the 
capacity to do bad as well as the capacity to do good. And because “doing good” is a 
capacity, it is something that can be fostered and promoted. While I am cautious with 
the idea of “doing” good or “making” peace (especially given my previous 
explanation of the many imperfect peaces), I nevertheless find his shift useful and 
consider myself a “realist.” I want to see and understand the world as it is – not to turn 
a blind eye to the ugly, not to turn away from bad. At the same time, I do not believe 
in a prescriptive “idealism.” Therefore, I want to engage in a process that continually 
seeks out peaces (rooted in their local and specific reality), and wherever possible to 
find ways to transform the negative into something more positive.  
 
So how does all of this fit into my thesis?  
 
The level of direct violence in Switzerland is quite low; however, that does not 
mean that Switzerland is free from structural and cultural violence. Unequal treatment 
of immigrants and discrimination based on nationality are a form of structural 
violence that is rooted in cultural violence. This cultural violence is ingrained in 
common myths and stories that are perpetuated by the media and fuel exclusionary 
hegemonic discourses. Therefore, in this thesis I focus on uncovering these elements 
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of cultural violence that form part of a Swiss national identity, and explore how these 
may be transformed to reflect a culture of peaces.  
 Especially important for this transformation is the idea that conflict is in fact 
an opportunity. As such the current tension between the “Swiss” and the “foreign 
other” does not have to lead to violence but instead has the potential to fuel a 
transformation toward something positive. However, I do not claim to know what this 
positive end is, and in fact question the idea that there even is a specific “end goal.” 
Rather, I hope to open up spaces where a variety of peaces can take root and flourish. 
Finally, while I believe that this thesis could be useful for analyzing identity and 
immigration in other contexts, I am also fully aware that peace cannot be exported: 
that “without being related to concrete places it will never have any social power and 
remain an abstraction in the brains of peace researchers” (Dietrich and Sützl, 1997: 
15). Therefore, I will focus my research on a very specific context, time and place.  
 
 
1.2 National Identity 
  
In this thesis, I set out to uncover how a “Swiss” identity is used as a 
juxtaposition to create the “other” and how these concepts influence the political 
discourse surrounding foreigners in Switzerland. However, in order to analyze the 
discourse and to understand the relationship between these identities, it is important to 
first establish what is understood by the idea of being “Swiss.” To do that, I must first 
establish what I mean by a collective or “national” identity. Although the idea of 
“nationality” pervades our common understanding of the world, a critical reflection 
shows that it is a very complex and highly contested concept. Therefore, before I 
proceed, I first consider some of the existing theories and debates about the nation, 
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nationality, nationalism, as well as the state and citizenship, and use these to create a 
framework of analysis for “Swiss” nationalism.14  
If I were to ask anyone on the street if there is a difference between a 
“Spaniard,” a “Brit,” an “American” and a “Swiss” person, then most would answer 
in the affirmative and base their answer on quite distinct images they have in their 
head. However, even though we have a sense of being different, it is quite difficult to 
define what being “American” or being “Swiss” actually means. We usually use these 
terms to describe our “nationality” and use them to identify ourselves as belonging to 
a specific group. But the term nationality is highly contested and often quite 
confusing, especially since it has been used interchangeably with citizenship to mean 
belonging to a “nation” as well as belonging to a “state”.  
A state can be conceived of as a recognized political entity, which among 
many other powers has the power to recognize residents as citizens, usually on the 
basis of some form of social-contract. According to the New Oxford American 
Dictionary a state can be defined as “a nation or territory considered as an organized 
political community under one government.” Such a definition highlights the 
confusion between nation and state, as the concept of the nation is definitionally 
linked to the state.15 Rejai and Enloe (1969) try to clarify the distinction by noting that 
the state is primarily a political-legal concept, whereas the nation is primarily a 
psycho-social concept. Such a distinction is also reflected in Adrian Hastings (1997) 
differentiation between the state as a political unit and the nation as a self-conscious 
cultural community.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 I am aware of the rich debate over the current relevance of the “nation” and the 
challenges from globalization, corporations and network dynamics. However, a full 
analysis of this debate is outside the scope of this thesis and I start with the 
assumption that while contested the nation is still significant in the world order. 
15 It is important to note here that given the role of language in any nationalist project, 
dictionaries and how they define the world not only describes but also creates reality.!
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However, in many cases, the idea of citizenship and nationality overlap as 
people believe that the state corresponds with a nation, in what is commonly referred 
to as the nation-state. According to Hastings, “almost all modern states act on the 
bland assumption that they are nation-states” (1997: 3). However, there are many 
cases of states that include multiple nations and of nations without a recognized state. 
As Anthony Smith notes “the idea of one nation coinciding with one state in reality is 
almost non-existent” (2001: 15). 
Having a clear understanding of what is meant by “nation” is not only an 
intellectually interesting question, but has very important real-life implications. As 
Tharailath Koshy Oommen explains, “The state is a legally constituted entity which 
provides residents protection from internal insecurity and external aggression” (1997: 
33); however, he also admits that “it is not possible to extend measures of social well-
being and the right to political participation to all resident of a state because they are 
of two types - citizens and non-citizens” (1997: 34). The important question then is 
who gets to be a citizen. According to Oommen, “residents who are nationals are 
invariably citizens” and non-national residents may also be citizens “although they 
encounter several problems in acquiring citizenship” (1997: 34).  
1.2.1 What is a nation? 
Given these considerations it becomes important to understand what is meant 
by the nation and by nationals. Are nations primordial entities that form the 
foundation of our world system? Have they always existed or are they a product of a 
certain era? What are the defining elements of a nation? What do we mean by 
nationalism? Different scholars and theorists answer these questions quite differently.   
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Although the exact meaning of the nation is highly contested, scholarly 
opinion can be generalized into four broad understandings of when and how nations 
originated (Smith, 2001). The first of these paradigms is the primordial conception, 
which views nations as “existing before all things and originating everything” (Smith, 
2001: 51); even if nations have sometimes been hidden or suppressed, it is simply a 
matter of the nationalist uncovering these roots and reminding compatriots of this 
past. Smith identifies three strands of primordialism, namely: organicist nationalism, 
which views nations as organic or natural; socio-biological nationalism, which argues 
that nations can be traced back to the genetic reproductive drive of individuals; and 
cultural primordialism which is based on the belief that attachments are formed 
according to ‘primordial givens’ such as the actualities of blood, language, locality, 
religion and tradition. Smith qualifies this view by noting that contrary to popular 
perception, this view in reality emphasizes people’s belief in the primordiality of these 
factors.  
A perennialist perspective is similar to a primordialist approach as it also 
argues that nations have always existed, even if nationalist ideology may be new. This 
view was quite popular before the Second World War, and still is widely reflected in 
popular public opinion. Perennialism generally comes in two varieties. Recurrent 
perennialism claims that particular nations may come and go, but nations in general 
are ubiquitous and perennial. On the other hand, continuous perennialism highlights 
the longevity of particular nations. Adrian Hasting (1997) argues for a largely 
perennial conception of the nation in The Construction of Nationhood. Although he 
does not argue that nations are primordial, he traces the origin of England (which 
according to him is the original nation) as far back as medieval times.  David Miller 
also argues that the nation is an old concept based on a sense of belonging to a distinct 
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group and having a homeland. However, he concedes that the concept has changed 
and in modern times has come to encompass the idea of a nation as an active political 
agent, which is the source of legitimate authority (1995: 29-31). In this way he falls in 
the middle of a perennialist and a modernist understanding of the nation.  
Modernists argue that the past is largely irrelevant and that the nation is a 
thoroughly modern phenomenon, both chronologically recent and qualitatively novel.  
Miroslav Hroch sums up this position in his assessment that "the nation is not, of 
course, an eternal category, but was the product of a long and complicated process of 
historical development in Europe” (1996: 79). However, modernists vary significantly 
in their interpretation of what these complicated historical processes were.  
Smith (2001) divides modernist interpretations into five broad categories. 
Ideological modernists trace the nation back to the enlightenment and the emergence 
and manipulation of the ideology of self-determination. Social-economic modernists 
trace the nation back to industrial-capitalism, direct rule and relative inequalities. The 
most well known socio-cultural modernist is Ernest Gellner (1996), who argues that 
the origin of the nation can be traced back to industrialization. Scientific and 
economic changes have transformed the world since the seventeenth century and have 
changed the role of culture in human life. In agrarian society, culture embedded 
humans within a relatively complex, stable and hierarchical structure that provided 
them with status and identity. On the contrary, in the modern world of high mobility 
and anonymity, individuals belong to more superficial and temporary professional 
bureaucracies and looser family associations. Therefore, what really matters is the 
membership and acceptance in a “high culture,” making the nation a contingency of 
public education.  
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The fourth category consists of political modernists, who are sometimes also 
considered as instrumentalists. This position is based on the claim that the nation 
emerged from the professionalized state, and is a political tool useful in a modern 
context. Liah Greenfeld (1995) makes an instrumentalist argument for nationalism, 
although she is not a traditional modernist as she traces the nation all the way back to 
sixteenth century England. Based on her analysis presented in Nationalism: Five 
Roads to Modernity, Greenfeld concludes that members of the new Tudor Aristocracy 
were the founders of nationalism. Originally the word “nation” had referred to a 
political and cultural elite, separated from the commoners, but then the Tudors 
changed the concept of “nation” to include all English “people.”  
 The final strand of modernism argues for a constructionist understanding of 
the nation, and is represented by two of the most influential scholars of nationalism, 
namely Eric Hobsbawm (1992) and Benedict Anderson (2006). Hobsbawm views the 
nation as socially constructed with invented traditions that mainly serve the ruling 
elite. He agrees on many points with Gellner, especially on “the element of artifact, 
invention and social engineering which enters into the making of nations” 
(Hobsbawm, 1992: 10); however, he disagrees with Gellner’s emphasis on a top-
down process, noting that it is also important to consider the view from below. 
Benedict Anderson views the nation as an imagined political community, taking root 
in the eighteenth century. He argues that “nationalism has to be understood by 
aligning it...with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which - as well as 
against - which it came into being” (Anderson, 2006: 12). These previous cultural 
systems where the religious communities and the dynastic realms, and nationalism 
was able to replace them in large part due to the combined emergence of print 
capitalism (which took advantage of the trend of vernacular languages replacing old 
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sacred languages) and a changed conception of time which introduced the notion of 
“meanwhile” (i.e. the idea that people are doing things at the same time and are 
therefore somehow connected). 
The fourth paradigm, as defined by Smith, is his own ethno-symbolic 
approach, which is based on a socio-historical and cultural analysis. Smith’s main 
argument is that modern nations are generally based on much older groups called 
“ethnies,” which define the boundaries within which modern nations can develop 
(Smith, 1986).  In other words, “an ethno-symbolic approach directs attention to the 
ways in which earlier forms of collective identity may influence the rise of nations” 
(Smith, 2001: 58). Furthermore, an ethno-symbolic approach emphasizes the 
“subjective elements of memory, value, sentiment, myth, and symbol” (Smith, 2001: 
57). However, while he recognizes the work of nationalists in shaping a nation, Smith 
disputes that their work is all unfounded fabrications: 
nationalists have a vital role to play in the construction of nations, not as 
culinary artists or social engineers, but as political archaeologists 
rediscovering and reinterpreting the communal past in order to regenerate the 
community. Their task is indeed selective - they forget as well as remember 
the past - but to succeed in their task they must meet certain criteria. Their 
interpretations must be consonant not only with the ideological demands of 
nationalism, but also with the scientific evidence, popular resonance and 
patterning of particular ethnohistories. (Smith, 1999: 181) 
 
In comparing the different approaches, Smith notes that neither modernists nor 
perennialists have sought to enter the inner world of nationalism (Smith, 2001: 60). 
Therefore, an ethno-symbolic approach is needed to understand both the collective 
passion and attachment to the nation as well as its persistence and possible 
transformation. Furthermore, Smith criticizes modernists for being weak on history, 
and calls for a more long-term analysis. Finally, Smith accuses modernism of being 
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an exclusively elite-oriented analysis, and instead promotes ethno-symbolism as 
stressing the link between the elite and the common people.  
Given my constructivist epistemology, I personally favor a modern 
constructivist understanding of the nation. I disagree with Smith that modernists are 
weak on history, but would argue that they simply interpret history differently. For 
example, Anderson traces the historical roots of the nation all the way back to the 
preceding dynastic and religious communities, while placing the birth of nations in a 
solidly modern context. Simply because modernists draw different conclusions from 
their analysis of history, and do not place the same emphasis on ethnic groups, does 
not justify dismissing them as ahistorical. Furthermore, Smith’s argument that 
modernists solely focus on the elite may be valid against Gellner, but, as noted above, 
Hobsbawm voices the same concern. One of his main contentions is that the nation 
“cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the 
assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people” (Hobsbawm, 
1992: 10).  
Nevertheless, I agree with Smith that there is a need to try and understand the 
inner world of nationalism. While I do not view any element of the nation as natural 
or inherent, I do believe that both supposedly objective as well as subjective attributes 
have been invoked in the imagining of the nation. In this regard, I lean towards a fifth 
conception of the nation. A post-modernist interpretation is based on the idea that: 
Nationalists who want to disseminate the concept of the nation will make 
liberal use of elements from the ethnic past, where they appear to answer to 
present needs and preoccupations. The present creates the past in its own 
image. So modem nationalist intellectuals will freely select, invent and mix 
traditions in their quest for the imagined political community.  
        (Smith, 1994: 18-19)  
While Smith argues that the post-modern perspective is still too fragmentary to be 
considered a paradigm of its own (Smith, 2001: 57), I find it to provide a useful lens. 
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Such an approach acknowledges the nation as the product of modern cultural 
conditions, yet looks to the past as a source of cultural elements that are selectively 
used to create an imagined political community. A post-modern approach also fits 
with my ontology that questions the existence of a single Truth. Moreover, it 
conceives of the nation as incomplete or in process, always re-formulating itself, 
which fits with my framework of “imperfect” peace and transformation.   
1.2.2 Building Blocks 
While I agree with Anderson that nations are imagined, that does not mean 
that they are not real. A constructivist understanding simply means that we have 
created it, but does not deny that our creation has important real-world implications. 
The easiest way for me to understand this is to use the analogy of a house. When we 
build a house, there are literally endless possibilities of how to construct it - what and 
how many rooms to include, how to arrange them, how many floors, etc. We have to 
make choices and decide what elements to include and what material to build with. 
These choices may be guided by what resources (mud, bricks, logs, or cement) are 
easily available and are also influenced by both the architect (who has the vision) and 
the laborer (who decides where each brick ends up). In addition, once a house is built, 
it requires constant upkeep to prevent it from falling apart. Finally, there are certain 
rules over who is allowed in the house, either to live or simply to visit.   
 Nations are very similar to houses. They are constructed by humans according 
to the times they are living in and to suit particular needs. There are different elements 
that can be used to construct a nation: language, territory, ethnic ties, history, myths, 
symbols, etc. Which ones are relevant partially depends on their availability, but is 
also influenced by the elites (the architects) as well as the masses (the construction 
!38!
workers). And once nations are built, they form a strong part of our identity and at 
least partially determine our relationship with our neighbors. However, 
acknowledging nations as constructs also allows them to be deconstructed or 
reformed. In a house, rooms can be repurposed, walls torn down, windows enlarged, 
and rotten foundations can be replaced. But before one can get started on either a 
renovation or demolition, it is important to understand all the elements involved.  
       The building blocks of nationalism can roughly be divided into two types, 
objective and subjective. Richard Handler notes that the boundaries of nations are 
permeable and vague. To avoid a problem of “fuzzy boundaries” he distinguishes 
between two kinds of boundaries. Objective boundedness is when a human group is 
bounded by “attributes or characteristics that each of its members ‘possesses’” even if 
what is objectively shared are “subjective states of mind of the group members.” On 
the other hand, subjective boundedness is “the sense that group members themselves 
have of forming a group” (1988: 7). These two perspectives are evident in Gellner’s 
two makeshift definitions of the nation: 
1. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, 
where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and 
ways of behaving and communicating.  
2. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as 
belonging to the same nation.  (Gellner, 1983: 6-7) 
 
Gellner refers to the first definition as cultural and the second one as voluntaristic, but 
the distinction fits with the general understanding that nations can be viewed either 
objectively (considering factors such as language, religion, customs, territory, and 
institutions) or subjectively based on a sense of belonging (Hroch, 1996; Smith, 2001: 
11). Although there is widespread acknowledgment of these two elements, scholars 
disagree on which ones are the most salient.  
! ! !! ! !! ! 39!
 A subjective understanding of the nation is perhaps easiest understood by 
Ernest Renan’s claim that a nation's existence is “a daily plebiscite” and although 
nations presuppose a past, in the present they are summarized by consent (Renan, 
1882). Most theorists include at least some aspect of this subjective nature of the 
nation; however, there is significant variability in the more objective factors that are 
considered to be relevant to the nation.  
 Renan argues that two things constitute the nation: one is “present-day 
consent, the desire to live together” and the other is “the possession in common of a 
rich legacy of memories.” Therefore, a heroic past, great men, and glory are the 
“social capital upon which one bases a national idea” (Renan, 1882). He is by no 
means alone in viewing a shared history as crucial to a nation. Smith (2001) also 
notes the importance of a shared history, and Miller (1995) includes the idea of 
historical continuity (linked to a community of obligation) as one of his five 
characteristics of national identity.  Hroch (1996) identifies three irreplaceable ties in 
the nation-building process, the first of which is the memory of some common past, 
viewed as the ‘destiny’ of the group.  
 It is important to note that while some authors do speak of a common history, 
most refer to common memories. Whereas historians tend to view history as factual, 
the idea of memory is more subjective and allows for the possibility of myth. 
Anderson (2006) notes that European nationalism in the 1800s was largely based on 
the idea of an awakening or a return to an aboriginal essence, making history a central 
pillar of nationalism. Out of this process developed the practice of speaking on behalf 
of the dead and filling in the past with stories. Anderson reasons that the history of a 
nation is a lot like our childhood: we do not really remember it, but instead use 
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pictures and documents to tell a story.  However, history is not only a matter of 
remembering, but is equally affected by forgetting. “All profound changes in 
consciousness by their very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias” 
(Anderson, 2006: 208). This leads to the paradox of often having to “already have 
forgotten things” one is constantly being reminded of (Anderson, 2006: 204). For 
example, the memory of a glorious battle may be important in the national 
imagination, but the memory also requires one to forget that in fact it as a war 
between brothers and sisters and that the losers have long since been integrated into 
the nation. Such oblivion allows narratives to spring out of specific historical 
contexts.  
 Therefore, the idea of shared history is closely tied to the idea of common 
myths. As Miller argues, national identity contains a considerable element of myth 
(both in the form of re-writing history and the invention of languages) (Miller, 1995: 
35). However, he warns that these myths or beliefs should not necessarily be 
discarded even if they are, strictly speaking, false as “they can be shown to contribute 
significantly to the support of valuable social relations” (Miller, 1995: 36). He bases 
his argument on George Orwell who asserts that “the belief that we resemble our 
ancestors...may be unreasonable, but by existing it influences conduct. Myths which 
are believed in tend to become true, because they set up a type of ‘persona’ which the 
average person will do his best to resemble” (Orwell in Miller, 1995: 37). Therefore, 
much like the nation itself, it is not really important whether the shared common 
history is “real” or represents actual events, but rather is important because it is 
believed in.  
 Another commonly cited characteristic is a common vernacular language and 
literature. According to Hastings the most important and widely present factor in the 
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development of nationhood is the presence of a widely used vernacular literature 
(Hastings, 1997). Oommen also views a common language as crucial for the 
sustainability of nations as the people need to be able to communicate with one 
another (1997: 33). Benedict Anderson presents perhaps the most comprehensive 
argument for the importance of language. In Imagined Communities (2006) he traces 
the origins of the nation back to print-capitalism and the shift from sacred religious 
languages (such as Latin) to standardized vernaculars. He contends that “print 
language is what invents nationalism” and that language is not just an emblem of 
nation-ness. Instead, “the most important thing about language is its capacity for 
generating imagined communities, building in effect particular solidarities” (2006: 
136). Therein lies a crucial distinction between the importance of a particular 
language per se, and the imaginative power of a shared language. Hroch makes a 
similar assumption when he notes the need for higher social communication, 
regardless of whether it is facilitated by linguistic or cultural ties (Hroch, 1996). 
Miller also notes the critical importance of communication and sharing beliefs: “what 
holds nations together are beliefs… but these beliefs cannot be transmitted except 
through cultural artifacts which are available to everyone who belongs - books, 
newspapers, pamphlets, and more recently the electronic media” (Miller, 1995: 32). 
Therefore, the modern communication revolution may be changing the importance of 
a common vernacular. Even Anderson admits that “multilingual broadcasting can 
conjure up the imagined community to illiterates and populations with different 
mother-tongues” (2006: 137).   
 Besides a shared history and language, many scholars claim that the existence 
of a homeland or other bounded territory plays an important role in defining the 
!42!
nation (Hastings, 1997; Miller, 1995). Oomen puts it most frankly when he states that 
“the nation is a territorial entity to which people have an emotional attachment and in 
which they invest a moral meaning, it is a homeland - ancestral or adopted” (1997: 
33). Furthermore, he argues that “the dissociation between a people and their 
homeland denationalizes them; they become an ethnie” (1997: 34). Smith (2001) 
likewise uses the distinction between occupying (rather than being linked to) a 
homeland as one of the factors distinguishing a nation from an ethnie.  
Such reasoning highlights another important factor: ethnicity. As noted above, 
an understanding of “ethnies” as the basis for nationhood is foundational to Smith’s 
ethno-symbolic view of the nation.  However, he is by no means alone in such an 
interpretation. For example, Miller agrees that “typically, though not always, a nation 
emerges from an ethnic community that furnishes it with a distinct identity” (1995: 
19). Oommen takes a slightly different approach by placing the nation between the 
state and ethnie. While territory is common to the state and the nation, culture is 
common to the nation and ethnie. Therefore, he views the nation as common culture 
in union with a territory (1997: 34). In this way he expands or replaces the idea of an 
ethnie with a common culture.  
The term culture is very broad and can be linked back to the elements of 
language, history and myth already discussed earlier. However, there are also other 
components of culture that may be salient to the nation. Hastings observes that 
religion is “an integral element of many cultures” and goes on to argue that religion, 
particularly Biblical Christianity,  “both undergirds the cultural and political world 
out of which the phenomena of nationhood and nationalism as a whole developed and 
in a number of important cases provided a crucial ingredient for the particular history 
of both nations and nationalisms (Hastings, 1997: 4). 
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Finally, culture is also heavily rooted in symbolism. There are a number of 
symbols which are common to most nations and which are important in building the 
imagined community. Perhaps first and foremost is a name, a collective proper noun 
used to refer to the nation. As Shakespeare noted, a name by any other name could 
never be as sweet (Smith, 2001: 7). Also of great importance is the national anthem. 
Anderson contends that the power of the national anthem lies in the simultaneity of 
the experience of singing together, creating a connection between people by the 
imagined sound (Anderson, 2006: 146). Perhaps of equal importance is the flag, an 
easily identifiable visible symbol of the nation. Beyond such obvious symbols are 
institutions that also have important symbolic power. According to Jean-Jacque 
Rousseau, “it is the national institutions that form the genius, the character, the tastes, 
and the mores of a people...which inspire in it this ardent love of the fatherland” 
(Rousseau in Smith, 2001: 34). These institutions may include the national assembly, 
the capital city, national academies, national holidays and the military (Smith, 2001: 
7).  
Symbols have also been influenced by advancements in print media. Anderson 
describes how maps, which were originally simply designed to show the extent of the 
domain, were transformed into logo-maps. Once territory was drawn on a map it 
created a specific shape that even out of context came to be identified with the nation. 
Over time people become attached not only to the actual territory but to the image of 
their homeland as represented in a logo map (Anderson, 2006: 179). Therefore, any 
change in national boundaries can be viewed as a direct attack on the logo-map and 
the national imagination.  
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The map is not the only object that has been turned into a symbol. As 
mentioned above, history and a sense of continuity and authenticity are often very 
important to the national imagination. Nations can try to claim legitimacy by proving 
local ancestry, and therefore “museums and museumizing imagination are both 
profoundly political” (Anderson, 2006: 182). Here print media has also allowed for 
the reproductability/commercialization of symbols of authenticity (such as historic 
buildings, artifacts, and natural phenomenon) in the form of stamps, postcards, names, 
etc. (Anderson, 2006: 182).  
All of these symbols, along with the myths, vernacular language, and history 
help shape a very distinct national identity. In National Identity and Geopolitical 
Visions, Gertjan Dijkink (1996) notes that these two concepts are difficult to separate, 
and therefore, a consideration of national identity is linked to an understanding of 
geopolitical vision. Geopolitical vision is influenced by the continuous stream of 
discourse as well as the experience of real events, which combine together to create 
an ‘imaginative geography’ of the world. Dijkink thereby argues that real world 
events also play an important role in creating the nation. How we judge these events 
is based on cognitive features developed at an early stage in life: “the daily impact of 
events and human activities create, what psychologists have called an‘adaptation 
level,’ an unconscious standard for style, sounds, quantities and solutions” (Dijkink, 
1996: 3).  This leads him to conclude that national identity is “continuously rewritten 
on the basis of external events” and that nations states need foreign policy to define 
what is ‘us’ and ‘them’ (1996: 5).  
Returning to the earlier metaphor of the nation as a house, it becomes clear 
that there are many different ways of imagining/constructing it, depending on the 
building blocks being used. Some nations have foundations based on historical myths, 
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others on a common vernacular language or a shared ethnicity, and so on. On top of 
these foundations there lie an endless possible combination of symbols, cultural 
elements, and myths all contributing to the formation of an imagined community with 
which the individual can identify. Moreover, just like a house a nation can also be 
imbued with a myriad of emotional qualities and perceived as a “home.” Therefore, a 
nation is based on both objective and subjective components; objective elements 
alone are not sufficient but they can be mobilized and form part of the subjective 
imagination of the nation.    
1.2.3 Nationalism 
 The last consideration, before turning to the specific case of Switzerland, is 
the concept of “nationalism.” According to Smith (2001: 5) nationalism can mean a 
number of different things: 
1. a process of formation, or growth, of nations 
2. a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation 
3. a language and symbolism of the nation 
4. a social and political movement on behalf of the nation 
5. a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular 
         
Other scholars, such as Hastings (1997), simply distinguish between 
‘nationalism’ as a theory and a practice. Hobsbawm and Gellner use the term to 
primarily mean a theory or the principle which holds that the nation and the state 
should be congruent, whereas Breuilly (1985) takes nationalism to refer to a political 
movement. In creating a typology of nationalisms, Michael Hechter (2000) bases his 
analysis on the idea of nationalism as collective action designed to make the 
boundaries of the nation coincide with those of the state.  
Within these political movements, there are different types. Both Smith and 
Greenfeld differentiate between an eastern, ethnic form of nationalism based on 
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common culture, and a western, civic, voluntary nationalism based on rational/civic 
law (Smith, 2001: 36-42; Greenfeld, 1995). Hobsbawm agrees with Hroch’s division 
of the history of national movements into three different phases. The first was purely 
cultural, literary, and folkloric, while the second phase marked the emergence of 
political campaigns lead by a group of pioneers and militants. Finally, in the third 
phase national movements gain (at least partial) mass support (Hobsbawm, 1992). 
Anderson also presents different waves of nationalism, but bases these on different 
criteria. Unlike many of his peers who locate the origins of nationalism in Europe, 
Anderson argues that the first wave of nationalism emerged from the creole 
communities in the new world where the nation was the creation of something new. 
This was followed by old world nationalism, which was portrayed as the awakening 
or return to an aboriginal essence and which created a model of the nation-state based 
on republican institutions, common citizenship, and popular sovereignty. The third 
wave consisted of official nationalism, in which existing empires and dynasties tried 
to make their populations into a nation. Finally, there was the last wave of 
nationalism, which was dominated by post-colonial nationalism and consisted of a 
mix of popular and official nationalism based on the pre-existing models of the nation 
state (Anderson, 2006).   
Although these categories are useful in a historical analysis, they say little 
about nationalism in the twenty-first century. In current popular use, nationalism is 
most often used to signify state-building nationalism and right-wing extremists (for 
example the neo-Nazi). However, Michael Billig takes issue with this conception, 
which he finds to be misleading as “it always seems to locate nationalism on the 
periphery” and thereby “overlooks the nationalism of the West’s nation-states (1995: 
5). To counter this misconception, Billig coins the term “banal nationalism” to signify 
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“the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be 
reproduced (1995: 6). The survival of the nation is dependent on a continual 
‘flagging’ of nationhood, which provides the background for political discourse and 
cultural products. These reminders are so common and so familiar that they are not 
consciously registered but instead are taken for granted.  
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Chapter Two:  Constructions of a “Swiss” National Identity 
2.1 A Swiss National Identity? 
Having reviewed the relevant literature to establish a theoretical framework of 
analysis, it is now time to turn to the case of Switzerland. In the following section I 
will provide my own answer to the question Ernest Renan (1882) asked more than 
one hundred years ago: “How is it that Switzerland, which has three languages, two 
religions, and three or four races, is a nation?” Although ethno-nationalists like 
Oommen would argue that “Switzerland (like Belgium) is a case of parts of different 
nations coming together to constitute a state” (Oommen, 1997: 36), my constructivist 
perspective identifies a distinctly Swiss imagined community. Although I do not 
agree with the emphasis Smith places on ethnie, in general I agree with him that in 
Switzerland different groups coexist in a federal state but all claim a common national 
identity (Smith, 2010: 15).  
The claim that Switzerland in fact consists of multiple nations is largely based 
on an ethno-linguistic argument dividing the Swiss into German, French, and Italian 
elements. This divide is strengthened by Switzerland’s federalism, which allows 
cantons to decide their own educational and mass media. Therefore, there is limited 
space for a shared experience on which Anderson based his imagined community. 
Others negate the existence of a national Swiss identity by arguing that the Swiss are 
more attached to their cantons than their nation (Eugster and Srijbis, 2010: 5). For 
example, in a letter to historian Denis de Rougemont (who has argued for the 
existence of a Swiss nation), the Swiss novelist Charles-Ferdinand Ramuz wrote that 
“we Swiss do know that we are not ‘Swiss’, but Neuchatelois, as you are, or Vaudois, 
as I am, or Valaisans, or Zurichois, that is inhabitants of genuine little lands which 
have truly authentic characteristics” (Ramuz in Chollet, 2011: 739). This idea that 
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cantons are their own mini-nations is not completely uncalled for, especially since thy 
all have their own constitution and flag, and some even have their own anthem, 
cantonal days, and historical myths and figures (Chollet, 2011: 751).  
Antoine Chollet (2011) from the University of Lausanne presents a slightly 
different vision of Switzerland as a “fractured nation.” While not arguing that 
Switzerland is multinational, Chollet contends that the Swiss nation is unfinished and 
incomplete.  As challenges to Swiss nationalism, Chollet highlights the importance of 
other imagined communities such as the cantons and language regions, as well as the 
deep divide caused by the animosity between Protestants and Catholics, and finally 
the weakness of the central state. These have all contributed to the creation of a 
“fractured nation,” which is defined by “neither genuine unity nor irreducible 
diversity” and which is “variously united and diverse, depending on the object” 
(Chollet, 2011: 749).  
However, the existence of cantonal identities does not necessarily negate a 
national identity. The canton of Ticino would arguably be the most likely candidate 
for an independent national status. There is a strong alignment between language and 
cantonal cleavage, as the canton contains approximately 60% of all Swiss Italian 
speakers. Furthermore, it is the only canton south of the Alps and therefore is 
physically isolated from the rest of Switzerland and was long marked by economic 
peripherality. Nevertheless, the political party Lega dei Ticinesi, which is 
characterized by a populist “cantonalism,” is not demanding independence from the 
Confederation (Mazzoleni, 2005: 215-216). Similarly in the case of Jura, the newest 
Swiss canton established in 1979, Jurassians had fought for independence from Bern 
but not from Switzerland (Smith, 2010: 15). 
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Part of the reason that sub-national identities have not superseded a national 
identity can be attributed to the fact that there are multiple cleavages – cantonal, 
linguistic, religious – and these borders rarely overlap. Therefore rather than reinforce 
each other they neutralize the power of any one cleavage (Mazzoleni, 2005: 225). 
Oscar Mazzoleni supports such a perspective by arguing that the Swiss national 
identity was constructed in such a way that its federal structure has allowed the 
survival of sub-national, cantonal and communal identities while re-modeling them in 
order to integrate them into a fundamentally non-conflictual co-existence (Mazzoleni, 
2005: 212).  
Therefore, while individual cantons may be resolutely independent they still 
view themselves in the context of the Swiss nation. Tracey Holzhueter explores this 
interesting dynamic between nation and canton in her paper “Finding (In)Visible 
Regional & National Cultural Boundaries in the Historisches Museum Basel16 and the 
Swiss National Museum in Zürich” (2014). She finds that the museum in Basel 
positions its regional identity as a separate entity, which had developed before the 
Confederacy of Switzerland. On the other hand, the Swiss National Museum shows 
off important historical events, particularly focusing on shows of military power and 
specific hegemonic images (such as Swiss Cheese, the Alps, and Heidi) intended to 
bond Swiss people over a shared culture and perpetuating Swiss myths and legends as 
the foundation of a national Swiss identity. 
Holzhueter concludes that while cultural regional boundaries are apparent at 
the cantonal level, they are rendered invisible when confronted at a national level:  
“When situated against other cantons, regional culture and identity is set on display, 
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but as soon as Switzerland engages with others, foreigners or Eurozone politics, the 
country demonstrates a solid ‘Swiss’ identity” (2014: 6).  
The claim for an overarching national identity is supported by survey 
evidence, which has demonstrated that Swiss linguistic communities do not perceive 
themselves as separate nations and identify primarily with Switzerland in general 
rather than with their linguistic group. In addition, a survey found that over 85% of all 
Swiss, regardless of language group, feel at least close to Switzerland (Eugster and 
Strijbis, 2010: 7). However, the question remains of what kind of national identity the 
Swiss share.  
Many scholars, including Anderson (2006), view Switzerland as a prime 
example of a civic or political nation. That is to say that Swiss identity is “based upon 
a common appreciation of political values such as direct democracy, neutrality and 
federalism” (Eugster and Strijbis, 2010: 3). Such civic nationalism is linked to the 
Swiss concept of being a Willensnation or a nation based on the will of the people. 
Switzerland as a political nation also fits with the idea of Constitutional Patriotism 
popularized in the mid-1980s by political philosophers Jürgen Habermas and Jan-
Werner Müller. Constitutional Patriotism promotes the development of an identity 
based on attachment to the values of the constitution and civic responsibility rather 
than ethnic or other cultural factors (Gordon, 2008). As such the idea of Switzerland 
as a civic nation conforms to a more subjective conception of the nation, in line with 
the idea of a daily plebiscite expressing the will of the people to be a nation.  
Although I agree that the civic element is particularly strong in the case of 
Swiss national identity, I also find that there are other factors at play. Eugster and 
Strijbis note that despite the fact that Switzerland is widely perceived as a political 
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nation, one of the “main dimensions of political conflict in recent years has been 
about ‘cultural demarcation’” (2010: 3). This leads them to question why in a 
Willensnation the biggest political fights are about whether to be culturally open or 
not, and they eventually conclude that “Swiss national identity not only contains a 
political, but also a cultural dimension” (2010: 13). Chollet also argues that the case 
of Switzerland falls short of Renan’s conception of the ‘spiritual principle’ and 
instead proposes that “Switzerland fits neither the ethnic definition nor the liber-
universalist one, but borrows from both of them to a very peculiar extent” (Chollet, 
2011: 748).  
Therefore, any exploration of Swiss national identity must take into 
consideration both the more subjective voluntaristic/civic element as well as more 
objective ethno-cultural variables. Furthermore, although national identity is a 
collective identity, it is experienced and understood at the individual level. This 
means that even if the majority of the people subjectively consider themselves as part 
of the Swiss nation, they may have very different understandings of what that means.  
While it is essentially impossible to assess the conception of the nation of 
every individual within a nation, it may be possible to consider general trends in the 
conception. As noted earlier, the most common distinction is between a civic or 
political understanding and an ethno-cultural understanding. However, I find that a 
further distinction made by Eugster and Strijbis (2010) can be very useful. They 
distinguish between a political, an inclusive-cultural and an exclusive-cultural 
identity. The first of these refers to “constitutional patriotism” in which the 
community is imagined around shared political institutions. An inclusive cultural 
identity is based on cultural elements that are not inherent but can be acquired (such a 
specific values, language, and religion), whereas an exclusive cultural identity is 
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based on inherited cultural markers. Such a classification is also reflected in the three 
major types of narratives of national identity identified by Veronique Mottier (1999) - 
the Staatnation narrative, the Kulturnation narrative, and the Volksnation narratives17. 
Each of these elements can be found in different conceptions of the Swiss nation, and 
have been more important at different times in Swiss history.  In their study Eugster 
and Strijbis find that “Switzerland reached a national consensus about what 
constitutes the political identity of the nation, but that the country is divided 
concerning its cultural identity” (2010: 4). In the following sections, I analyze the 
construction of each of these imagined communities.   
2.2 The Political Nation – the Staatnation 
Using data from the Swiss Barometer 2003, Eugster and Strijbis found that 
three concepts of the political nation – direct democracy, neutrality, and federalism 
are considered important by Swiss citizens. Out of these direct democracy was rated 
as most important, with about two-thirds of the respondents stating that it is ‘very 
important’ and over 90% supporting it. Neutrality and federalism were ranked as 
‘very important’ by 43.9% and 29.3% respectively and were valued as at least fairly 
important by about 80% of the respondents (2010: 11,13).  
The importance that Swiss votes give to these three institutions is also evident 
in a number of popular votes. In 1986 Swiss voters decided against joining the United 
Nations on the grounds that it could undermine Switzerland’s neutrality (Sheehan, 
2002). And even though the government had submitted a request to join the European 
Economic Area in 1992, the Swiss people voted against it in a popular referendum 
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17 These three concepts loosely translate to “state-nation,” “cultural-nation,” and 
“people/folk-nation” 
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(with 50.3% of voters and 16 out of the 23 cantons voting against it) (Müller, 1994). 
However, since the end of the Cold War, there have also been voices calling into 
question Switzerland’s stance on neutrality; some question against whom the Swiss 
militia army would have to defend the country and others have proposed that 
Switzerland’s sovereignty could actually best be defended by using multilateral 
policies (CHC, 2010:15).  
This slight shift in attitude is evident in the yes vote to join the United Nations 
in 2002, as well as in the fact that Switzerland has joined the IMF, the World Bank, 
and the World Trade Organization. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Switzerland 
also signed bilateral economic agreements with the EU as well as the Schengen & 
Dublin Conventions (CHC, 2010:16). However, despite these overtures at loosening 
the conditions of Swiss neutrality, Swiss voters still closely guard their neutrality and 
federalism, as is evident in the continued refusal to join the European Union. 
Especially during the last few years, there has been a move back towards greater 
isolationism. In the following section I explore the roots of these institutions, how the 
discourse of a political nation has been constructed and how it is manifested within 
the daily forms of “banal” nationalism. 
2.2.1 Myths and Memories 
The current state of Switzerland has evolved over centuries and therefore it 
makes sense to start with a historical perspective. However, myths and even historical 
“facts” can be framed to tell different stories, and in Switzerland one of the main 
frames is based on the three institutions of democracy, neutrality, and federalism. 
Although in popular culture the birth of Switzerland is traced back to 1291, most 
scholars agree that in reality the Swiss nation is a relatively modern invention. As 
Hughes (1975) notes in his history of Switzerland, the Helvetic Republic did not exist 
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until the French occupation by Napoleon in 1798 during which time Swiss 
citizenship, direct male suffrage, and an end to internal tolls and customs were 
introduced. Furthermore, Ticino was not added until 1803, and only after the treaty of 
1815 were the cantons of Valais, Geneva, Neuchatel, Graubünden, St. Gallen, and 
Aargau included in Switzerland. As Swiss historian Hans Kohn notes: 
The greatest diversity and unequality prevailed among various territories, 
forming the extremely loose structure of the Confederation. But even the 
individual cantons were in no way uniform or logical in their internal 
organisation. Many cantons represented loose confederations of frequently 
unequal communities. Though historical liberties were jealously guarded, 
neither national unity nor democracy characterised Switzerland before the 
French Revolution. (Kohn, 1956: 19)  
 Therefore, modern Switzerland was not born until after the Sonderbundskrieg 
of 1847 (civil war between the Catholic and Protestant cantons) with the acceptance 
of the Federal Constitution in 1848.  During the following decades the new country 
faced a lot of external pressure to justify its existence in a world based on the nation-
state, and Switzerland and its people started to imagine themselves as a nation.  
In the 1860s Federal Councilor Jakob Stämpli noted that if the common 
principle of the nation were accepted, then Switzerland’s existence would be 
destroyed (Tanner, 2011: 40). Around the same time, the legal scholar Johann Caspar 
Bluntschi, stipulated that Switzerland needed to justify its existence in order not to 
endanger its very survival (Tanner, 2011: 38). This led to the development of a unique 
conception of the Swiss nation as a Willensnation, with Swiss philosopher and lawyer 
Carl Hilty formulating the new credo “We have a strong will to be a nation”18 (Hilty 
in Tanner, 2011). In 1875 he expanded on this credo by explaining: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 My translation. The German original is “Wir haben einen starken Willen, eine 
Nation zu sein” 
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Not race or ethnic community, nor common language and customs, nor nature 
and history have founded the state of the Swiss Confederation… What holds 
Switzerland together…is an ideal, namely the consciousness of being part of a 
state that in many ways represents a more civilized community; to constitute a 
nationality which stands head and shoulders above mere affiliations of blood 
or language. (Hilty in Zimmer, 1998: 650)  
The imagining of a political nation needed to be reinforced by a conscious 
revival and development of historical images and myths. Therefore, it was a political 
decision made in modernity that 1891 was declared the 600th anniversary of 
Switzerland, retroactively assigning great importance to the Bundesbrief19 of 1291 
(Hughes, 1975, Tanner 2011). There had been several agreements between the 
original cantons prior to the Bundesbrief of 1291 and it was later reaffirmed and 
expanded on in 1315, but a political decision elevated the Bundesbrief of 1291 to the 
status of Foundational document and August 1st was named a national holiday 
(Tanner, 2011).  
This framing of the Swiss nation was supported by a number of historical 
myths and stories; probably most famous is the legend of William Tell. According to 
the story William Tell was forced to shoot an apple on his son’s head as punishment 
for an act of defiance against the ruling Habsburger dynasty. Despite successfully 
shooting the apple, Tell gets caught with a second arrow, which he admits was 
intended for the Austrian Vogt Gessler in case Tell had missed and hit his son. 
Because of this, Tell is imprisoned but manages to escape when a storm hits the boat 
in which he is being transported. He gets to land, tracks down Gessler, and shoots him 
in the Hohlegasse (Hug and Stead, 1890; Acherman, 1972; Reinhardt, 2014).  
The story of Tell is often combined in popular lore with the supposed 
founding of the confederation. The story says that in 1307 Walter Fürst von 
Attinghausen, Werner Staufacher, and Arnold von Melchtal (from Uri, Schwyz, und 
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Unterwalden respectively) met on the Rütli meadow to swear allegiance and mutual 
self-defense (Hug and Stead, 1890). Both of these stories posit noble alpine men 
against the evil Austrian Habsburger. However, there is no historical record of Tell’s 
existence, and most of these stories are based on historical accounts written centuries 
after the fact. Nevertheless, regardless of the factual nature of the stories, their 
symbolic value is uncontested. For example, importance of these origin myths is 
evident in the most successful Swiss movie ever, Die Schweizermacher20 (1978). In 
the movie an Italian seeking Swiss citizenship proudly shows of his portrait of 
William Tell to an immigration officer and claims that without honoring Tell it is not 
possible to understand what it means to become Swiss.21 
Of course, a historical analysis calls into question some of the underlying 
assumptions. For example, the Swiss Confederation is always presented as a pact of 
resistance against the overbearing Habsburger. Conversely, some historians note that 
the Bundesbrief of 1291 may not have been signed in 1291 and may not have been 
directed specifically at the Habsburger (Reinhardt, 2014: 12). According to Hug and 
Stead (1890: 129) the league of allegiance was actually established following the 
death of Rudolf III of Habsburg-Austria in a moment of hope for emancipation. 
Furthermore, even though the Habsburgers are considered Austrians, they had their 
origins and home within what is today part of Switzerland. Therefore, viewing them 
as the foreign enemy takes an act of ‘already having forgotten’ something of which 
one is being constantly reminded.   
Nevertheless, these stories of Tell and the Rütli pact have been framed by 
popular culture and the political elite as the beginning of Switzerland’s political !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20!The Swiss Makers 
21 My translation!
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institutions. The confederation can be interpreted as the origins of federalism. 
Furthermore, Tell and the Eidgenossen’s will for independence and rebellion against 
an occupying power can be framed as a root of modern armed neutrality (Reinhardt, 
2014: 8). Without too much imagination, direct democracy can also be traced back to 
the Landesgemeinde. These were the assemblies that oversaw the use of the Almend. 
The Almend or the commons, were a stretch of land common to all, including “the 
free and the unfree, rich and poor, noble and serf” and everyone was brought together 
for deliberation (Hug and Stead 1890: 126).  
Switzerland’s will for self-determination is furthermore cemented by the tales 
of several key battles. The first of these “triumphant victories” was at the Battle of 
Morgarten in 1315 in which the Eidgenossen22 strategically used their territory to 
defeat the army of Duke Leopold of Austria. It is often viewed as first proof that the 
young Confederation was able to defend itself and was the beginning of two centuries 
of victories on the battlefield. The second battle of major significance in Swiss lore is 
the Battle of Sempbach, fought in 1386 against Duke Leopold III. The battle started 
out in favor of the Austrians, who had formed themselves in a compact phalanx and 
protected themselves from the Swiss attack with their long lances. According to the 
myth, the fate of the battle only changed when Arnold von Winkelried stepped out 
from the Swiss ranks and used his body to catch as many spears as possible in order to 
break a hole in the Austrian defense. His famous last words are said to be “take care 
of my wife and children” (Hug and Stead 1890: 171-172; Reinhardt, 2014: 24). Of 
course, the Austrian version of the event was quite different, telling of Leopold and 
his men as innocent victims attacked on their own territory on official business by a 
group of traitors. Interestingly, at that time this version resounded not just with the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!22!Confederates!
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Austrians but also with pro-Austrian groups in Zürich, indicating the contested nature 
of the early Confederacy (Reinhardt, 2014: 24).  
The Swiss National Museum in Zürich also highlights the battles of Murten 
and Marignano, part of the exhibit in the Ruhmeshalle, as important factors in Swiss 
history and identity (Holzhueter, 2015: 4). The Battle of Murten (1476) was part of 
the Burgunder wars and was an overwhelming victory by the Swiss federal army 
against the forces led by Charles the Bold of Burgundy (Hug and Stead 1890: 214; 
Reinhardt, 2014: 42). This victory further established the Confederates as a force to 
be reckoned with and as a significant military power in the center of Europe. The 
Confederates’ military success continued and at one point had such strong control 
over Milano that even Niccoló Machiavelli is said to have stated that the Confederates 
might expand their rule over all of Italy (Reihnhart, 2014: 47). However, in 1515 the 
Swiss troops were defeated by the French at the battle of Marignano, a defeat that 
marked the end of the Confederates’ military exploits outside and was arguably the 
first step toward neutrality.  
As Hug and Stead note, “whilst no one thinks of taking these beautiful old-
world stories literally, yet few of us would care to toss them contemptuously and 
entirely on one side” (1890: 124).  Furthermore, they “represent and illustrate a long 
epoch during which a high-spirited people were engaged in establishing a 
confederation, and maintaining it against a powerful enemy” (1890: 125). Not much 
has changed in the last one hundred years to change Hug and Stead’s assessment of 
the role of these historical myths in Swiss identity. They are stories that most Swiss 
children grow up with and are seen as the foundation of the three most important 
political institutions.  
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2.2.2 Territory 
In 1875 Johann-Kaspar Bluntschli contended that a national identity simply 
based on volunteerism and political institutions, even if backed by references to a 
mythical past, would not suffice to maintain the Swiss nation. Therefore, he proposed, 
“If the Swiss possess a particular nationality, then this feeling derives above all from 
the existence of their beautiful homeland… which unites its inhabitants as sons of the 
same fatherland, even though they live in different valleys and speak different 
languages”  (Bluntschi in Zimmer, 1998: 651). This started a process Oliver Zimmer 
has dubbed the “naturalization of the nation,” and which was set to the backdrop of 
mounting ethno-linguistic nationalism in the neighboring states, as epitomized by 
Germany’s völkisch nationalism (1998: 649). As part of this process there emerged 
three prominent portrayals of the Alps – as unifying force, defensive fortress, and as a 
purifying force (1998: 645).  
The Alps were portrayed as a unifying force by connecting them to the 
cornerstones of Swiss national identity – namely its democratic institutions. 
According to Kilian Elasser (2008), the importance of the Alps is epitomized by the 
Gotthard Mountain. The Gotthard pass is the main connection between northern and 
southern Europe and therefore is strategically of crucial importance. Therefore, the 
opening of the Gotthard railway line in 1882 was a significant event for national 
identity. For example, in 1897 Carl Spitteler (who later won the Nobel Prize in 
Literature) wrote a travel guide called “Der Gotthard,” in which he wrote “The 
Gotthard railway line takes us right to the heart of Switzerland, through two of the 
three most important founding cantons of the Swiss confederation (Schwyz and Uri). 
Tell and Stauffacher, Rütli and Hohle Gasse, Altdorf and Bürglen are familiar names” 
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(Spitteler in Elasser, 2008: 3).  
 As such the Gotthard and the Alps became the physical manifestation of the 
national myths. Furthermore, they became known as a defensive fortress and a 
symbol of Swiss neutrality: Switzerland “made of peasants, craftsmen, hunters 
became the neutral keeper of the most important transit line through the Alps” 
(Elasser, 2008: 1). This link between the mountains and Swiss neutrality culminated 
during World War II, during which Switzerland’s entire national defense strategy 
rested on the national redoubt – the fortification of the Gotthard and surrounding 
mountains to which the Swiss military would retreat in case of a German attack. Thus 
the Alps were considered Switzerland’s only hope to retain its neutrality, and to this 
day many credit the fortified Alps as one of the main reasons why Germany never 
invaded Switzerland (Elasser, 2008, Zimmer, 1998).   
2.2.3 Language 
Another important component of national identity is language. In this 
Switzerland is somewhat unique as it is one nation with four national languages. 
However, this multilingualism can also be framed in the context of the dominant 
political institutions. Basing his claim on the work by Hughes (1975), Anderson 
notes,  “today’s multilingual Switzerland is a product of the early 19th century” 
(Anderson, 2006: 139). Unalterably-denoted linguistic zones only emerged in the 
second half of the 19th century, and attempts at standardization arrived very late, so 
that there remained a large variety of sometimes mutually unintelligible German 
idiolects (Anderson, 2006). During this time period, most other emerging nation-
states were solidifying their national identity by promoting a single standardized 
national language; however, Switzerland was somewhat precariously caught in the 
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middle of different powerful neighbors. Furthermore, since Switzerland had earlier 
established its neutrality, it could not be seen favoring any of its neighbors by 
promoting one language over the others. Consequently, there was no attempt at 
Germanification, and as Anderson argues, “legal party between German, French, and 
Italian was thus the obverse side of the coin of Swiss neutrality” (2006: 141). 
Moreover, the decision to accept Romansh as the fourth national language was 
based in a large part on a defense of Switzerland’s independence and neutrality. In the 
1930s both Germany and Italy were intent on uniting all German and Italian speakers 
within their respective states. Italian politicians not only had their eye on Italian 
speaking Ticino, but were also interested in annexing Graubünden, arguing that 
Romansh was in fact nothing more than a Lombardy dialect. They even went so far as 
to circulate maps using Italian names for all the towns in Graubünden. Therefore, 
elevating Romansh from a neglected dialect to a national language also served the 
purpose of making it clear that the language was fundamentally Swiss, and clearly 
different from Italian (Amrein, 2013). Similarly, it could be argued that the 
maintenance of Swiss German (in all its dialects) as distinct from High German, helps 
bolster Swiss neutrality by clearly demarcating it as different from Germany and its 
policies.   
Furthermore, multilingualism cannot only be framed in the context of 
neutrality, but also in the form of federalism and direct democracy. To this day, 
language policy remains largely a matter of the canton, reinforcing the federalist 
nature of Switzerland (even while occasionally leading to tensions between the 
different cantons and language regions). The democratic element is evident at the 
national level, as it was through a direct popular vote that the fourth national 
language, Romansh, was accepted by an overwhelming 92% of voters in 1938 
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(Amrein, 2013).  
2.2.4 Economics 
Even when discussing other elements of the Swiss nation, such as its current 
economic standing, it is possible to frame the topic in the context of federalism, 
democracy, and neutrality. For example, in “An Economic Theory of Switzerland” 
Charles Blankart (2011) uses a geographic foundation to develop a federalist 
argument for Switzerland’s wealth. He claims, “a consideration of the initial, 
exogenous geographical situation of Swiss territory provides a better understanding of 
the country’s development” (Blankart, 2011: 74). His theory is that the fractured 
geography of Switzerland prevented the formation of a strong centralized 
government, so that Switzerland developed as a federal state. Referencing Bean’s 
Law, Blankart argues that in a small fractured state (such as Switzerland) migration 
costs to the borders are quite low and comparative competition from neighboring 
states is quite high. Therefore, the cost of repression and taxation by a federal body 
are comparatively high and taxes remain correspondingly low. In addition, 
Switzerland was widely considered difficult to conquer, and the one time that the 
Swiss were conquered by the French in 1798, it was so difficult to tax the federalist 
cantons that Napoleon had to resort to enforcing a non-monetary tax of 12,000 troops 
instead of normal taxes.  
According to Blankart, this combination of federalism and neutrality has 
contributed to Switzerland’s economic success. For example, he argues that 
Switzerland’s strong federalism is the reason for the federal government’s no-bailout 
policy (every Canton is responsible for its own finances and the federal government 
has no jurisdiction to intervene). The lack of a national safety net in turn forces each 
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canton “to conduct a solid budget policy and thus to establish a good reputation in the 
minds of the financial market actors” (Blankart, 2011: 79).  
In his study on “When Did the Swiss Get so Rich” Roman Studer draws a 
different conclusion but still operates within the same political institution framework. 
He views Switzerland’s current prosperity as the dividends of political neutrality and 
stability during the twentieth century, which especially boosted the finance/banking 
industry. Based on findings that Swiss real wages were actually by far the lowest in 
the sample up until the 1880s and then did not match those of other European 
countries until after the First World War, Studer concludes that today’s affluence is 
primarily a dividend of stability and neutrality during the 20th century.  
These economic theories fit into the discourse of Switzerland as a political 
nation by attributing much of Switzerland’s present day prosperity to its federalism, 
democracy, and neutrality. However, they also require a fair amount of what 
Anderson (2006) has called the “characteristic amnesia” of the nation-state. While 
Switzerland for a long time has imagined itself as a model nation in terms of peace 
and humanitarianism, it has recently been faced with a number of issues that had long 
been suppressed from popular memory. One of these issues is Switzerland’s 
involvement in the global slave trade. For example, Swiss banks owned significant 
shares of slave trading companies and trading houses financed and did business with 
slave traders (Janka, 2003). In the 1990s Switzerland also faced international criticism 
for its handling of Nazi gold as well as the accounts of Holocaust victims, an issue 
that has yet to be fully resolved (Picard, 1997b).  
 
 
2.2.5 Flagging Political Institutions 
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Reinforcing a national Swiss identity based on political institutions is 
relatively simple since all citizens are exposed to them on a daily basis. The system of 
direct democracy allows citizens to propose initiatives and referenda, which get voted 
on about four times per year. That means that politics, whether in the form of a 
campaign poster, a political debate on TV, or a discussion among friends, is never far 
away. Even symbols of nationalism, such as the national anthem, are up for debate. 
The current anthem, the “Swiss Psalm” has been quite strongly criticized for not 
resonating with a significant number of the Swiss, and so in 2014 the Schweizerische 
Gemeinnützige Gessellschaft23 launched a popular competition for a new anthem. The 
only criteria for the competition was that the anthem should reflect the ideas present 
in the preamble to the Swiss constitution. After receiving 208 submissions, a jury 
deliberated and eventually selected six entries to be presented to the people at large. 
Then in April and May of 2015 online voting combined with the expert opinion of the 
jury determined the three finalists, and finally the winner will be decided by popular 
vote and then proposed to the relevant Federal authorities in the fall (CHymne, 2015).   
Another important national institution that marks the lives of at least half the 
population is the military. Barring a few exceptions, all Swiss men are required to 
serve in the Swiss army once they turn 18. This means they become an integral part of 
armed neutrality, as they are taught to serve and defend Switzerland in case anyone 
threatens its neutrality.  In my family, there is a standing joke that we cannot have 
other (male) Swiss guests over for dinner without the conversation at one point 
turning to the Swiss army, in particularly to where the men at the table had been 
stationed, which division they had served in, and so on. As such, the experience of 
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serving in the army serves a two-fold purpose: it promotes the idea of armed 
neutrality and at the same time provides a shared experience among at least half the 
population.  
The presence of the army is also fairly common in daily life and fits in with 
Billig’s idea of banal nationalism. It is not uncommon to see a recruit in full uniform 
and assault rifle slung over his shoulder riding the train for his weekend leave. 
Therefore, it is also not surprising that one of the best-known symbols of Switzerland 
is the Swiss army knife, an item that has reached the level of one of Anderson’s iconic 
logos.  
2.2.6 A Note on Gender 
While rarely being explicitly acknowledged as part of the national discourse, it 
is important to note that Swiss national identity is a clearly gendered construct. 
Possibly the most obvious example in terms of neutrality is the gendered nature of the 
army. That the nation is defended by men is also evident in the historical myths – the 
heroes are men like Tell and Winkelried. Admittedly, there are some celebrated 
female characters, such as “Mother Royaume” who helped defeat a surprise attack on 
Geneva by pouring boiling soup over the city walls (Mottier, 1999: 7). Another 
example is Bertha the “Spinning Queen” of Burgundy who was celebrated as a model 
of industry and economy (Hug and Stead, 1890: 70-72). However, these are mostly 
second-tier and regional figures, and are notably connected with traditionally female 
tasks such as cooking and spinning, and are missing from the institutional discourse.  
At the national level the only notable female character is the Helvetia, the 
personification of Switzerland present on everything from post-stamps to Swiss coins, 
and featured in a prominently visible statue in front of the Bundeshaus.24 The Helvetia 
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is generally interpreted as either a geographical representation of Switzerland, which 
emphasizes agricultural productivity and abundance, or as a symbol of the nation and 
the state, which shows off various weapons and virtues such as vigilance, intrepity, 
freedom, peace, love and unity (Kreis, 2014).  However, unlike mythical male figures, 
the Helvetia has no real backstory and thus serves as a canvas upon which the desired 
qualities can be projected according to the times.  The extremely gendered nature of 
Swiss politics is also evident in the fact that at the federal level women did not gain 
the right to vote until 1971, and thus have been excluded from direct democracy for 
the majority of Swiss history.  
 
2.3 The Culturally Inclusive Nation – the Kulturnation 
 While Eugster and Strijbis (2010) acknowledge that there is a general 
consensus on the imagination of Switzerland as a political nation based on the three 
central institutions of democracy, federalism, and neutrality, they also argue that there 
are other factors at play as well. One of these alternative conceptions is based on 
culturally inclusive elements, which are cultural factors that are not inherent, but 
which a person is able to change. These are sometimes simply referred to as the 
“national culture.” For example, Dominik Müller (1994: 7) claims that for him “it 
would be more convincing to explore Swiss identity in the details, in daily attitudes 
and behaviors, in the way daily political decisions are made.”  
 Although I am proposing the existence of a national culture, I by no means 
claim that all elements of such a culture are homogenous across the country. Beyond 
individual differences, there are also differences between the linguistic groups, 
cantons, and perhaps most notably the Röstigraben. The term refers to a cultural and 
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linguistic divide between the German and French parts, using Rösti, a potato dish 
typically associated with German-Switzerland, to mark the Graben or ditch 
(Espersen, 2012: 59). The difference is often evident in voting patterns, with the 
French-speaking community tending to be more positive towards the EU and foreign 
policy proposals (Espersen, 2012). Dominik Müller illustrates this divide when he 
notes that many of the French Swiss seem to have less tolerance for all the laws 
regulating the environment and traffic safety, and that they find the German Swiss to 
be too serious and detail oriented. On the other hand, the German Swiss find that “the 
French Swiss ideas of personal freedom and liberalism are perhaps too simple” and 
that they focus more on the general rather than examining the details of what the 
administration is doing (Müller, 1994: 5-6). 
 Despite these differences a “Swiss Culture” is evident in the dominant 
discourses regarding national values. While some might dismiss these as nothing 
more than stereotypes, they can actually be quite illuminating. The pervasiveness of 
the image of the Swiss as simple, hard working, and responsible is further reflected in 
everything from official documents to the narratives about the economy and the Alps. 
These values are also closely related to the concept of the Swiss Sonderfall, which 
underlies Swiss political culture. The idea is that Switzerland’s combination of 
pragmatism, consultation and consensus building, balance between equality and 
difference, and focus on the local and human dimension has made it a unique or 
exceptional case. Finally, both language and religion are also important for the 
culturally inclusive nation. Although both of these are discussed in the context of 
plurality, this plurality is still limited to the four official languages and the two main 
branches of Christianity. I discuss each of these elements in more detail in the 
following section.  
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2.3.1 Swiss Stereotypes: A Two-sided Coin  
 As the Röstigraben indicates, Swiss culture is not homogenous but in fact 
quite complex.  In particular, the outsider perspective on Swiss culture shows a 
marked bifurcation of what is considered Swiss.  According to the prominent Swiss 
historian Jakob Tanner (2011), the perception of Switzerland has long been split, with 
many referring to it as an earthly paradise or an Arcadia in the mountains, while 
others present the Swiss as an ugly, greedy people. For example, Switzerland has 
alternatively been called a model and a rogue state.  
This divided opinion is very clear in considering different portrayals of 
Switzerland’s role in the Second World War. Some hail Switzerland’s heroic feat of 
remaining neutral while being completely surrounded by axis forces, while others 
have argued that Switzerland was not so innocent because the country helped bank-
roll the German war machine and turned approximately 10,000 refugees back at the 
borders (Picard, 1997a: 23). The debate over Switzerland’s role and moral standing 
has continued until today, especially with regard to how the banks handled the 
accounts of victims of the Holocaust and Nazi-gold, (Picard, 1997b: 30-38). When 
discussing the Swiss banks’ reaction to criticism that they were still harboring money 
from victims of the Holocaust, Cowell argues that the decision to create an investment 
portfolio to compensate the victims was “an interesting symbiosis of avowed 
philanthropy and hard-nosed self-interest that is not atypical of the Swiss” (1997: 
135). As is often the case, this combination of interests allows for different 
interpretations, with some lauding the banks’ action while others denounce them as 
self-serving. 
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Of course the reality is much more complex because humans and societies 
rarely (or I might even dare say never) fit into neat boxes. However, these stereotypes 
are examples of the competing discourses regarding a “Swiss Culture.” Moreover, 
while often understood as having negative connotations, stereotypes are simply “a set 
of beliefs about the characteristics of a social category of people” and “human and 
social sciences have preferred to emphasise their constructive functions as … 
discourses that lay boundaries between groups” (Dervin, 2011: 6). Therefore, 
studying stereotypes can “constitute a sound basis for understanding intergroup 
behaviours” (2011: 6). 
Stereotypes can generally be divided into two categories: auto-stereotypes 
(which stem from members of the in-group) and hetero-stereotypes (which originate 
from the “other”) (Dervin, 2011: 6). Since I am studying how a Swiss national 
identity is imagined by the Swiss themselves, I am much more interested in the auto-
stereotype. However, auto- and hetero-stereotypes are often mutually reinforcing so it 
can also be informative to consider how outsiders view the Swiss.  
In his discussion of Switzerland, David Hampshire (a British National) 
provides some insight into the hetero-stereotypes about Switzerland. He somewhat 
ironically creates a long list of adjectives in an attempt to highlight the paradox of 
being Swiss. For example, he notes that the Swiss are perfect yet insecure, intelligent 
and arrogant, polite yet unfriendly, obedient and obstinate, thrifty, materialistic, and 
affluent, conventional and inventive, liberal and conservative, virtuous and 
xenophobic (2007: 386).  
In particular the concept of a “Swiss” work ethic is a common theme among 
commentators. In an interview regarding life and work in Switzerland, Irish national 
David Ryan noted both the Swiss people’s “penchant for precision and perfection” as 
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well as their work ethic. As an example he shares a story of how on occasion he used 
to stay out on weeknights until the ‘ungodly’ hour of 11pm only to return home and 
find all his neighbors fast asleep (2003: 36-37). On a similar note, Cowell comments 
that “Switzerland is a nation that supposedly thrives on efficiency: Punctuality, 
expensive precision watches, and trains that run on time are all part of the Swiss 
national persona” (1997: 141). 
2.3.2 Auto-stereotypes: Die Schweizermacher 
In general the hetero-stereotypes I just mentioned fit quite well with the 
dominant discourses about a “Swiss culture” within Switzerland.  A first impression 
can be found in the film Die Schweizermacher (1978), the most successful Swiss film 
ever. The film portrays the work of two immigration officers evaluating foreigners 
trying to gain Swiss citizenship. While “The Swissmakers” is a comedy, it derives 
much of its humor from highlighting (and often poking fun at) stereotypical cultural 
elements. For example, during their training to become immigration officers, the 
trainees have to list the characteristics for attaining Swiss citizenship; prime among 
them are being modest, hardworking, upright, reliable, honest, and simple. 
Moreover, on their home visits they note the order and cleanliness of 
apartments and expect absolute punctuality and conformity. In the film, an interview 
with the neighbor of one of the applicants reveals the scandalous fact that the 
applicant is shamelessly deviating from all acceptable norms: instead of hanging up 
the standard white curtains, her kitchen window presents a gaping black hole, and she 
even dares to put out her trash in a brown rather than the normal grey trash bag. And 
of course all applicants are expected to learn Swiss German.  
One could argue that these are over-generalizations and stereotypes, and it is 
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true that they do not necessarily apply to all Swiss. Nevertheless, they attain their 
comic value because they hit all too close to home. For example, I have heard my 
own grandmother complain that a lot of the foreigners living in her town have the 
audacity to put out their trash bags for Thursday trash collection on Wednesday night, 
instead of at 7:00am the next day. Other than being unsightly, it is true that leaving 
out trash overnight might attract unwanted scavengers; nevertheless it is an example 
of how these stereotypes manifest themselves in the lived experience.  
Although the idea of a “Swiss Culture” may have started in the realm of 
discourse, discourses can be quite powerful and eventually get translated into action; 
in other words they are performed in daily life. It would be interesting to further 
consider the performative nature of national identity by considering Judith Butler’s 
analysis of gender performativity, but unfortunately that is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Instead, I share a personal anecdote to help illustrate the basic point.  
During the first class of the masters program (before we knew each other very 
well) the professor asked that we select a class timekeeper to make sure that we went 
on break and finished on time. One of my classmates looked over at me and half-
jokingly stated that I was Swiss and that we Swiss are good with time - after all we 
make Swiss watches and our trains run on time. I had no objection to his suggestion, 
so I became the timekeeper. However, from that moment on, I no longer just felt 
responsible for myself but also to the entire class. I started paying more attention to 
the time and making sure that I was punctual. Without giving it too much thought, I 
started acting/performing in accordance with (and thus perpetuating) the stereotype.   
Therefore, stereotypes are not constrained to the realm of the imagination but 
get enacted in real life. For example, that a “Swiss” work-ethic is more than popular 
myth was shown in a national referendum in 2012, in which 66.5% of the voters 
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decided against extending annual vacations from four to six weeks (SwissInfo, 2012). 
Moreover, Ryan was struck by the apparent lack of widespread abuse of very 
generous unemployment benefits (2003: 37). The importance of a strong work ethic is 
also related to a sense of personal responsibility.  One simple example of this sense of 
individual responsibility (as well as respect for public order) is dedication to the 
recycling of waste. In 2003 the Swiss recycled 47% of all urban waste, recycling 70% 
of paper, 95% of glass, 71% of plastic bottles and, 85-90% of aluminum cans (Swiss 
World, 2014).  While the push to recycle has been backed by a number of cantons 
taxing waste production (often in the form of a fee to be paid per bag of waste 
collected), the success of the program nevertheless depends on people acting on an 
understanding that everyone must do their part. 
That being law-abiding and “scrupulously honest” are also not just 
meaningless stereotypes is evident in the fact that the Corruption Perceptions Index 
currently ranks Switzerland as tied with Norway in fifth place (Transparency 
International, 2014). On a similar note, “Swiss cautiousness” is reflected in the 
general deference to the precautionary principle. One recent example is the 
moratorium on GMO products in Switzerland. In a 2005 referendum, 55.7% of voters 
cast their ballots in favor of a five-year moratorium against the commercial 
cultivation of both GMO crops and animals. The ban was extended in 2010 and again 
in 2012, currently set to last until 2017 (GMO-Free Europe, 2014). In the meantime, 
the government is supporting more research on the impacts of GMO plants and 
animals.  
These are just a few examples of how stereotypes relate to the national 
consciousness. When certain discourses about self-perception reach hegemonic status, 
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then the effect can be felt in real life political decisions as well as individual behavior. 
While it is very informative to consider how these discourses manifest in popular 
culture and are acted out in daily life, their true power is evident in the extent that 
they have been adopted as official values.  
 At the federal level, cultural nationalism was made a pillar of state policy 
during the 1930s, most prominently with the publication of the 1938 White Paper on 
Swiss culture. This so-called Kulturbotschaft25 was soon seen as the Magna Carta of 
Swiss cultural policy, and highlighted the three principles of decentralized political 
structure, reverence for human dignity and liberty, and Switzerland’s affiliation with 
three different European cultures (Zimmer, 2004: 20). 
 In 1999 there was a general revision of the Federal Constitution, and the 
resulting document reflects the values deemed of national importance by political 
elites as well as the voting public. Of particular interest when considering the values 
that supposedly underlie current Swiss policies and behavior is the preamble. 
Especially noted are responsibility, respect, solidarity, and consideration of the future. 
In the name of Almighty God! 
The Swiss People and the Cantons, 
mindful of their responsibility towards creation, 
resolved to renew their alliance so as to strengthen liberty, democracy, 
independence and peace in a spirit of solidarity and openness towards the 
world, 
determined to live together with mutual consideration and respect for their 
diversity, 
conscious of their common achievements and their responsibility towards 
future 
generations, 
and in the knowledge that only those who use their freedom remain free, 
and that the strength of a people is measured by the well-being of its weakest 
members; 
adopt the following Constitution 
                                  Swiss Federal Confederation (2014) 
2.3.3 Swiss Values: The Alps and the Economy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Cultural message 
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In the previous section on political nationalism, I noted how a discourse based 
on the three national institutions has been used to frame historical myths, the Alps, 
and even the economy. The same is true for cultural elements. For example, I 
previously discussed how Switzerland’s economic success can be presented within 
the framework of federalism, neutrality, and democracy. However, there are also 
alternative explanations for Switzerland’s current wealth. One popular position, 
especially in public discourse, is to emphasize Swiss education, entrepreneurship, and 
most of all the Swiss work ethic. Roman Studer explains how such an argument 
contends that “these characteristics have enabled Switzerland – a country poorly 
endowed with natural resources and in former times known as one of the ‘sick men’ 
in Europe – to rise to unexpected heights” (2008: 2). 
Equally, the Alps can also be framed in both institutional as well as cultural 
terms. In his article “In Search of Natural Identity: Alpine Landscape and 
Reconstruction of the Swiss Nation,” Oliver Zimmer demonstrates how for the one 
hundred years prior to 1870 there was a “nationalization of nature” in which the Alps 
reflected what was considered to be authentically Swiss. This not only involved 
popular historical myths and memories but also supposed national virtues, which were 
projected on the Alps in an attempt to lend more continuity and authenticity to Swiss 
national identity (Zimmer, 1998: 643). Moving from a classical utilitarian perspective 
to a more romanticized conception, the Swiss Alps and their inhabitants came to stand 
for simplicity, purity, honesty, and liberty. For example, the Helvetic Society 
(founded in 1761) portrayed the Alps as the center of the country’s national virtues 
(Zimmer, 1998: 647). 
After the 1870s there emerged a process of naturalizing the nation, previously 
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discussed in the section on the political nation. This process developed a deterministic 
framework, which linked the Alps with the idea of democracy and neutrality, but in 
its third strain also naturalized the link between the Alps and a pure national 
character. The Alps were seen as the genesis of a simple life and a pure peasantry, 
which is “the best bearer of Swiss characteristics…untiring in his diligence, strict in 
his economizing, simple and sober in his way of life” (Ernst Laur in Zimmer, 1998: 
655). Furthermore, just as the Gotthard Mountain became central to the perception of 
the Alps as a bastion of neutrality and national defense, the building of the Gotthard 
Tunnel came to be associated with key Swiss values. As Elasser explains in his article 
on the mythological meaning of the St. Gotthard Railway line, “Swiss values survived 
the transition to modernity and they materialised in the tunnel, especially those 
themes central to Swiss national identity such as freedom, Christianity, social 
solidarity, love for the Fatherland and work ethic” (2008: 13). 
2.3.4 Switzerland’s National Political Culture: the Sonderfall 
So far I have focused on Swiss values, especially the work ethic, 
responsibility, simplicity and prudence. In this section, I focus in particular on 
Switzerland’s national political culture. As explained in the section on the political 
nation, Switzerland’s institutions play a significant role in determining national 
identity. However, any political system needs to be grounded in a system of 
references, in other words the specific culture of a given society (Chevrier, 2009: 
171). Consequently, the specific form that national institutions take is influenced by 
political culture (Chevrier, 2009: 172). Not all people within the same cultural context 
will give the exact same meaning to a given situation nor will they necessarily act 
similarly; however, hegemonic discourses provide them with “templates and 
references to make sense of their experience and action” (Chevrier, 2009: 171). 
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Therefore, in order to understand Swiss national identity it is important to understand 
its political culture.26  
According to Sylvie Chevrier, this common political culture is “based upon 
attachment to local communities and institutions, to government through consensus 
and to conflict solving by resorting to arbitration and pragmatism” (Chevrier, 2009: 
169). In many ways this idea is linked to the understanding of Switzerland as a 
Sonderfall or exceptional case. The general idea of the Sonderfall emerged from the 
1930s onward, largely as a result of the Swiss experience in World War II and then 
due to its peace and growing prosperity in the post-war years (CHC, 2010: 2). Since 
then, “the conviction that Switzerland has become, and remains, a very special case, 
remains a fundamental, albeit contested, element in modern Swiss political culture 
and life” (CHC, 2010: 1).  
 While some credit the Swiss Sonderfall to the historical elements of neutrality, 
federalism, and direct democracy (in line with the discourse of the political nation), 
others varyingly stress the importance of political stability, moderation, consensus, a 
supportive political culture, prosperity, national economic models fostering efficiency 
and reliability, social cohesion, and unusual welfare patterns based on personal 
responsibility, voluntarism, and local provisions (CHC, 2010: 2). As such, the 
Sonderfall is not just a matter of successful institutions, but rather is a way of thinking 
about them (CHC, 2010: 4).  
In other words, it is the way things are carried out that matters, and not just the 
institutions themselves. Hence a political culture of civic engagement, the 
militia approach and self restraint and moderation are also essential elements 
of the Sonderfall, making it even more an identitarian concept. (CHC, 2010:8) 
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26 Here I also use Chevrier’s understanding of culture as a frame of meaning rather 
than values 
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The idea of the Sonderfall is particularly potent because it is not viewed as an 
act of providence but rather rests on the “Swiss conviction that they themselves were 
the authors of their success” (CHC, 2010: 6; Chevrier, 2009: 175). This has 
encouraged a fair amount of self-satisfaction, with some Swiss claiming that 
Switzerland is the only true democracy and that the Swiss are “more 
moral/humanitarian, more democratic and better organized” (CHC, 2010: 8). More 
importantly, “acceptance of the concept and the institutions and practices on which it 
is said to rest is seen as a necessary qualification for being a true Swiss” (CHC, 2010: 
14).  
Of course, the Sonderfall has not been without criticism, and as early as the 
1960s there were claims that Switzerland was “an introverted, petty bourgeois 
society” (CHC, 2010: 8). The use of the concept declined a little in the 1990s, with 
one minister even claiming that he never wanted to hear the term again (CHC, 2010: 
16). Since then the Sonderfall has remained a highly contested idea, but the 
underlying ideas still serve as a good framework for analyzing a Swiss national 
political culture.   
 Chevrier (2009) identifies four fundamental elements of the Sonderfall: the 
importance of the local and the human dimension of the community one belongs to, 
the tension between respecting difference and the pressure for equality, the 
importance of consultation and consensus building, and finally a sense of pragmatism. 
This last element is relatively easy to understand as it is the “mistrust towards abstract 
principles and systemic approaches which tend to make positions irreconcilable” 
(Chevrier, 2009: 176). Instead, pragmatism calls for the conciliation of differences by 
making compromises that fit the complex reality, even if that means abandoning more 
systematic solutions. 
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Thus, the idea of pragmatism is directly related to the idea of consultation and 
consensus building. As Gabriel Aubert notes, “Political relations in Switzerland are 
founded entirely on respect for the minority: because of the deeply held conviction of 
the value of compromise the majority shares the daily exercise of power with the 
minority” (1989: 381-382). This need for the political elite to respect the minorities 
and the will of the people is largely related to the threat of a referendum which “hangs 
over the lawmakers’ heads” as a “powerful incentive to compromise (Aubert, 1989: 
382). Since any decision by the government can be called to a national referendum by 
the collection of 50,000 signatures, lawmakers need to work toward a general 
consensus prior to passing a law if they hope to get it implemented and not delayed or 
even rejected by a popular referendum.  
In the case that consensus building and compromise fails, then there is a 
strong tradition of arbitration as a means to address conflict. In the popular 
imagination, this practice is traced back all the way to the Bundesbrief of 1291. While 
some have associated the pact of allegiance between Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden 
with the beginning of the national institutions (as I explained in the previous section), 
another interpretation highlights the process for arbitration outlined in the pact as a 
root of modern political culture.  According to the treaty, the ‘conspirators’ not only 
promised to help one another against outside attack but also agreed to go to 
independent arbitration whenever a conflict arose between them. The ‘wisest’ 
members of the Confederation were supposed to mediate and solve conflicts, while 
the rest of the members were responsible for enforcing the judgment (Chevrier, 2009: 
174).  
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Consensus building and arbitration have been of particular importance in the 
creation of the Swiss industrial peace, and thereby is linked to Switzerland’s 
prosperity. During the interwar period Swiss industry was plagued by a number of 
significant strikes. However, starting in the 1930s there was a marked shift away from 
strikes towards signing collective agreements. In 1933, the Federation of 
Metalworkers and Watchmakers stopped regarding strikes as the best option for 
obtaining concessions from employers, and in 1936 the Federal Council mandated 
that collective disputes concerning pay should be submitted to compulsory arbitration 
(Aubert, 1989: 374). Nevertheless, in 1937 there was a major strike regarding wages 
and paid leave in the watchmaking industry. Rather than facing state arbitration, the 
workers chose to submit their dispute to a private tribunal and ended up signing a 
collective agreement, a move that was soon repeated by the metalworking industry 
(Aubert, 1989: 375). Not content with general agreements, the unions started pushing 
for more detailed agreements, and then in 1945 the chemical industry managed to 
secure a complete collective agreement fixing working conditions (Aubert, 1989: 
376). Since then both arbitration and fixed working condition agreements have 
imposed a peace obligation on all parties. The peace agreements are generally 
respected due to a combination of a strong work ethic, the presence of foreign 
workers who do not wish to risk their job security, economic conditions and the 
political system (Aubert, 1989: 380).   
 The need for consensus and arbitration is particularly important in an 
egalitarian context, in which “conflicts cannot be solved with one part imposing its 
solution to the other” (Chevrier, 2009: 176). However, the pressure for equality is 
often in conflict with the need to respect differences. This tension between “the 
rejection of hegemony and the preservation of peculiarities is part and parcel of the 
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Swiss culture” (Chevrier, 2009: 176). For example, in his evaluation of the position of 
“Switzerland in a Changing Europe,” William Rappard notes that “Swiss national 
unity is based on the federation of autonomous units, each glorying its diversity” and 
that  “Switzerland has ever been the home of political individualism.” At the same 
time, “the Swiss are so hostile to every form of hero worship that they are disinclined 
even to accept the temporary leadership of elected presidents, preferring instead to be 
governed by anonymous committees” (1938: 690).  
This hostility toward hero worship and desire for equality is often interpreted 
as the need for individuals to act alike, which leads to mistrust and intolerance toward 
anyone unusual. As Chevrier explains: 
Any great person who breaks out of the traditional frame would necessarily 
stand above the law and create new references, which would inevitably lead to 
a clash with a tremendous coalition of resisting forces…. The safety of the 
community requires that the people behave in conformity with the norms and 
that all offenders be severely punished. To some extent, the quest for 
egalitarianism implies strict discipline.  (Chevrier, 2009:176) 
Since Switzerland’s official policy is to respect diversity, this push for 
conformity normally does not manifest itself in overt authority. Instead it is based 
more on what Erich Fromm has termed  “anonymous authority.” As Fromm explains, 
“Nobody makes a demand, neither a person, nor an idea, nor a moral law. Yet we all 
conform as much or more than people in an intensely authoritarian society would” 
(1954: 148). The only authority comes from an undefined “It” which can be varyingly 
interpreted as “profit, economic necessities, the market, common sense, public 
opinion, what ‘one’ does, thinks, feels” (1954: 148). 
Beyond the pressure to conform to Fromm’s “anonymous authority,” the 
desire for equality also manifests itself at the economic, social and political level. The 
structure of the Swiss government is designed to promote a relatively equal society. 
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Switzerland is a Confederation in which power is distributed between the federal, 
cantonal, and municipal governments. Furthermore, it is a direct democracy in which 
all citizens over the age of 18 have the right to vote for their representatives in 
parliament as well as directly vote on issues. Through a system of referenda and 
initiatives, the Swiss people have the right to bring legislation to a national vote, thus 
insuring that the people have the final say in all policies. 
One of the few things that the Swiss people do not vote for directly is the 
Federal Council (the executive head of the federal government). The Federal 
Assembly votes for the seven council members, and according to Article 175 of the 
Constitution “care must be taken to ensure that the various geographical and language 
regions of the country are appropriately represented.” Beyond the legally binding 
regulations set in the Constitution, the four major political parties have also developed 
a “Magic Formula” which has no binding legal status but is nevertheless generally 
respected. The Formula uses voter support for each party to determine the number of 
seats each party gets in the Federal Council and also reinforces the linguistic 
representation mentioned in the constitution (Swiss Info, 2006). All of these 
mechanisms are supposed to ensure that there is a diffuse distribution of power and 
that no one group dominates the others politically.  
The desire for basic equality has also influenced economic and social policies. 
For example, the Social Insurance policy of Switzerland covers a number of different 
aspects including retirement, disability, unemployment, family allowances, maternity 
leave, accident and health insurance. All of these are supposed to function together to 
ensure that everyone receives at least enough to be able to live a decent life. However, 
the policy combines the value of equality with the value of personal responsibility. 
For example, retirement insurance is divided into three pillars. The first pillar is the 
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state pension plan, the second is an occupational pension plan, and the third is a 
private option, often in the form of a retirement savings account. This is an example 
of a pragmatic solution that attempts to balance the tension between equality and 
personal freedom: the state will guarantee a minimum, but there is also individual 
responsibility to plan for the future (Swiss Info, 2014). 
Finally the Swiss people also exhibit a deep mistrust “of majorities, of strong 
political personalities, of charismatic leadership” (Müller, 1994: 2). For example, 
while each canton has its aristocrats, their privileges are confined to the private sphere 
and generally do not play a role in public life (Chevrier, 2009: 176).  Furthermore, 
there is a tendency to appreciate humbleness over aggrandizing behavior. Although 
there are many rich Swiss, people spending too much money on status objects or seen 
as flaunting their wealth are often viewed quite negatively.  This attitude is reflected 
in the general anger with top executive pay, which has led to numerous initiatives. In 
March 2013, 68% of voters supported the so-called “Fat Cat” initiative which gives 
shareholders a veto over top manager payments, bans big signing bonuses and golden 
parachutes. In the same year, the 100,000 signatures necessary to present a national 
initiative were also gathered in support of the “1:12” initiative, which intended to 
limit the pay of the top executive to no more than 12 times the amount of the lowest 
paid employ. This initiative ended up not receiving the majority support it needed to 
get passed, but it nevertheless illustrates the concerns regarding equality within the 
Swiss population (Stephens, 2013).  
 These examples illustrate how the importance of equality is manifested in 
Swiss politics and daily life. However, as the Sonderfall argues, what makes 
Switzerland so special is the ability to balance equality with plurality. While not 
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including it in their study on Swiss identity, Eugster and Strijbis nevertheless 
hypothesize that Swiss pride about cultural pluralism may be relevant to a cultural 
understanding of national identity. The idea is that “the Swiss are simply proud of 
being able to live peacefully together despite cultural fragmentation” and that 
“citizens appreciate Switzerland’s large variance between cantons and language 
regions” (Eugster and Strijbis (2010: 20).  
  Antoine Chollet (2011) argues that one of the defining characteristics of Swiss 
nationalism is the twisting of factors that should divide the nation into the essence of 
nationalism. Presenting Swiss identity as based on unity through diversity, allows 
factors such as linguistic diversity and federalism based on cantonal independence, to 
be re-framed to fit a national self-image. This glorifying of diversity is particularly 
relevant when considering the final two factors important in an inclusive cultural 
understanding of Swiss national identity, namely language and religion. 
2.3.5 Multilingualism  
 Switzerland has four official languages: German, French, Italian, and 
Romansh. German is the majority language representing about two-thirds of the 
population. French is spoken by approximately 20% of the population, and Italian and 
Romansh are the minority languages spoken by 6% and less than 1% respectively 
(Espersen, 2012). This linguistic diversity was a challenge to traditional nation 
building. However, Anderson argues, “The appearance of Swiss nationalism on the 
eve of the communications revolution of the twentieth century made it possible and 
practical to ‘represent’ the imagined community in ways that did not require linguistic 
uniformity” (2006: 141). Besides being aided by developments in communication, 
Swiss nation-builders also decided to replace the idea of one unifying national 
language with a discourse celebrating linguistic diversity as a fundamental 
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characteristic of Swiss nationalism. The success of this project is evident in the fact 
that despite not having one single national language to rally around, more than 90% of 
respondents in the Eurobarometer 2003 considered speaking at least one national 
language as important to national identity (Eugster and Strijbis, 2010).   
 Of particular note was the addition, by overwhelming popular vote, of 
Romansh as the fourth national language in 1938.  For many years, Romansh had 
been considered an obsolete language of no particular importance and without any 
official recognition. Then, in the 1930s, Switzerland faced increased pressure from its 
neighbors, which were pursuing totalitarian language policies. Therefore, the 
acceptance of a minority language as part of Swiss multilingualism was considered as 
the ultimate geistige Landesverteidigung27, or as Federal Councilor Philiipp Etter 
noted, the vote had been nothing less than the defense of Swiss national thinking 
(Amrein, 2013; Zimmer, 2004: 18).   
At the federal level, there are a number of measures in place to protect 
language diversity. In 2007 the Swiss federation enacted the Sprachengesetz28. The 
purpose of this language law is to strengthen multilingualism as an essential feature of 
Switzerland, to solidify the internal cohesion of the country, and to promote the use of 
multiple national languages at both the individual and institutional level. 
The Sprachengesetz augments the already existing sections on language policy 
in the Swiss Constitution.  The federal government allows the Cantons to decide their 
own official language. However, it also states that, “In order to preserve harmony 
between linguistic communities, the Cantons shall respect the traditional territorial 
distribution of languages and take account of indigenous linguistic minorities.” (Swiss !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 spiritual national defense 
28 Language law 
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Federal Constitution, 1999: art. 70, para. 2). Furthermore, there is a division between 
the territoriality and the personality principle. In communication with the federal 
government, all citizens are free to choose in which official language they wish to 
communicate. However, at the cantonal level, all residents must respect the official 
cantonal language(s) (Espersen, 2012: 62-63).  
 That means that residents must adjust to the linguistic environment of the 
canton. This not only affects foreign immigrants, but also Swiss citizens who are 
moving to a canton with a different official language. In other words, the linguistic 
freedom of all migrants (including the Swiss) is restricted to the extent that they are 
“expected to acquire for themselves a sufficient knowledge of the local language and 
to enroll their children in the local schools” (Espersen, 2012: 62). This territoriality 
principle is viewed as the main guarantee for the security of the minority language 
groups and as the foundation of Swiss linguistic peace.  
 Also important to language diversity is the continued use of the vernacular, 
especially Swiss German. While it is the majority language, it has never been 
standardized and therefore is not seen as posing a threat as a dominating language 
(Espersen, 2012: 70). The continued use of the vernacular is particularly significant 
since language standardization was crucial to the development of the nation-state 
(Anderson, 2006). For example Nebrija’s original Castilian grammar was conceived 
of as a pillar of the nation-state (Illich, 1980).  
 Julia Slater (2008) notes that Swiss-German is based on a paradox: the 
German-speaking Swiss are strongly attached to their spoken language, but at the 
same time do not take it entirely seriously. There is no official written form of the 
vernacular, it is not considered part of education, and it is relegated to the private 
sphere. Nevertheless, there is quite a lot of pride and interest in the various Swiss 
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dialects, including an impressive project to create “The Swiss Idiotikon” or a 
comprehensive Swiss-German dictionary, which has been in the making since 1862 
and so far consists of 15 out of the 17 planned volumes. While dictionaries are 
invariably national projects, the Swiss Idiotikon is a combination of a dialect and 
historical dictionary that does not offer any standardization. According to Walter 
Haas, professor of German Studies at the Fribourg University, the enthusiasm for the 
project is based in a combination of a defense of cultural history, scholarly interest, 
and the nationalistic “desire to display something that belonged specifically to 
Switzerland” (Slater, 2008).  
3.2.6 Christianity 
 The study by Eugster and Strijbis found that compared to other factors, 
(organized) religion was deemed as much less important, with only 39% of 
respondents stressing its relevance to national identity (2010: 11). Nevertheless, 
religious references remain central to symbols of the Swiss nation, and any review of 
Swiss history would not be complete without considering the role Christianity has 
played in the formation of the modern Swiss state. 
 As shown above, the first line of the preamble to the current Swiss 
Constitution starts with “In the name of Almighty God!”29 Furthermore, the Swiss 
flag prominently features a white cross. To top it all of, the current national anthem is 
called the “Swiss Psalm” and not surprisingly has a very religious foundation. It calls 
upon all free Swiss to pray, as their pious souls already sense that God dwells in the 
Fatherland.  Interestingly it also makes a lot of reference to nature, with specific 
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29 This phrase was already present in the original Constitution in 1848 and has 
remained the opening line in all revisions since then.  
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mention of the Alps, reinforcing the central role of the Alps in Swiss national identity. 
Combine these three together and it becomes difficult to deny the fact that 
Christianity is still relevant in Swiss national identity.  
 A look at history also shows the important role religion has played in the 
formation of modern Switzerland. Being home to both Zwingli and Calvin, 
Switzerland played a major role in the reformation, after which there were rising 
tensions between the Catholic and Protestant cantons. These tensions came to a head 
in Switzerland’s civil war, the Sonderbundskrieg, which was fought between the 
Catholic and Protestant cantons (Reihnhardt, 2014). Although relatively bloodless, it 
nevertheless demonstrates the importance religious identity has in Swiss identity. At 
least until 1848 the ancient religious cleavages were politically more important than 
linguistic ones, as some of the Catholic cantons went so far as to outlaw Protestantism 
and vice-versa (Anderson, 2006).  
 Since then, tensions have abated somewhat and the rhetoric has changed to 
demonstrate just how well the two sides can live together in a religiously diverse 
Switzerland. For example, one of the central questions explored by the Swiss National 
Museum is “Why do Protestants and Catholics live in close proximity to each other in 
Switzerland?” (Holzhueter, 2015: 5). However, although the coexistence of 
Protestants and Catholics is presented as another facet of Switzerland’s diversity, this 
plurality is generally only accepted within the confines of the Christian tradition.  
 
 
 
 
2.4 The Culturally Exclusive Nation – the Volksnation 
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Unlike a political or culturally inclusive identity, the conception of a culturally 
exclusive national identity is mostly based on the idea of race and ethnicity. Eugster 
and Strijbis (2010) acknowledge that both race and ethnicity are social constructs and 
as such are malleable. However, since they are concepts passed down through 
generations, change happens slowly and cannot be effected by the individual without 
the consent of society. Therefore, these concepts can be used to exclusively define the 
nation. For example, the Chinese nation is quite strongly predicated on a politico-
ethnic understanding, which means that even if I gained Chinese citizenship, spoke 
perfect Mandarin and followed all customs, my nose, big eyes, and blond hair would 
always mark me as the other.  
In the case of Switzerland the existence of an ethnic Swiss has been proposed 
in the past, but currently the trend is to make this part of Swiss identity less explicit. 
Nevertheless, the idea of a Volksnation formed a “crucial dimension of the 
construction of the national order” (Mottier, 1999: 8), and there are still some 
interpretations of history and myth that focus on the imagined ethnic origins of the 
Swiss. 
 The earliest signs of settlements in the area of modern day Switzerland, were 
discovered in 1853 when workmen happened upon the remains of an old lake 
settlement created by the Pfahlbauers (pile-builders) (Hug and Stead, 1890: 3). These 
lake-dwellers are said to have left their pile buildings and started to be absorbed into 
other groups (most likely into some Celtic tribes, particularly the Helvetians) around 
600-700 BC (Hug and Stead, 1890: 11). Since then, the territory has been inhabited 
by a number of different peoples, most notably the Celts, the Rhaetians, Alamanni, 
Burgundians, and Franks.  
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Although most modern Swiss are likely descendants from the Alamanni and 
the Burgundians (Hug and Stead, 1890: 45), Swiss mythology is still strongly tied to 
the Helvetians. Switzerland was referred to as the Helvetian Republic under the rule 
of Napoleon and to this day is officially known as the Helvetic Confederation (usually 
used in the Latin Confoederatio Helvetica). However, such a conception requires 
historical forgetfulness on a number of levels. First of all, there is no direct lineage 
from the Helvetians. Furthermore, the Helvetians are not indigenous to the territory 
since they previously had lived between the Rhine and the Main and only settled in 
Switzerland after being pushed out by the Germans. Finally, historical accounts 
indicate that during the reign of Cesar the Helvetians actually attempted to leave their 
harsh homeland and settle in Gaul. However, the plan of the hundreds of thousands of 
migrating Helvetians was foiled by Cesar’s army, and the Helvetians were forced to 
return to Helvetia, which was integrated into the Roman empire as the state Civitas 
Helvetiorum (Hug and Stead, 1890: 14, 21-24,34). 
It was after the founding of the Eidgenossenschaft (the Confederation) that the 
name Schweiz (Switzerland) eventually took hold. The original oath was sworn 
between Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden, and at first the inhabitants of these areas 
called themselves by the names of their own communities, or simply as Eidgenossen 
(Confederates). However, during the various wars, the opponents often did not 
differentiate between the different Eidgenossen and referred to them collectively as 
Schwyzer, a term that has morphed into the modern day Schweizer. Even the Swiss 
flag resembles the flag of the canton Schwyz, which is red with a small white cross in 
the corner.   
It is important to remember that at that time the foe usually were inhabitants of 
regions which now belong to Switzerland (Zürich, Bern, etc.) and hence even the 
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name of the nation requires a very specific ability to have already forgotten things one 
is constantly being reminded of. In this way the Swiss imaginary is based on the 
concept of a very specific people; however, the term has been re-imagined in such a 
way that currently Schweizer also includes Italian speakers in Ticino, French speakers 
in Geneva, and Romansh speakers in Graubünden.  
Despite this complex and diverse genealogy, some historians have tried to 
construct the idea of a pure Swiss ethnie. Especially during the early 20th century, 
when the Swiss nation was being pressured from all sides by its more homogenous 
neighbors, some scholars argued for a Swiss Wesengemeinschaft30 based on organic 
nationalist ideals (Zimmer, 2004: 12). Such a view focusing mostly on the pre-
modern past was championed by groups right of the center, ranging from the Catholic 
conservatives to the fascist right (Zimmer, 2004: 13).  
Organic nationalists differed from civic nationalists by emphasizing the 
genealogical decent from the medieval ‘founders’ rather than viewing them as early 
representatives of republican ideals (Zimmer, 2004: 13). Although such a line of 
argument was not widely supported by the mainstream political parties or newspaper, 
it was fairly well developed in the margins. Karl Keller-Tarnuzzer was a proponent of 
a culturally exclusive Swiss Volk and defended his views in an article titled “Die 
Herkunft des Schweizervolkes”31 in the Thurgauer Newspaper in 1936. His argument 
was that the centuries and millennia of the development of the Swiss Confederation 
resulted in “Swiss blood” based on the unique intermingling of various groups. While 
he acknowledged the various groups that have inhabited Switzerland he nevertheless 
contended that the Pfahlbauer (who had lived in Switzerland from at least 3000BC) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Community based on being 
31 “The Origins of the Swiss People” 
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had a unique adaptive advantage and that therefore their resiliency forms a key 
ingredient in the evolution of the “Swiss race”. His conclusion was that “It is high 
time… that the widely held theory that we are nothing but Alemanni, Frenchmen and 
Italians gives way to a consciousness that we Swiss form a distinct race based upon 
the original population of this country, the Pfahlbauer”  (Keller-Tarnuzzer in Zimmer, 
2004: 15). 
 These days such an argument may seem a little absurd, but nevertheless the 
ethnic or genetic relationship among the Swiss is still a topic of research. For 
example, in 2012 a study by Buhler and others looked at “The Heterogenous HLA 
Genetic Makeup of the Swiss Population.” Although their main purpose was to 
determine possible regional differences in order to optimize donor recruitment 
strategies in hematopoietic stem cell transplantation, they nevertheless also used their 
data to gain a better understanding of the genetic background of the Swiss. Using data 
from more than 20,000 subjects, they compared both geographic and linguistic 
subdivisions in Switzerland. Not surprisingly, they found a heterogeneous genetic 
makeup, with pronounced differences evident in Ticino, Grisons, and Wallis 
corresponding to a highly significant differentiation between the Alps and the 
Plateau/Jura as well as between linguistic groups.  
Related to this interest in Swiss genealogy are the eugenicist discourses of the 
Volksnation, which were highly influential in Switzerland from the late 1800s to the 
end of the Second World War (Mottier, 1999: 8). While today the idea of eugenics is 
popularly declared as “un-Swiss,” at that time, Swiss scientists were instrumental in 
the field’s development and the ideas were considered scientific orthodoxy. 
Widespread interest in the field of eugenics led to the foundation of the Julius Klaus 
Foundation for Heredity Research, Social Anthropology and Racial Hygiene in 1922. 
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The foundation’s first president, Otto Schlaginhaufen, was particularly concerned 
with identifying the racial origins of the Swiss. As part of his quest to document the 
“Homo Alpinus Helveticus” Schlaginhaufen and his team measured over 35,000 male 
army recruits. They found that according to their analysis the majority of Swiss are a 
mix of six different races and only 8.7% of Swiss were “pure” race. Of these, only 
1.4% were considered pure “Homo Alpinus” (Mottier, 1999: 11). 
 The quest for a “pure” Swiss race was linked with the work of psychiatrists 
and sexologists concerned with the idea of Volksdegeneration, mostly attributed to 
hereditary mental illness (particularly in the Jews), narcotic poisons (including 
alcohol), and reproduction with “inferior” partners. The “inferior other” included 
“criminals, prostitutes, alcoholics, immoral people, the mentally ill, haemophiliacs, 
people with tuberculosis, drug addicts, gypsies, vagrants” and a strong line was drawn 
between the white and “inferior” races such as the Jews, Chinese, and “Negroes” 
(Mottier, 1999: 12). 
 Beyond teaching sex education focused on discouraging sex with such 
“degenerate” partners, eugenicists such as Auguste Forel called for their sterilization, 
a practice first put into action in 1892. During the following decades, Switzerland 
maintained the top position in terms of sterilizations and various cantons legalized the 
practice of forced sterilizations (Mottier, 1999: 13).  While the practice of forced 
sterilization lost its popular appeal following the Holocaust, the idea did not disappear 
completely. Possibly the most striking example is the project Kinder der Landstrasse 
(Children of the Road). The project was organized by the children’s charity Pro-
Juventute (but supported by federal institutions) and between 1926 and 1973 
organized the kidnapping of over 700 Jenisch (gypsy) children in an attempt to 
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eradicate vagrancy. The founder of the project, Alfred Siegfried, is supposed to have 
said the following: “We must say that we have already achieved much if these people 
do not start a family, do not reproduce without restraint and bring new generations of 
degenerate and abnormal children into the world” (New, 1997: 108).  
Although the idea of the Homo Alpinus Helveticus has been discarded by most 
in favor or a more pluralistic understanding of ethnicity in Switzerland, the 
attachment to the idea of an indigenous mountain people still holds sway in 
Switzerland. For example, the adoption of Romansh as the fourth national language 
was arguably largely driven by the political situation of the time, but part of the 
reason that the population so easily accepted Romansh was that it appealed to the 
popular self-image of a rugged mountainfolk (Amrein, 2013). 
In addition, the continued significance of genealogy is reflected in the 
importance of family names in the popular understanding of what it means to be 
Swiss. Like certain dialects, some names can be traced to particular regions or even 
villages, and exotic last names are often used to peg someone as a foreigner. In his 
satirical work “Schweizen”32 Charles Lewinsky plays on various Swiss fears in 
creating 24 different visions of Switzerland’s future. One of his stories is based on a 
police investigation of the murder of journalist Sven Söderholm. In the short story 
Commissioner Ramakrishna takes the lead and is aided by his assistant Dragan 
Pavlovic, police photographer Juan Gomez, coroner Dr. Abdelkader, and the Chief of 
Police Li Chung. The investigation eventually leads them to the Director of the 
AONS (the Action for Original Swiss Nationals), who had murdered the journalist in 
an attempt to hide the fact that his family tree was not purely Swiss but at one point 
had also included some Germans (Lewinsky, 2013: 83-90).  
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While taking the issue to a satirical extreme, Lewinsky nevertheless touches 
on an important point, also mentioned in the movie Die Schweizermacher (1978). In 
the movie one of the immigration officers has trouble pronouncing a surname and 
comments that it should be possible to require that foreigners first change their names 
before applying for citizenship.33  Moving from popular culture to real life, David 
Hampshire also notes that Swiss with foreign names may become victims of 
xenophobia (Hampshire, 2007: 387). Therefore, although most people would not 
argue that there is one Swiss ethnic group, blood lines and links with a particular 
people still form an important part of the imagined Swiss community.  
A genealogical framing of national identity is also evident in Switzerland’s 
citizenship laws. Unlike the United States, which follows the principle of jus soli, 
meaning that everyone born within the territory is a citizen, Switzerland follows the 
principle of jus sanguinis, which means that a child born in Switzerland only gains 
citizenship if at least one of the child’s parents is Swiss. While these two legal 
concepts can be traced back to Roman law, they acquired new and decisive 
importance following the French Revolution.  Citizenship no longer simply implied a 
generic subjugation but came to identify the “members of the sovereign” (Agamben, 
1998: 76) 
 Furthermore, it is quite difficult to become a naturalized citizen in 
Switzerland, as it takes at least ten years of residency in addition to a number of other 
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33 In an interesting twist Secon@s Plus Aargau, part of a national group fighting for 
citizenship and equal opportunities, has called for the right of naturalized Swiss to 
change their last names without any problem. Ivica Petrusic, the president of 
Second@s Aargau admits that simply changing a name will not solve the integration 
issue, but argues that it is a pragmatic idea based on the desire of naturalized citizens 
who want to adapt their names to the cultural context (SwissInfo, 2009) !
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factors. Therefore, Swiss citizenship is still strongly associated with the concept of 
having “Swiss blood.” According to one study, 81% of respondents stressed the 
importance of having Swiss citizenship as part of national identity, thereby, indirectly 
supporting a more exclusive conception of the nation. However, when directly asked 
if having Swiss ancestors was important, only 42% of the respondents responded in 
the affirmative (Eugster and Strijbis, 2010: 11). 
 
2.5 Negative Identity and the “Other” 
 Finally, apart from the three positive conceptions based on politics and both 
inclusive and exclusive cultural elements, it may be useful to consider the idea of 
Switzerland as a nation defined in the negative by what it is not. Chollet notes that his 
concept of the “fractured” nation can also be understood in terms of negative 
nationalism. For example, consensus is actually the absence of conflict; neutrality is 
the absence of a political stance; and federalism is not meddling in other’s business.  
In such a conception, Switzerland is “what remains when one has removed every 
possible characteristic” and therefore leads to a constant reference to the non-Swiss 
other (2011: 749).  
 Such a negative conception can be useful when considering the plurality of 
Swiss culture. While the Swiss like to imagine themselves as a heterogeneous and 
plural nation, a negative conception reveals that this plurality is quite limited and 
restricted to certain elements accepted as part of a Swiss national identity. Being 
Swiss does not require the presence of one specific language or religion; however, the 
plurality is generally imagined as limited and it is possible to speak a language or 
follow a religion that is popularly considered to be “non-Swiss” and reason for 
exclusion. Similarly, although there is no unique Swiss ethnie, there is still a 
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relatively widespread imagination of the Swiss as being a white (and ideally 
mountain-dwelling) people. Therefore, it is possible that certain groups may be 
excluded because they do not fit into an ethnic perception of the Swiss, even if 
ethnicity is imagined in plurality.  
Moreover, the idea of a negative identity is related to a Derridean 
conceptualization of identity boundaries, predicated on order derived from binaries 
(such as man/woman, black/white, us/them). The negative part of the binary functions 
as a “constitutive outside,” which gives content and meaning to the positive half 
(Mottier, 1999: 5). However, as Veronique Mottier points out these binaries often 
overlap and crosscut each other. These crisscrossing boundaries are constantly 
threatening the desired order by creating a lot of ambivalence.  Therefore, a negative 
construction of Swiss identity is closely tied to discourses based on threat and fear.  
For example, Mottier argues that war has been of particular importance in the 
construction of Swiss identity, and that rather than being based on a common cultural 
heritage, Swiss national identity is founded on (real of perceived) external threats. She 
continues, “Swiss national identity has consequently been described as negative, 
emerging   through   ‘difference’   and   in   particular   through the demarcation of 
external enemies” (1999: 5). Such mechanisms of “othering” are centered on the 
“foreign”  (especially immigrant workers and asylum seekers), who are used to 
juxtapose the identity of the “us.”  
  Mottier’s analysis fits with Gertjan Dijkink’s theory on national identity 
(discussed in the theoretical framework). According to Dijkink national identity is 
constantly influenced by external events, and perceived threats are particularly 
important in shaping the discourse on national identity. He explains that all humans 
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yearn for a kind of world order, “a sensible pattern of people things and behaviour” 
(1996: 15) and that the nation is the “most relevant recourse for those who wish to 
restore order when they are faced with a serious disturbance” (1996: 16). 
 In the past the most significant source of fear was a threat to territorial 
boundaries by traditional war. However, changes in military technology and 
geopolitics have shifted the main source of fear to issues related to identity/culture as 
well as economic and environmental security (1996: 144-145). This serves to 
highlight the connection between national identity and the “foreign other” (most 
importantly immigrants). In the next section, I further explore this connection, 
focusing primarily on how the popular conceptions of a “Swiss national identity” 
described in this chapter influence attitudes and policies regarding the “other.” 
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Chapter Three: Immigration and Identity 
In the previous Chapter, I looked at the various conceptions of what it means 
to be Swiss as expressed in hegemonic discourses.  In Chapter Three, I take a closer 
look at the issues of immigration and foreigners in the context of national identity.  
 
3.1 A History of Immigration 
While the issue of immigration has been a central part of political and public 
discussions since the founding of the modern nation, Yvonne Riaño and Doris Wastl-
Walter (2006) have identified four main phases of immigration in Switzerland. 
During the first phase, prior to World War I, Switzerland underwent a process of 
industrial expansion and foreigners were seen as crucial for the country’s 
development. Foreigners, especially Europeans, were welcomed into Switzerland as 
long as they behaved ‘properly.’  Bilateral agreements gave foreigners equal rights as 
citizens (except for the right to vote) and could be naturalized after only two years of 
residence. However, the increasing presence of foreigners resulted in a conservative 
backlash that claimed Switzerland was being invaded by uncivilized ‘barbarians.’  
This shift in perception became dominant with the outbreak of the First World 
War and the development of the notion of Überfremdung (the idea that excessive 
foreigners were threatening Swiss identity). In reality, the number of foreigners had 
actually decreased during the war, but the level of perceived threat and a discourse of 
Überfremdung outweighed the facts. In 1932, the government issued the Federal Law 
on the Settlement and Residence of Foreigners (ANAG), which restricted the civil 
rights of foreigners and limited the possibility of becoming a permanent resident. In 
many ways, this was a turning point for immigrants in Switzerland, as they were no 
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longer considered immigrants but were conceptualized as foreigners. The law was 
intended to protect the Swiss labor market and identity by requiring officials to 
consider the intellectual and economic interests of the country as well as the degree of 
Überfremdung before granting permits to foreigners. This culture of threat continued 
into the Second World War and was central to Geistige Landesverteidigung (a 
program of spiritual defense of the nation).  
During the post-war era Switzerland benefited from rapid economic expansion 
and once again experienced labor shortages, particularly for un- and semi-skilled 
labor. To address the opposing desire to protect Switzerland and the need for foreign 
workers, the government devised a system of seasonal and temporary workers on a 
rotation system. Seasonal workers were allowed in Switzerland for up to nine months 
before they had to return home. Some workers received one-year permits, but the 
renewal was contingent on Switzerland’s economic situation. As such the government 
used a laissez-faire approach in terms of number, but designed the system to serve as 
an economic buffer in case of a recession. Since foreign workers were seen as 
seasonal, little effort was made to integrate them into society. There were limited 
family reunifications, and in 1952 a new citizenship law increased the number of 
years of residency required for naturalization to twelve.  
In response to high prices and growing inflation during the 1960s, a number of 
decrees were passed with the intention of reducing the number of foreign workers. 
However, these were not successful and so in 1965 there was the first popular 
initiative against Überfremdung, which demanded that the percentage of foreigners 
could not exceed 10% of the population. The government successfully called for the 
rejection of the initiative, but was still forced to accommodate the mounting pressure 
by issuing further decrees limiting the presence of foreigners. Still not satisfied, the 
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National Action Committee launched a second initiative in 1969. The initiative, 
named after its main proponent Schwarzenbach, was even more extreme than the first 
and demanded that no  canton could have more than 10% of foreigners and no Swiss 
person could be laid off as long as their was a foreigner working within the same 
branch of an enterprise. Once again, the government fought against the initiative, but 
only by issuing a compromise decree to implement annual quotas on immigration.   
Despite the government’s attempt to stabilize the foreign population, the 
number of foreigners continued to grow. However, the defeat of a third 
Überfremdung initiative seemed to indicate a weakening of xenophobic attitudes. 
Moreover, the economic recession of the 1970s drastically reduced the number of 
seasonal-workers. In 1981, there was even an initiative to improve the situation of 
foreigners by supporting automatic family reunions and automatic renewals of yearly 
permits; however, it was rejected by an overwhelming 84% of voters.  
The beginning of the 1990s marked the start of a fourth phase in immigration 
discourse in Switzerland. After the end of the Cold War, Europe became increasingly 
integrated, and while Swiss voters rejected membership in the European Economic 
Area, there was nevertheless a spirit of rapprochement with the rest of Europe. For 
example, in 1989 and 1990, the governments of Spain and Portugal negotiated 
reduced residency requirements for their citizens and in general there was an increase 
in the number of permanent residents. As the previous model of seasonal workers 
became untenable, the government created a commission to develop a new policy. 
The solution came in the form of a “three-circle” policy in which foreigners were 
conceptualized according to “cultural proximity.” The first and closest group 
consisted of members of the European Union, which where followed by nationals 
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from the USA and Canada in the second circle. Finally, the third circle consisted of all 
the rest.  
Given widespread criticism of the policy, both as racially prejudiced and 
limiting needed skilled-immigrants from the third circle, the government created a 
second commission in 1997. The recommendation was to introduce a point system 
(based on the Canadian and Australian model); however, the system was never put 
into practice. Instead the three-circle model simply morphed into a two-circle model, 
which came into practice with the 2001 bilateral agreement on the free movements of 
persons in the European Union.  The agreement gave EU nationals the same rights as 
the Swiss (except for the right to vote) and thus discursively removed them from the 
concept of the foreigner. Therefore, foreigners are mostly imagined as those who 
come from outside the EU, and their entry is strictly limited to skilled personnel who 
are thought to be necessary for the economy.   
 
3.2 Attitudes towards Immigration 
This brief historical overview of immigration in Switzerland indicates that 
public and elite opinion has changed over time. The idea of Überfremdung forms a 
central theme, with both economic and cultural fears influencing official policy. This 
fits well with the two major theories used to explain people’s attitudes towards 
immigration: one is based on interests and the other on ideology (Wilkes and others, 
2008; Malhotra and others, 2013; Sides and Citrin, 2007).  This division is common 
across most studies even if authors use different names to indicate the same division; 
for example, Sides and Citrin (2007) refer to these two theories as ‘rational’ and 
‘symbolic.’ They also add a third category of “information” which refers to the 
information (or lack thereof) regarding the actual size of the immigrant population.  
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With regard to this last category Sides and Citrin (2007) find that contextual 
factors are mostly unrelated to opposition to immigration. These findings are 
supported by Wilkes and others (2008), who also found that attitudes are not 
significantly affected by the rate of immigration. However, while contextual factors 
generally have little impact, misperceptions about the size of immigrant populations 
are prevalent and have a significant impact on popular attitudes towards immigration 
(Sides and Citrin, 2007).  
The effect of large immigrant populations can be interpreted according to two 
theories – threat theory and intergroup contact theory. In their article “The More the 
Merrier,” Green and others (2010) found that contact generally reduced exclusionary 
immigration attitudes; however, this effect was dependent on the type of immigrant. 
The presence of North and West European immigrants generally reduced perceived 
threat, while a larger proportion of Muslims was related to an increased perceived 
threat. Their study is particularly notable because it highlights the different attitudes 
towards different immigrant groups. Popular discourse in Switzerland often 
distinguishes between various categories including culturally similar versus culturally 
distant, ‘old’ and ‘new,’ adaptable versus inadaptable, and legitimate versus 
illegitimate immigrants (Green and others, 2010: 187).  
The idea that interests determine attitudes is predominantly based on the 
concept of economic interests, and particularly the labor-market. The theory is that 
native-born people fear that immigrants may either take their jobs or at least depress 
their wages. Furthermore, the validity of the threat may not be as important as the 
perception of such a threat (Wilkes and others, 2008: 303). Mahotra and others 
distinguish between “prevalence” and “conditional” impact, and find that “when labor 
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market threat is present, there is a significant association between labor-market 
competition and views on immigration” (2013: 392). This theory is supported by the 
findings of researchers in Canada: in a study of 17 national Canadian Gallup Polls, 
Wilkes and others (2008) found that the state of the economy influenced attitudes 
toward immigration.  
 Furthermore, an economic theory generally distinguishes between the 
attitudes of low-skilled and high-skilled workers who should feel threatened by 
different types of immigrants (Wilkes and others, 2008: 304). Basing her analysis on 
two sets of survey data covering a wide range of countries, Mayda (2006) finds 
empirical support for this theory.  When moving from consideration of attitudes (and 
thus perceived threat) to actual impact on wage distribution, Favre (2011) finds that 
recent immigrants in Switzerland are overrepresented at both the top of the high-skill 
and at the bottom of the low-skill occupations. While there is no significant effect on 
natives in the low-skill bracket, Favre finds strong evidence for the notion that high-
skill natives whose skill set is similar to that of immigrants lose (2011: 21). This 
should indicate that high-skill workers in Switzerland should feel threatened and 
therefore oppose immigration. This could possibly help explain why exit polls at the 
Swiss national elections showed that the majority of people in the high-income 
bracket had voted for the conservative/anti-immigrant Swiss People’s Party 
(Skenderovic, 2001: 7). 
 In contrast, a study by Hainmueller and Hiscox found that a positive attitude 
towards all migrants (including high-skilled immigrants) was significantly correlated 
with higher education and skill level. They conclude that rather than being linked to 
economic factors, skill and education level is linked with cultural values and beliefs, 
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as “more educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on 
cultural diversity” (2007: 399). 
While the influence of economic interests remains widely contested as an 
explanation of attitudes towards immigration, there is a general consensus on the 
importance of ideological concerns – especially national identity (Hooghe and Marks, 
2004). For example, Sides and Citrin note that “Public opinion is not insensitive to the 
economic consequences of immigration, but more important are deeply held symbolic 
attitudes, such as beliefs about cultural unity or homogeneity” (2007: 501).  
In the past national identity was often used as a single category to explore the 
role of identity in forming attitudes towards immigration. However, that obscures 
much of the story. Pehrson and others argue that the relationship between national 
identification and anti-immigration prejudice depends on how national groups are 
defined by their members. They find that anti-immigration attitudes were in general 
stronger in countries in which national identity was based on language and weaker in 
those where the nation was defined in terms of citizenship. Interestingly, these effects 
were seen at the national rather than the individual level, and cannot be explained as 
the aggregation of individual-level effects. As such, “the identification-prejudice 
relationship depends on being in a nation in which these criteria are generally 
considered important, rather than being an individual for whom they are important” 
(2009: 33). In contrast, support for an ancestry-based perception of the nation was 
only linked to prejudice at the individual level (2009: 24).  Finally, they somewhat 
contradictorily find that having co-nationals who strongly identify with the nation 
may actually make individuals more tolerant of immigrants. One possible explanation 
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of this is that having strong national identification may decrease the perceived threat 
to the nation (2009: 34).  
In their study on “Nationalism and patriotism as predictors of immigration 
attitudes in Switzerland,” Green and others distinguish between nationalism as the 
“uncritical and blind attachment to the nation” and patriotism as “pride in national 
democratic institutions” (2011: 369). They further associate nationalism with the 
conception of the nation on the basis of a common cultural heritage or ancestry, and 
find that such an exclusionary conception of the nation is linked with anti-
immigration attitudes.  
Finally, Hooghe and Marks argue, “the way a citizen conceives her national 
identity is decisive”; in particular it is important to distinguish between national 
identities conceived in exclusive versus inclusive terms (2004: 415). As Andrea 
Haenni Hoti (2006: 235) puts it: 
In the Swiss society there are competing patterns of identiﬁcation with the 
nation: one type is based on a constructed common ethnicity and is strongly 
related to the idealization of the in-group and, at the same time, to xenophobia. 
Another pattern of identiﬁcation is based on the concept of citizenship and 
focuses on equal participation of immigrants in all societal domains.  
 
Therefore, understanding how a Swiss national identity has been constructed 
and to deconstruct the various competing discourses is not just an intellectual activity, 
but one with important political implication. Eugster and Strjbis understand this when 
they argue, “the content of the national identity impacts on the definition of national 
interests. It determines, for example, who should be included and who excluded from 
policies, and what is seen as good or bad for the national community” (2010: 13). 
However, in order to fully understand the political implications of identity, it is not 
enough to simply understand how identity is constructed but also how these 
conceptions of national identity are mobilized. In Chapter Two, I explored how a 
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Swiss national identity has been constructed; in the following section, I explore how it 
has been mobilized in debates over immigration.  
 
3.3 National Identity, Politics, and Immigration 
I ended the historical overview of migration in Switzerland with the two-circle 
model and the bilateral free movement of persons agreement with the EU signed at 
the beginning of the 2000s. However, that is not the end of the story. In 2014, many 
observers where shocked when a majority of Swiss voters cast their ballots in favor of 
setting limits to immigration, in effect revoking the free movement of persons 
agreement. Following the passing of a popular initiative, the government now has to 
find ways to practically implement the will of the people. This means that currently 
Switzerland stands at another cross roads with regards to immigration, and recent 
decisions likely mark the transition into a fifth phase of foreigners in Switzerland.  
  Therefore, understanding how a Swiss national identity has been mobilized in 
these debates is not only interesting from an academic or intellectual standpoint, but 
also for better understanding the mechanisms at work that may influence how people 
respond to and transform the dominant discourse. Switzerland is an interesting case 
because the mechanisms of direct democracy, particularly popular initiatives, allow 
for the assessment of proposals by specific interest groups, the governments’ official 
stance, and finally the popular opinion as expressed at the ballot box. Since the 
implementation of the popular initiative, there have been hundreds of initiative 
proposals. However, some never make it onto a ballot, and of those issues that have 
been voted on very few have been approved. With regards to immigration and 
foreigners there have been quite a few proposals, and in accord with other initiatives 
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the majority have been rejected. However, in the last few years, three initiatives have 
been approved by popular vote. This seems to indicate a significant shift and is 
worthy of further exploration.   
 
Year of 
Vote 
Name (Committee) Purpose Yes/No 
1970  Überfremdung 
(National Action) 
Leveling off of foreigner population in 
Switzerland (limited to 10%) 
No – 54% 
1974  Against Überfremdung and the 
overpopulation of Switzerland 
(National Action) 
Annual naturalization limit of 4,000 
Number of foreigners to be limited to 
500'000  
Cantonal max of 12% of population 
No – 66% 
1977 Überfremdung 
(Swiss Republican Movement) 
Foreign residents limited to 12.5% of 
population   
No – 70% 
1977 Limitation of Naturalization 
(National Action) 
Limitation of annual naturalization to 
4,000 as long as the total population is 
more than 5.5 million  
No -66% 
1981 Mitenand 
(Working group for a new 
foreigner policy/Catholic 
workers movement) 
 
End of seasonal worker status 
Consideration of foreigners in political 
decisions 
No – 84% 
1988 Limiting Immigration 
(National Action) 
Limit population to 6.2 million, limit 
border-crossers to 90,000 and no more 
than 100,000 seasonal permits per year  
No  - 67% 
1996 Against illegal immigration 
(SPP) 
Asylum seekers have neither the right to 
enter the country nor free residency and 
work permits  
No – 54% 
2000 Regulation of immigration 
(Committee for limited 
immigration) 
Limit foreigners to no more than 18% of 
the total population 
No – 64% 
2002 Against the misuse of asylum 
(SPP) 
If an asylum seeker enters from a secure 
third-country, his or her request should be 
denied 
No – 50% 
2008 Democratic naturalization 
(SPP) 
Naturalization should be the decision of 
the municipality, in any way they see fit 
No – 64% 
2009 Against the building of 
Minarets  
(Committee against the 
building of Minarets, supported 
by SPP) 
Ban of the building of more minarets 
 
Yes – 
58% 
2010 Deportation of Criminal 
Foreigners 
(SPP) 
Certain crimes as well as the misuse of 
social services leads to automatic 
deportation from Switzerland   
Yes – 
53% 
 
2014 Against Mass-immigration 
(Committee against mass-
immigration, SPP) 
Switzerland is independent in determining 
its foreign population. The number of 
permits should be limited to yearly 
maximums and subject to quotas 
Yes – 
50% 
Table 1: List of Initiatives related to immigration (data collated from Hofer, 2015).  
Given that Swiss national identity is highly political, Eugster and Strijbis 
hypothesized that how national identity is imagined is linked with party affiliation. 
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They found that the data supports their hypothesis that the Greens tend to be less 
attached, while members of the Swiss People’s Party are more attached to a cultural 
nation. It is possible that this could be explained by other factors. For example, people 
in urban areas and those with formal higher education give less importance to cultural 
dimensions of the nation, whereas age and religiosity are positively correlated with a 
cultural identity (Eugster and Strijbis, 2010). How this plays out in the political 
context is evident in the voter analysis of the decision on whether or not to join the 
EEA in 1992. While the overall vote was no, the yes votes were predominantly from 
French speakers, the inhabitants of larger cities, and voters with higher education 
(Müller, 1994). However, even when taking these control variables into consideration, 
a difference based on party lines is still evident (though less prominent) (Eugster and 
Strijbis, 2010).  
This link between political parties and the different conceptions of the nation 
provides a reasonable foundation for exploring attitudes towards immigration along 
party lines. Moreover, while anyone can launch a popular initiative, they are usually 
promoted by a specific committee and backed by a given political group. Most 
recently, the Swiss People’s Party34 (SPP) has been the main champion of limiting the 
rights and presence of foreigners (and of backing up a cultural conception of the 
nation). Therefore, understanding the current political climate is predicated on an 
analysis of the rise to power of the SPP.  
  
 
3.4 The Radical Right in Switzerland 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 In German the name is Schweizerische Volkspartei - SVP 
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 While there has been a recent rise in right-wing populist politics, many still 
consider Switzerland as an exceptional case compared to its neighbors (Skenderovic, 
2001). As Skenderovic outlines, there are five main arguments to explain the limited 
success of radical-right politics in Switzerland. The first is a historical argument 
predicated on the fact that Switzerland did not have a fascist or national socialist 
regime in the 1930s and 1940s, which is supposed to be indicative of a very low 
tolerance for an anti-democratic, right-wing stance. A second argument is based on 
the ‘consociational system’ and contends that the strong integrative capacity and 
coalition basis of the Swiss party system does not leave room for radical politics. A 
third argument stresses the importance of direct democracy as a means for marginal 
groups to advance their interests by means of initiatives on particular issues without 
having to be officially represented in parliament. The next argument is based on the 
notion that since Switzerland is commonly conceived as a civic nation founded on 
political will, there is little room for ultra-nationalist discourse based on a 
homogenous ethnic and cultural nation. Finally, the last argument is based on the 
assumption that widespread respect and tolerance toward minorities has limited the 
spread of a radial agenda (2001, 2-3). 
 However, a more in-depth analysis shows that many of these arguments do not 
represent the whole picture. At the historical level, recent research has shown that 
discrimination (particularly anti-Semitism) were more widespread than has commonly 
been depicted (Skenderovic, 2001: 4; Erlanger, 2012). Furthermore, the 
consociational argument has lost some of its persuasiveness as the political system in 
Switzerland has become more polarized in recent years. Of particular note here is the 
breaking of the “magic formula” in 2003, when the traditional balance in the Federal 
Council was disturbed for the first time in decades (Wise, 2012: 13). Furthermore, 
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long-standing notions of concordance and consensus have been increasingly 
challenged by parties taking on an oppositional role in the government (Skenderovic, 
2001: 4).    
 While direct democracy has often been heralded as a useful safety-valve 
allowing people to make themselves heard, it also allows specific interest groups 
(such as the radical-right) to influence popular opinion through public campaigns. 
Skenderovic goes so far as to argue that “direct democracy provides opportunity 
structures which are of great importance and favorable to the emergence and 
mobilization of the radical right” (2001: 5). On a similar note, Erlanger notes that 
democratization “does not always herald positive change; at times it helps sustain old 
prejudices” and perpetuates inherent conservatism (2012: 3).  
 The final two arguments are predicated on the conception of Switzerland as a 
multi-cultural civic nation. However, as I have demonstrated in the previous section, 
constitutional patriotism is only one of several competing discourses and while 
plurality is important to the Swiss identity, it is contained to rather strict 
predetermined parameters. Skenderovic provides a nice summary when he states that 
“indigenous multiculturalism” in Switzerland is often seen as being fairly limited and 
has failed “to develop open attitudes toward new minorities and has not resulted in the 
establishment of inclusive opportunity structures for recent migrants” (Skenderovic, 
2001: 6). Instead, an ethno-cultural framing of Swiss national identity presents an 
opportunity structure, which the radical right can use as a counter concept to the 
political nation. This analysis indicates that Switzerland is not uniquely immune to 
radical right wing politics, and that in fact its system of direct democracy can serve as 
a mechanism to take advantage of various opportunity structures. While these 
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structures have been part of the system for a long time, the recent success of the 
radical right shows that there has been a marked shift in the mobilization of these 
opportunities.  
Prior to 1990, the radical right in Switzerland consisted mostly of small, often 
competing fringe parties (such as Republican Movement, National Action/Swiss 
Democrats, Vigilance, and the Automobilist/Freedom Party) (Skenderovic, 2001). 
Then, during the 1990s, the Swiss People’s Party shifted its focus towards an anti-
immigration stance and started to unite many of the previous fringe parties. The SPP 
grew out of the Party of Farmers, Traders and Independents, which had been a 
cooperative part of the national government since 1929 and then fused with the 
Democratic Party in 1971 to form the SPP. The transformation of the SPP was largely 
linked to Christoph Blocher, a successful businessman and president of the SPP 
Zurich. He proposed a more radical right-wing agenda, focusing specifically on issues 
of immigration, and his influenced helped double the number of cantonal branches 
until the SPP was represented in all cantons.  
The success of the Party’s strategy was evident in the 1999 election results, as 
the SPP gained 22.5% of the popular vote, thus becoming the strongest party in 
Switzerland. Then in 2003 the party was able to break the “magic formula” by gaining 
an extra seat in the Federal Council, forcing out one of the CVP (Christian-
Democratic People’s Party) representatives. Although there remains a significant 
amount of infighting (to the extent that in 2007 one of the SPP councilors broke from 
the party to create her own party), the SPP has become one of the most powerful 
political forces in Switzerland (Skenderovic, 2001; Wise, 2012). 
Many attribute the SPP’s success to its three-part “winning formula,” which 
combines neoliberalism, exclusionism and nationalism to gain voter support (Wise, 
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2012: 16). Initially, it may seem counterintuitive that a radical-right party is running 
on a neoliberal agenda. However, the party has combined liberalism with nationalism 
to suggest the reduction of the negative impact of a liberal market by emphasizing the 
national components; in essence they propose excluding one portion of the 
competition (Skenderovic, 2001: 15). Therefore, much of their political focus is on 
immigration policies and exclusion. Since the ideology of racism has been largely 
disparaged, the SPP relies instead on a form of ‘neoracism,’ which exalts the ‘right to 
be different.’ While this may sound positive, its interpretation supports racist 
ideologies. 
From this viewpoint, culture, whether attributed to nation, ethnic identity or 
Volk, is viewed as a static and natural category, and becomes the determining 
feature of differentiation. Cultural and social phenomena are naturalized and 
thus acquire an essentialist connotation. (Skenderovic, 2001: 14) 
 
Furthermore, the party platform is strongly rooted in a populist appeal to the 
‘common man’ and presents the SPP as the defender of the ‘people’ by running 
against the more established parties (Skenderovic, 2001: 15). In order to exploit this 
populist base, the SPP is often seen as “a notorious example of the successful strategy 
of the professional marketing of political campaigns in order to reinforce the effects 
of their political actions” (2001: 16). That the media can play an important role in 
politics is not a new concept; however, in the case of Switzerland the SPP has stood 
out in its marketing strategy and its use of emotional media campaigns (2001: 15). 
While politics permeate all forms of media, one of the best places to analyze 
the political message of the SPP is in its campaign posters. As Christelle Maire de 
Bellis explains in her paper “Illegal Migration and Asylum Abuses: Constructing New 
Figures of Speech in Political Posters,” posters are an important communication tool 
in political debates. As such, “they bring to life representations that are produced by 
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discourses and ideologies” (Kretchmann, 2009). Therefore, I critically deconstruct the 
discourses and ideologies represented in the campaign posters of two of the popular 
initiatives regarding immigration that have recently been approved.  
3.4.1 The Minaret Ban 
 The first exclusionary and anti-immigrant initiative that was approved by the 
Swiss public was a ban on building minarets. While initially polls showed that the 
majority opposed the initiative, once all the ballots were counted a surprising 58% 
voted in favor. The campaign committee argued that minarets should be banned 
because they are symbols of religious-political power and that they are lighthouses for 
jihad (Hofer, 2015). Most legal experts argued that the proposal violated human and 
constitutional rights regarding the freedom of religion; however, while the federal 
government (including both chambers of parliament) rejected the initiative, they did 
not find grounds to dismiss it on binding human rights concerns. That left it up to the 
public to decide the issue.  
 A significant part of the debate over the initiative focused on the controversial 
campaign poster designed by Alexander Segert, pictured on the next page. The highly 
controversial poster was effective because it gained a lot of media and public attention 
(even if it was negative attention) and because it was framed within several discourses 
central to Swiss identity and the threat thereof. It depicts a Swiss flag, seemingly 
pierced by seven minarets that are made to look like missiles and throwing dark 
shadows across the flag. In the forefront is a woman covered in a black chador, with 
only her eyes visible. Next to this image are the words “STOP – Yes for the minaret 
ban.” 
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A number of elements are at play in the poster. First of all, the style, graphics, 
font, and color scheme are reminiscent of the WWII era. As such it is very backward 
looking, recalling the idea of a former Switzerland in all its glory. However, more 
importantly, it combines the two concepts of “threat” and “Islam”. As I explained in 
the previous section on Swiss national identity, Switzerland has long been constructed 
in the negative, largely in opposition to external threats. During the First and Second 
World War as well as the Cold War, it was quite easy to maintain a threat narrative. 
However, recently that narrative has had to change to find a new threat.  
Furthermore, although many like to believe that Switzerland is the poster-child 
for civic nationalism, my previous analysis shows that other cultural elements are also 
very important for the national imagination. In particular, the conception of the Swiss 
as a white, mountain folk rooted in a Christian heritage remains very salient. As Wise 
(2012: 22) explains: 
The construction of the Swiss identity through the reification of “us” vs. 
“them” boundaries between immigrants and natives would seem to make 
Switzerland particularly sensitive to ethnic threat form immigrants, especially 
those such as Muslims which may not conform visually to the “us” ingroup. 
 
It should thus not be a surprise that the category of “foreigner” is increasingly 
being associated with Muslims in both the media and in public debates. The 
increasing importance of religion in the context of immigration is mostly a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 http://boingboing.net/images/stopp_poster.png 
!116!
phenomenon of the 21st century. For example, in their study of immigrants in the 
media, Lindemann and Stolz found that in 2004 religion was mentioned in 23% of 
coded core sentences, compared to only 1% in 1970 (2014: 47). At the same time, 
there has been a corresponding decrease in the use of generic terms to designate the 
“foreign other.” Moreover, general media discourse fails to distinguish between Swiss 
Muslims and non-Swiss Muslims, simply equating Muslim to “foreigner.” As such, 
“the mere allusion to religion is sufficient to set a boundary between the Swiss in-
group and the out-group” (2014: 48).  
 Even more interesting is the fact that in sociological reality, Muslims represent 
only a minority of immigrants, but they represent a massive majority in the media 
discourses regarding religious affiliation (Lindemann and Stolz, 2014: 52). The 
resulting fear may in part be explained by Daniel Hopkins “politicized places 
hypothesis,” which is based on two core assertions: 
1. While levels of ethnic heterogeneity might escape notice, changes in the 
levels are less likely to do so.  
2. Salient frames which “define what the problem is and how to think about 
it” increase the likelihood that changing levels of ethnic heterogeneity will 
lead to political conclusions. (Wise, 2012: 23)  
The theory would predict that it is not the number of Muslims in Switzerland, but the 
fact that the number is growing that is cause for alarm. This seems plausible since the 
Muslim population in Switzerland has grown from 16, 350 in 1970, to 152,217 in 
1990, 310,800 in 2000, and an estimated 433,000 in 2012 (Erlanger, 2012: 4). This 
recent increase in numbers is largely due to the elimination of the seasonal worker 
program, family reunifications, and an influx of refugees from Turkey and the former 
Yugoslavia. In fact, Switzerland currently has the largest community of Kosovo 
Albanians outside of Kosovo (Erlanger, 2012: 4) 
Right-wing news media is feeding this fear and setting the tone for the debate. 
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One prime example can be found in an article published by Le Temps entitled, 
“Muslims soon the majority?” Contrary to official predictions by the Federal Bureau 
of Statistics, it claims:  
No other religious community increases as fast as the Muslim one. In 1970, 
4000 inhabitants of the canton of Zurich declared belonging to Islam. It 
represents one inhabitant out of 280. In 1990, Muslims were already 30,700 in 
the canton of Zurich. This number has doubled until 2000 where 
approximately 67,000 Muslims were registered in the canton. [...] on the Swiss 
level as well, we notice that the number of Muslims doubled in a lapse of time 
of ten years. If this evolution continues, Muslims will soon be the majority in 
the country.          
 (Le Temps, Sept. 19, 2004, quoted in Lindemann and Stolz, 2014: 48)   
This same exaggeration is evident in the campaign poster. While the poster shows 
seven minarets completely domineering the Swiss map, at the time of the ban there 
were only four existing minarets in all of Switzerland (Hofer, 2015). 
The fear of the growing Muslim population is largely linked to two distinctive 
threats. One is the idea of terrorism and extremist violence, which has never been an 
actual threat in Switzerland but still haunts the public’s imagination. According to 
Erlanger, much of popular unease is centered around young Muslim men who “are 
seen as clinging to a macho culture complete with car racing, petty crime, sexual 
harassment, and violence” (2012: 5). Therefore, it would have made sense for the 
poster to use the image of a jihadi fighter to represent the threat against Switzerland. 
However, even more prominent is the fear that Islamic traditions in the form 
of Sharia law could challenge Switzerland’s political institutions and culture. In their 
argument against the initiative, the Federal Council made the wise observation that if 
it was really a matter of security then banning minarets was not really the way to go: 
the ban would not actually prevent extremist acts of violence as their planning was 
not dependent on any specific building (Hofer, 2015). However, proponents of the 
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initiative countered such logic by quoting Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan who had said that "Minarets are our bayonets” (Soukup, 2009) and argued 
that minarets are symbols not of Islam as a religion but of the advance of an Islamic 
way of life. The fear is that if left unchecked the growing Muslim presence could 
eventually challenge Switzerland’s independence, neutrality, and entire political 
process.  
This argument helps explain why the poster depicts a Muslim woman, rather 
than a young man in the foreground. During political debates over the issues, 
members of the SPP repeatedly presented the minaret ban as a symbolic stand against 
forced marriages and honor killings (Arena, 2009)36. As such, the poster presents an 
even more insidious image; rather than presenting Switzerland as being threatened 
(with the possibility to fight back), it shows the country as already defeated. During a 
political debate, Ulrich Schlüer (SPP member of parliament from Zürich and one of 
the initiators) argued that the minaret is a symbol of political victory by citing how 
after the fall of Constantinople the conquering forces built minarets on the Hagia 
Sophia to mark their victory (Arena, 2009). Similarly, the poster shows how the 
national logo of the flag and the white cross have been pierced by the minarets, which 
resemble the flags of a conquering army. At the same time the woman is not so much 
a threat as a vision of Switzerland’s future under Sharia law.  
Islam as the threatening other is so effective because it can be interpreted in 
two ways – as a religion and as a form of social order. The poster cleverly makes use 
of this double-sided coin by posing Islam as simultaneously threatening two 
conceptions of Swiss national identity. It is able to connect an cultural notion based 
on religion with the concept of the nation based on a specific political culture and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 As I mentioned in the background information in the introduction, there had 
recently been two cases of honor-killings that had shocked the nation.  
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national institutions. If Switzerland indeed were purely a civic nation based on 
constitutional patriotism, then the poster would not have emotionally resonated with 
the majority of the general public. As Erlanger notes, “While mostly secularized, 
large parts of the population still regard a common Christian heritage as the 
foundation stone of Swiss political culture and social cohesion” (2012: 6). Equally, if 
the poster had solely appealed to the public on a religious foundation it would most 
likely not have swayed many of the voters who are more concerned with the 
preservation of Swiss national institutions and political culture. The combination of 
the factors was the winning formula.  
 
3.4.2 Automatic Deportation of Criminal Foreigners 
Shortly after voting to approve the ban on minarets, the Swiss public made 
another controversial decision mandating the automatic deportation of any foreigner 
found guilty of certain crimes or of the misuse of social services. Prior to the decision 
deportation was always an option; however, it was decided on a case-by-case basis 
rather than an automatic sentence.  The campaign against criminal foreigners was 
launched in 2007 and was voted on in November 2010, with 53% of voters approving 
the measure (Hofer, 2015). Just like the minaret ban, the focal point of the campaign 
was also a very controversial poster designed by the same advertising agency. The 
“Black Sheep” poster was a strategic success for the SPP as it prompted a lot of 
publicity. It depicts three white sheep standing on a Swiss flag, while one of the sheep 
uses its hind legs to kick a black sheep off the flag.  In big letters it says “Create 
Security.” 
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Taking another look at the poster, it is interesting to note that nowhere does it 
specify anything about criminals. Nor does it explicitly mention foreigners. Instead, 
the power of the poster and its message is derived from the mythology behind the 
“black sheep.” According to SmartMeme, the importance of a myth is not about 
whether it is true or false, but rather in how much cultural meaning it can carry. These 
stories or myths are “powerful in that they give people a lens for interpreting and 
understanding the world” (Canning and Reinsborough, 2009: 8). The term “black 
sheep” can be found in many languages and generally signifies someone who does not 
fit in with the rest. Often it has negative connotations implying a disreputable, 
wayward, and undesirable character. As I explained in the previous chapter, Swiss 
culture is still deeply rooted in the principle of conformity as a means to balance the 
competing interests of equality and plurality. Therefore, the black sheep can be 
understood as everything that does not fit with Swiss political culture.  
At the literal rather than the symbolic level, black sheep are often considered 
less desirable because black wool cannot be dyed, whereas white wool can be 
processed into many different colors and is therefore more profitable. The origins of 
the idea can be traced back all the way to the Old Testament when Jacob separated 
out the spotted goats and the black sheep from the herd (Schmid, 2013). In this way 
the term provides an intertextual link with the Judeo-Christian tradition. In addition to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37  http://www.nebostoopeth.com/content/images/2015/03/SicherheitShaffen.jpg 
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these religious undertones, the image of the black sheep is linked to a larger narrative 
that differentiates between the “dark” foreigner as undesirable and of the pure, white 
Swiss. Finally the poster strategically uses the idea of “creating security” to mobilize 
the idea of the nation under attack. By leaving the details of the threat unspecified, it 
allows everyone to fill in the gaps according to personal preference. The genius of the 
poster is that it conveys its message in a simple image without ever having to mention 
the words “foreigner” or “criminal.” Instead it artfully combines many of the main 
elements of various conceptions of a Swiss identity – conformity, equality, peace, 
Christianity, ethnicity, and the need to defend against an enemy.  
 As I have explained, these two posters and the affiliated campaigns have been 
so successful because they have been able to mobilize the various conceptions of what 
it means to be Swiss and use these to frame the debates to fit specific political 
objectives. These competing conceptions are widespread and in theory anyone can 
mobilize them for different purposes. What has made the SPP campaigns so effective 
is that they have combined the dominant discourses and have used them to tell a story. 
According to Canning and Reinsborough (2009) the most important elements of a 
story are conflict, characters, imagery, foreshadowing, and assumptions. In the SPP 
story, the conflict and characters are simple – the “Swiss” versus the “foreigner other” 
(the white sheep versus the black sheep) with nothing other than national security at 
stake. Since the entire story is captured in a single poster it relies heavily on its ability 
to show rather than tell. It can convey so much by playing on underlying cultural 
assumptions. White is good, black is bad, the Swiss flag represents us and all that is 
good, we need to defend ourselves, and our security is paramount. And finally the 
poster uses powerful foreshadowing – if you vote in favor of the SPP initiative, then 
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the threat will be eliminated and you are guaranteed security and the safety of your 
identity. 
 However, this is not the only story that can be told. Narratives, discourse, and 
frames can all be shifted and transformed. If one wants to move away from racist or 
exclusionary discourses, then there are two options. The first one is to change the 
story, to shift the frame. Alternatively, it is possible to question the very existence of a 
framework and to call for a re-imagination and new consciousness. I explore both 
options in the following chapter.  
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Chapter Four: Changing the Story or Reimagining the Framework? 
So far I have explored what it means to have a “national” identity, how this 
identity is being imagined in the case of Switzerland, and finally how this discourse is 
affecting Swiss politics, particularly the policies regarding immigration. In this final 
chapter I consider two possible approaches to the question of how to transform the 
relevant discourses to promote a culture of “peaces.” The less radical approach 
consists of “changing the story,” whereas a more radical approach requires the re-
imagination of the entire framework. As I explained in Chapter Two, there exist 
competing conceptions within the concept of a “national” identity that can be 
mobilized to fit specific political agendas. Therefore, it should be possible to mobilize 
different elements to “change the story” of what it means to be Swiss to better fit a 
culture of “peaces.” Furthermore, our identities are socially constructed and derive 
their power from hegemonic discourses. Therefore, if identities are not bound to any 
essential characteristics, then it is possible to reimagine the very concept of identity 
and to question the concept of the nation.  
4.1 Changing the Story 
Culture and identities are not static but change and evolve over time. For 
example, Arai (2006) explains that in conflict situations different elements of culture 
can be made relevant as the conflict progresses. Similarly, Bar-Tal and Nahhas (2013) 
argue that cultures evolve and that given the right circumstances cultures can change. 
While they analyze how intractable conflict situations can transform previously 
peaceful cultures into cultures of violence, it stands to reason that the process can 
work both ways.  
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This process of reconstructing national identity fits with Zimmer’s (1998) idea 
that modern nations alternate between “settled” and “unsettled” periods. During 
settled periods, “the values, symbols, and myths that make up the nation as a cultural 
order are more or less taken for granted, so that they form, as it were, a cultural 
tradition or common sense” (1998: 643). On the other hand, unsettled periods are 
characterized by a questioning of the authenticity of the national identity and by 
attempts to redefine national identity.  
These “unsettled” periods are often triggered by a disturbance to the status 
quo. Dijkink claims that the ideal reaction would be to eliminate the disturbance. 
However, since this is not usually possible, the alternative is a symbolic response: the 
changed order is given new meaning by reconstructing national identity (1996: 16). 
Nowadays, the most significant challenge to the status quo is immigration, and just as 
Dijkink predicted there is no reasonable way to eliminate this disturbance. Therefore, 
the logical conclusion is that “creating more favourable attitudes towards immigration 
may require re-imagining national identities” (Sides and Citrin, 2007: 478). 
Given that identities are dynamic, how is it possible to change dominant myths 
and discourses? Once a myth exists, it is essentially impossible to complete destroy it. 
As Tanner (2011) puts it, there is no rational hammer that can remove myths from the 
world. However, myths are elastic; they can be broken ironically and can be given a 
different meaning when applied in a different context. As Mottier explains, discourses 
are reproduced and transformed by both individual and collective narratives. 
Moreover, these “narratives do not simply express a pre-given national identity but 
function as performatives: speech acts which bring into being that which they name” 
(1999: 5). Therefore, re-imaging national identity is a matter of changing these 
narratives. 
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4.1.1 Smartmeme: Changing the Story 
In today’s world the average adult in urban and suburban America is exposed 
to approximately 3000 commercial messages a day (Canning and Reinsborough, 
2009: 11) and the presence of radio, TV, computers, the internet, mobile phones, and 
now smartphones makes it almost impossible to disconnect from receiving endless 
media messages.38 Given this inundation of messages, the stories we are told and the 
picture of the world they paint often seem so set that it is hard to imagine an 
alternative. However, a historical overview of the evolution of these stories can help 
highlight the possibility of change and to explore what factors facilitate such change.  
The stories that currently surround us usually feature some key characters – 
the hero, the villain and the victim. However, these characters have not always been 
the same, and some are relatively new inventions altogether. For example, 
Applebaum notes how the idea of the hero changed within a few decades from the 
conquering soldier and the noble martyr to someone “performing groundbreaking 
work that was not war and that might contribute indirectly to peace,” and eventually 
to a “new” hero who “worked intentionally for peace, both international and 
interpersonal…” (2009: 98). Equally the idea of the “victim” has not been consistent. 
Simone Weil (1940) explains how the objectification of what we classify as the 
“victim” of force in classical texts such as the Iliad cannot be understood in the way 
that we currently conceptualize a victim.  Historian and Communication theorist 
Vicente Benet even writes about the “invention of the victim” as a concept that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Switzerland has some of the highest rates of internet and smart phone use. In 2013 
87% of the population were using the internet (compared to 84% in the US) (ICT 
union, 2013) and smart phone use is sky rocketing (Curtis, 2013). 
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emerged from the enlightenment and the pacifist movement following the First World 
War (2013: 392-393). 
How violence is presented has also changed over time. Our understanding and 
experience of war has been greatly influenced by changes in technology, especially 
the development of photography and film. In Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan 
Sontag (2003) follows the development of news-coverage of war. She moves from the 
first photographic documentation of war in the Crimean War, where subjects were 
mostly staged and photographed after the action was finished, to the largely televised 
Vietnam War. These changes in the mediation of war have had a direct impact on 
how the general public perceives war, and therefore the stories we tell each other 
about war. Finally, Steven Pinker (2012) questions some of the most fundamental 
stories that we have come to accept as unquestionable. If slavery and duels have 
mostly become things of the past, then is it not also possible that violence that is 
currently socially acceptable and even institutionalized can also be changed? 
I am not here to engage in the debate over which stories are “right” or “true,” 
but cite these examples to highlight that stories can change: war is noble and glorious, 
war is devastating and should be avoided; soldiers are heroes, scientists are heroes, 
pacifists are heroes…. Our world is not static, and the stories we tell ourselves are 
changeable. Therefore it is also possible to change dominant stories of immigrants: 
foreigners are a threat or immigrants are an asset to the community.  
The creators of SmartMeme have understood the power of the story, and have 
developed a story-based strategy for social change. They accept that the world we live 
in is a world of stories, and contend that we as humans understand our world in the 
framework of these stories. So if we want to change the world, we have to start by 
changing the stories we tell (Canning and Reinsborough, 2009). The SmartMeme 
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campaign model is based on four major steps: the narrative power analysis, strategy 
development, action, and reflection. The entire process is refined into eight cyclical 
action steps. Once an issue has been identified the first step is to develop a vision and 
concrete goals. Next it is important to identify the targets – whether these are 
institutions, decision makers, or the general public – and the role that each plays. 
Once the targets are identified then the “Battle of the Story” can begin. This consists 
of identifying and deconstructing control stories and then constructing a more positive 
alternative story. In order to win the battle, the campaign needs a synthesized 
narrative that can be spread using specific tools such as memes and viralization. It is 
also important to be strategic in picking the points of intervention (either physical or 
ideological). And as with any campaign, the final step is to ascertain results and 
evaluate the level of success (Canning and Reinsborough, 2009). 
 While the members of SmartMeme are not the first to try to change the world 
by changing the stories we tell, they do provide some useful concepts and tools to 
analyze campaigns and to understand why some campaigns are so powerful and how 
we can make others more effective. In particular their story-based strategy provides a 
framework to understand the current “battle of the story” taking place on the topic of 
immigration and immigrants in Switzerland. In the previous chapter I analyzed how 
the SPP has successfully mobilized elements of national identity to create a powerful 
control story regarding immigration in Switzerland. In the following section I explore 
how these stories are being countered and how alternative narratives can compete 
with the control story.  
 
4.1.2 The Black Sheep and Minarets 
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 Although the Black Sheep campaign for the deportation of criminal foreigners 
proved a success at the ballot box, it was not uncontested. There was significant 
backlash against the poster and the simplified depiction rightfully was accused of 
being racist and led to much outrage both within Switzerland and in the international 
press. Even Doudou Diene, the UN special rapporteur on racial discrimination, called 
for the Swiss government to provide an official explanation of the campaign and 
wanted to have the poster banned (Foulkes, 2007). 
One of the most popular response tactics was to try to subvert the meme by 
culture-jamming. Culture-jamming is “a technique to subvert dominant culture 
narratives… by coopting slogans and images and recontextualizing them to create 
(usually subversive) new meanings” (Canning and Reinsborough, 2009: 53). One of 
the first cases was when the SP (the Social Democratic Party) responded to the 
original poster with their own version in which the black sheep was replaced with a 
goat. The goat, the mascot of the SPP, was given the face of Blocher, the leading 
figure of the SPP. In this way the SP tried to use the SPP’s campaign against them. 
39 
SP counter-poster  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!39!Rhetorik.ch, 2007 
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Soon there were dozens of other versions popping up all over Switzerland. Most 
played with the idea of color and multiculturality while expelling the SPP or racists 
from the symbolic Switzerland. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
(Left) A poster for the expulsion of the SPP by a multicultural Switzerland40  
(Top) A poster for the expulsion of racist Swiss41 
(Bottom) A poster to create solidarity and expelling the SPP42 
 
Others drew comparisons between the SPP politics with the racist practices of Nazi 
Germany. Some posters were original creations, while other protestors made creative 
use of spray paint to alter the message of the SVP posters. 
                      43 
Spray painted posters 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/26/26366/1.html 
41 http://www.woschod.de/2007/09/29/6-oktober-in-der-schweiz-svp-nicht-
willkommen-ganz-fest-gegen-rassismus/ 
42 http://ch.indymedia.org/de/2007/08/51830.shtml 
43 http://www.rhetorik.ch/Aktuell/07/10_20/index.html   
http://ch.indymedia.org/de/2007/08/51830.shtml 
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Beyond these counter-images, a group of outraged Swiss who opposed the SPP 
politics founded the “Black Sheep Committee.” This group organized a counter 
protest to a SPP political demonstration held in Bern. It was supposed to be a party 
against racism. Unfortunately the counter protest lead to clashes and turned violent, 
with rocks thrown, property damaged, and the police responding with tear gas 
(Sciolino, 2007). 
        In the end this attempt at changing the story was relatively unsuccessful. One 
of the reasons is because the counter story was not part of a coordinated campaign. 
Although those opposed to the SPP agenda made use of some of the tactics involved 
in a story-based strategy (such as culture-jamming), it was never a fully developed 
strategy. More importantly, the SPP campaign was mostly a “story of the battle” as it 
was a story based on certain shared assumptions (such as the myth of the black sheep 
and a specific understanding of Swiss identity), whereas a proper counter campaign 
would have had to be a full on battle of the story. 
According to SmartMeme, “since an audience’s existing stories will filter new 
facts or information, change agents need to offer a new story” (Canning and 
Reinsborough, 2009: 20). However, most of the culture-jamming attempts simply 
modified the existing story without offering an entirely new story. They tried to 
change the story without changing the larger frame, and most of the posters still 
operated within the us-versus-them framework (simply changing who is “us” and who 
is “them”). In the end someone is being kicked out. Only one poster that I have found 
went beyond this framework. Rather than showing sheep being thrown out, it shows 
white sheep in Switzerland eagerly rolling out the red carpet for some shiny gold 
sheep. 
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In this way it tries to present the “foreigners” in an entirely different light. The 
story here is one of welcome guests that will contribute to Switzerland’s prosperity. 
However, even this poster is still open to criticism as it arguably serves to perpetuate 
the original poster. Any subsequent depiction of sheep and the Swiss flag will always 
be a reminder of the original SPP poster and in this way prolong its power. I do not 
agree with the SPP tactics and posters at all and believe that people are right to 
protests. However, what would have happened if everyone had simply ignored the 
poster? 
        Although the poster was already made public in July 2007 and was part of a 
mass-mailing to all households on August 1st, it did not receive much attention until 
the SP came out with their counter poster on August 18th. Then during August and 
September the critics got louder and more visible, in turn making the poster one of the 
most talked about political subjects in Switzerland and even attracting the attention of 
international media from the BBC to the New York Times. In this way the opposition 
helped fuel the power of the poster, which the SPP initially had worried was too 
inconspicuous (Rhetorik.ch, 2007). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!44! Rhetorik.ch, 2007 
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This highlights one of the main difficulties with changing the story, namely 
how to change the story without inadvertently supporting the control story? The 
question is whether it is possible to transform the image of the black sheep in a 
culturally efficient and ethical way? Eloísa Nos Aldás (2013:79) describes “cultural 
efficiency” as 
a cultural responsibility for any message uttered by a sender working towards 
a nonkilling society. This means that the actors… will always have to take into 
account long-term education as a cross responsibility of any of their messages 
or actions in spite of their immediate goals.  
 
Simply changing the configuration of the characters/sheep without changing the 
larger framework proved to be ineffective and culturally inefficient. More promising 
was the poster that portrayed the “foreign” sheep as valuable additions to Switzerland, 
but even that perpetuates a clear distinction between “us” and “them”. Now they are 
valuable rather than criminals, but it is still overly simplistic. 
There were some other creative responses that moved a little more in the 
direction of changing the story. Particularly humorous is a prank phone call to the 
SPP hotline45 by The B1 radio station in Bern. The prankster claims to be a sheep 
farmer just down from the Alps and is outraged by the SPP proposal to kick-out all of 
his black sheep. He says he is one of the few black-sheep farmers in Switzerland and 
this campaign would take away his income. The response of the bewildered 
spokesperson is of course entertaining, but more importantly the farmer’s concerns 
highlight some of the issues at play. For one, the black sheep are critical to his 
livelihood. Moreover the SPP spokesperson specifically has to state that all sheep are 
the same, no matter the color (Ladygoodmood, 2007). Although making people 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45!I was not able to ascertain whether this was a real prank call to the actual SPP 
hotline, or whether it is simply a comedic sketch. However in either case it does not 
lose its value as a call to consider alternative stories.!
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question some of the underlying assumptions of the SPP story is a step in the right 
direction, an isolated prank phone call is not enough to stop a well coordinate media 
campaign. 
For any critique of the SPP Black Sheep campaign to really have been 
effective, there needed to be a coordinate story-based strategy. Rather than simply 
trying to tear down the SPP campaign and point out how racist it is (which granted is 
an important step), there also needed to be an alternative story. An alternative story 
would have to be much more culturally effective and take care to promote a culture of 
peace. It should provide a much more nuanced picture of immigration in Switzerland 
and move away from dichotomies as well as from using sheep to represent people. 
Instead there needs to be an effort to humanize the “other.” In her discussion of 
“Public Discourses for Nonkilling Societies”, Nos Aldás (2013) provides a few 
strategies that would be useful in this case. Particularly valuable would be 
personalizing using witness testimony, polyphony and dialogism, irony, 
defamilirazation, and playing with the grammatical person (the construction of “I”, 
“we”, “them” etc.). 
 As I explained in Chapter Three, questions of identity are central to people’s 
attitude towards immigration, and in Chapter Two I showed how there are competing 
discourses on what it means to be Swiss. Therefore, one possible strategy for 
changing the story would be to mobilize different elements of “Swissness.” The SPP 
has focused on a few specific elements, in particular combining an exclusive ethno-
cultural conception of Switzerland with a narrative of threat. However, there are other 
elements that could be used to tell a more inclusive story, especially the idea of 
Switzerland as a multicultural nation. As I explained earlier, plurality (of languages, 
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religions, cantons, etc.) is an important component of the Swiss national identity. 
While the concept of plurality so far has been limited, the general acceptance of the 
basic concept provides an opening for pushing these boundaries.  
 The counter campaign against the minaret ban was moving in the right 
direction with a poster claiming “The sky above Switzerland is big enough.” The 
image removes the dichotomy of “us” and “them” and completely removes 
dehumanizing and racist elements. Instead in presents a plurality of religions all on 
equal ground. Furthermore, it moves away from a message of fear to a message of 
hope using the powerful symbolism of light.  
 46  
 
History and myth have also proved to be important in imagining national 
identity; therefore, it is also possible to put current events in a historical context that 
explains why religious plurality is so important. A poster by the liberal FDP 
attempted exactly that by calling for “Religious freedom instead of Culture War” and 
urges voters to vote no to the dangerous minaret ban. The idea of Kulturkampf  
(Culture War) refers back to the tension and violence between Protestants and 
Catholics and the civil war fought between the two in 1847. Rather than instigating 
fear, the historical reference tries to highlight that religious freedom and acceptance is 
a cornerstone of the Swiss nation.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!46!http://www.printmag.com/wp-content/uploads/poster3.jpg!
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Unfortunately, these attempts to defeat the minaret initiatives were not 
successful at stopping the initiative. One possible explanation is that the posters only 
engaged in half the “battle of the story.” As I explained earlier, Islam was in part such 
a great target because it could be presented alternatively as a religious and as a civil 
threat. The counter campaign mostly focused on the idea of religious freedom, but did 
not address the fears of oppression by Sharia law that the image of the burka-clad 
woman had aroused. It seems that not enough attention was drawn to the irony of 
trying to prevent an oppressive regime by becoming a more oppressive regime. For 
many the minaret ban was not so much about the minarets themselves rather than 
taking a symbolic stance against the perceived encroachment of a legal and civil 
system presented as contrary to the Swiss way of life.  The poster by the Society of 
Minorities was one of the few attempts to highlight this hypocrisy by comparing the 
minaret ban to bans on religious freedom in other countries.  
48 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!47!http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/minaret-campaign/7822626 
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This poster is an example of how, besides highlighting the importance of 
plurality, it is also possible to subvert the idea of Switzerland as a Sonderfall. Since 
the SPP and other right wing forces have taken over the concept of the Sonderfall, 
they have reinvented it as a political weapon. As such the SPP “has refused to see 
changes in the Sonderfall as the result of anonymous outside trends but as the work of 
unpatriotic, spineless and left leaning elites” and the Sonderfall has become a sort of 
golden age which is “regarded as something fixed and static” and in need of 
protection (CHC, 2010: 17). However, that need not be the case. It is also possible to 
use the idea of the Sonderfall to set Switzerland apart from the general trend towards 
xenophobia in Europe and of repression in the world in general. It is possible to argue 
that openness, tolerance, and inclusion of all voices in a democratic system is what 
needs to be protected. In any case, the studies discussed in Chapter 2 indicate that 
strengthening the notion of Switzerland as a civic or political nation rather than 
advocating an ethno-cultural conception could go a long way in reducing racism and 
xenophobia.  
 
 
4.2 Reimaging the Framework 
 
Until now I have questioned the various ways that nationality can be 
conceptualized, but I have not problematized the fundamental concept of nationality 
and citizenship. Although I have considered various definitions of the “nation” as well 
as the contested history of the concept, I have not delved deeply into the ethics of 
nationality and citizenship. Since the nation is a constructed concept, an imagined 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48http://www.swissinfo.ch/blob/433888/a622891d90f4c446b7aa4551d9297150/sriimg
20091014-11350977-0-data.jpg 
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community rather than a primordial entity, it is important to question both the 
usefulness and the ethics of the nation-state.  
Back in 1882, Renan already recognized the fact that “nations are not 
something eternal. They had their beginnings and they will end.” However, he notes, 
“at the present time, the existence of nations is a good thing, a necessity even. Their 
existence is the guarantee of liberty, which would be lost if the world had only one 
law and only one master.” He even predicted that a European confederation would 
“very probably replace” nations in the future. Not long after him, Sidgwick wrote that 
the cosmopolitan ideal was the ideal of the future, but agreed with Renan that at that 
time national and patriotic sentiment had to be “reckoned with as an actually powerful 
political force, and which appear to be at present indispensable to social well-being.” 
Therefore, “We cannot yet hope to substitute for these sentiments, in sufficient 
diffusion and intensity, the wider sentiment connected with the conception of our 
common humanity” (Sidgwick in Miller, 1995: 64). Since then, more than a century 
has passed and Renan’s prediction is starting to fulfill itself in the form of the 
European Union. Therefore, it is time to once again assess whether nations are still a 
good thing and a necessity for our times, or if perhaps the world order needs to be re-
imagined.  
Hungwe an Hungwe note that “The idea of a nation has enabled postcolonial 
societies to invent a self image throughout which they could act to liberate themselves 
from imperialist’s oppression (2010: 35). However, even though nationalism was 
critical during decolonization, “the nation and nationalism are problematic in post 
independence” (2010: 34). Acharaya and Buzan draw on Robert Cox’s argument that 
“theory is always for someone and for some purpose” to question the role of the 
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nation-state in International Relations Theory (2010: 3). Moreover, they argue that the 
nation-state system is not a given since there are alternatives to western International 
Relations Theory.  
For example, Tadjbakhsh argues that the idea of the Western “state” is 
problematic within an Islamic worldview, which views the state as a means to an end 
rather than an end in itself. Strong sub-state and super-state identities compete with 
the state for loyalty, and the state has only been accepted as a passing means to work 
towards social cohesion and progress towards a moral good in the current state system 
(Tadjbakhsh, 2010). On a similar note Muhammad Iqbal said that “tribal or national 
organizations on the lines of race or territory are only temporary phases in the 
unfoldment [sic] and upbringing of collective life, and inasmuch as I have no quarrel 
with them; but I condemn them in the strongest possible terms when they are regarded 
as the ultimate expression of the life of man- kind” (Iqbal in Hashmi, 1993: 61). 
Besides the alternative offered by an Islamic worldview, Qin presents a Chinese 
perspective as a counter to the nation-state system. The idea of Tianxia (space under 
heaven) was one of the guiding concepts of the tributary system, which lasted for 
2,000 years. As a holistic concept, it does not define entities with finite boundaries, 
nor does it consist of “like units.” Instead, it is based on the Confucian concept of 
“family” and the relations among states are seen as relations among people (Qin, 
2010). 
Despite the existence of alternatives and numerous voices calling the concept 
into question, the nation-state has maintained its power as a hegemonic discourse. In 
his book On Nationality, David Miller defends the concept of the nation and argues 
that national identities are a valid source of personal identity and that people are 
justified in recognizing special obligations to co-nationals. Furthermore, it is 
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justifiable to use nationality to pose policy limitations (1995: 3). He refines his 
argument a little by distinguishing between “nations formed largely by political 
imposition and those created by input from all sections with open competition” and 
arguing that only the latter civic-nation has a claim to a “legitimate” or “authentic” 
national identity (1995: 4). While he makes a distinction between imposition and 
choice at the national level, he dismisses the same argument at the individual level. 
He acknowledges that “valid identities are those that are freely chosen” (1995: 43) 
and at the same time recognizes that “one is forced to bear a national identity 
regardless of choice, simply by virtue of participating in a way of life” (1995: 41).  He 
then tries to dismiss this paradox by arguing that even with “unchosen” identities one 
can chose how to react and the level of importance one gives to said identity (1995: 
43). I am not convinced by this distinction, and thus will return to the issue of lack of 
choice in the matter of national identity later on in this chapter. 
Miller then turns to the issue of ethical universalism and particularism based 
on the inclusion and exclusion of relational facts (1995: 49-50). He admits that a 
universalist cannot justify national allegiance (1995: 64) and that “the consistent 
ethical universalist ought to be a cosmopolitan” (1995: 79). Instead, he argues that 
ethical particularism is compatible with the recognition of universal human rights, as 
the obligation to respect and fulfill these rights falls primarily on co-nationals (1995: 
79). Furthermore, being particularist does not mean being partial, as it is a matter of 
“applying the rules and the criteria appropriate to the context in a uniform way… 
without allowing personal prejudice or interest to interfere” (1995: 54). As he 
explains, treating different groups according to different standards is not being partial: 
If I am a member of group G, then I must act towards all the other members of 
group G in certain ways, and that will require me to be impartial even if I 
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happen to like Elizabeth more than John; and so forth. But I am not required to 
act in the same way to people who are not members of G. (1995: 54) 
While Miller is talking within the context of nationality, applying his logic to other 
groups highlights how problematic it is. For example, one could define group G as 
being male, or as being white, or as heterosexual, and the problem with his logic 
becomes self-evident. Therefore, I find his argument for the impartiality of 
particularism as convincing as his dismissal of the involuntary nature of national 
identity.  
The last issue to consider is his discussion of a universalist ethic and a 
cosmopolitan world view. He explains the idea of a cosmopolitan “international 
ideal” as the argument that 
if we could persuade people to discard ideas of nationality and to regard 
themselves simply as members of the human race, perhaps with cultural 
affiliations to a particular group but nothing more than this, the world would 
be a freer and more peaceful place. (1995:13) 
 
However, he rejects this idea as being unrealistic since the ethics of nationality rests 
on “well established facts about human identity and human motivation” (1995: 80). 
Therefore, he claims that “the onus is on the universalist to show that, in widening the 
scope of ethical ties to encompass equally the whole of the human species, he does 
not also drain them of their binding force” (1995: 80).  
 
4.2.1 Nationalism, Choice, and Power 
 After these preliminary considerations, I would like to return to the issue of 
choice in national identity. I started this thesis with the bold statement that I am Swiss 
and that I was born with this identity, a claim that it is time to examine a little more 
closely. As I have explained earlier, a Swiss identity can refer to both Swiss 
citizenship and Swiss nationality, but in the case of Switzerland these two concepts 
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largely coincide with each other. First of all, Swiss citizenship laws are predicated on 
being or having become a member of the Swiss nation, and nationality is at least in 
part defined in political terms predicating nationality on the democratic right to vote 
granted by citizenship.  
 Since Swiss citizenship is based on jus sanguinis and national identity also 
contains a genealogical undertone, the fact that I was born to Swiss parents 
automatically granted me a Swiss passport and all the rights associated with 
citizenship. Furthermore, I was born within the territory of Switzerland and, at least 
until I was six, was raised in a society that promoted the ideals of a Swiss cultural 
identity: I spoke Swiss German; I went to Sunday school; and I imagined myself as 
part of the community. All of this explains how I was born into a “Swiss” identity, but 
it does not explain the why. Why was I born in Switzerland and why was I born to 
Swiss parents? 
Perhaps if I believed in reincarnation, I could argue that my behavior in a prior 
life determined the level of privilege I was born with. However, to me that is not a 
satisfactory answer. Therefore, I am left with the simple answer that I did nothing - it 
is an identity I was born into and one I had no control over at the time of my birth. As 
such, my nationality is very similar to my sex, gender, and skin color, which are not a 
matter of personal choice, but which nevertheless have a profound effect on a 
person’s level of privilege. Later in life, when I fulfill my civic responsibilities by 
voting, paying taxes, and respecting the law, then I might have a better claim for the 
privileges associated with citizenship. However, all of these rights and responsibilities 
(and even the ease with which I could get naturalized as a citizen in a different state) 
are predicated on which nation-state I was born in. 
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Given these considerations, I propose an additional definition of 
“nationalism.” So far nationalism has been understood mainly as either the ideology 
that the nation should be politically sovereign and therefore coterminous with the 
state or as a political movement to achieve this goal (Breuilly, 1985; Hobsbawm, 
1992; Hastings, 1997; Smith, 2011)49. However, I propose that nationalism, should 
also be understood and evaluated in the same way as sexism, racism, and 
heterosexism. The nation, just like race and gender, is a socially constructed and 
imagined concept, which has been imbued with enormous social and political power. 
I can determine my nationality or in which country I am born in to the same extent 
that I can decide the color of my skin, my sexual organs, my gender, and my sexual 
orientation. Over the last centuries we have come to question the right to discriminate 
based on race, gender, and to some extent even sexual orientation, but our entire 
international system is still based on distinguishing people based on their 
nationality.50  
I understand that like sex, gender, and race, the nation and the state are 
concepts that will not disappear any time soon. Nevertheless, it is important to 
critically deconstruct the concept and to examine the power behind the construct. The 
first crucial step in this process is to recognize the privilege inherent in nationality and 
citizenship. Here it is very useful to turn to the work of Devon Carbado who suggests 
a “privilege-centered” understanding of discrimination based on “the notion that 
taking identity privileges for granted helps to legitimize problematic assumptions 
about identity and entitlement” (2005: 190). Carbado further argues, “we cannot 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 At least by mainstream International Relations Theorists 
50 Voices from the periphery, particularly postcolonial thinkers, have been 
questioning the role of the “nation” for a while. However, since Switzerland does not 
consider itself to be part of colonial history, these voices have not really been heard 
within a Swiss context.  
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change the macro-effects of discrimination without ameliorating the power effects of 
our identities” (2005: 191). While he focuses particularly on outlining the privileges 
associated with race, gender and sexual orientation, a similar list can be made for the 
privilege of belonging to a certain nation-state. Nationality and citizenship is 
associated with two kinds of privilege, one is the privilege of being part of the “in-
group” which every national has within his or her own territory and the other is a 
privilege that is linked uniquely to a certain nationality and transcends national 
boundaries. Although by no means exhaustive, here is a sample list of what could be 
called “Swiss Privilege” and is granted to all those recognized as Swiss.  
As a Swiss person: 
• There are many countries for which I do not need a visa to enter. 
• It is usually easy to get a visa when I need one. 
• I am free to move about, live and work in the entire European Union. 
• When I travel most people assume that I am honest and generally trust 
worthy. 
• I can vote in Swiss elections and referenda 
• I am neither being excluded nor targeted by the media 
• I can expect that my job application won’t be rejected due to my nationality 
• I can expect to get paid the same as my co-nationals 
• I won’t be denied an apartment based on my nationality 
• I am not the target of negative stereotypes and I am not blamed for increases 
in crime 
• If I get into legal trouble, I won’t be deported 
• I am not targeted by right-wing extremists 
• I do not have to make a daily effort to integrate and fit in with cultural norms 
that may be different from what I am used to 
• I do not have to balance a bi-national identity and I am not forced to chose 
between two cultures   
 
Of course this privilege has to be understood in the context of other privileges by 
considering the idea of intersectionality. This means that every individual stands at 
the crossroads of many identities, which interact to determine how the individual fits 
into societal power structures. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
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intersectionality originally arose from a critique by feminists of color who argued that 
power had to be understood not only in terms of gender but should also consider race 
and class (Allen, 2011). Since then other power axes such as heteronormativity and 
disability have been proposed; however, so far the issue of nationality has largely 
been ignored from the “center.”  
 
4.2.2 Transcending Duality 
 
 One of the major challenges of talking about privilege and the nation I have 
struggled with while writing this thesis is not to inadvertently strengthen the very 
concept I am trying to critique. The problem is that it is very difficult to escape what 
Foucault terms a “regime of truth.”  Like I explained with the black sheep counter 
posters, they were largely ineffective. Although they were intended to critique the 
SPP campaign, they actually served to magnify it.   
 This issue is not unique to the debate over nationality, and has become a 
central issue within feminism. For example, even though Vandana Shiva critiques the 
Western dualistic conceptions of gender, she cannot seem to escape the discourse of 
man/woman and feminine/masculine (Shiva, 1988). As Judith Butler explains: 
As feminists, we have been less eager, I think, to consider the status of the 
category itself and, indeed, to discern the conditions of oppression which issue 
from the unexamined reproduction of gender identities which sustain discrete 
and binary categories of man and woman. (1988: 523)  
 
 This is the same criticism faced by proponents of the “Dialogue” or “Alliance of 
Civilizations” which were proposed as alternatives to the idea of the “Clash of 
Civilizations.” As Adib-Moghaddam points out, “the idea of a ‘dialogue of 
civilizations’ is as dependent on the myth of undisturbed civilizational entities as the 
‘clash of civilizations’” (2011: 25). On a similar note, Dacey notes that the Dialogue 
! ! !! ! !! ! 145!
of Civilizations only rejects Civilization as “Ethos” but not as “Methodology” (2008: 
9). 
 Another danger which applies equally to discussions of the “foreign other” as 
well as to women is that in the “effort to combat the invisibility of women as a 
category feminists run the risk of rendering visible a category which may or may not 
be representative of the concrete lives of women” (Butler, 1988: 523). Nevertheless, 
Butler also acknowledges that it “remains politically important to represent women” 
as long as it is done in a way that does not reify the category that the theory is 
supposed to emancipate (1988: 530). 
 Therefore, I have tried to discuss politically important issues regarding 
identity and immigration without essentializing the categories. I argue that although 
the concept of a “Swiss national identity” does exist because it is part of a collective 
imagination, it is by no means an uncontested category. Every individual imagines the 
concept a little differently and the concept evolves over time. It is a concept steeped 
in power that is mobilized for different political ends. Furthermore, while I have 
focused on a “Swiss national identity” and how it has been constructed in opposition 
to the “other,” I also do not claim that the category of “other” exists independently of 
the hegemonic discourse.  
While analyzing the power behind the concept of the nation is of particular 
importance in the current political context, it is equally important to look for ways to 
transcend these particularities and the dualistic categories of “us” and “them.” The 
idea of duality is often traced back to Rene Descartes’ theory of the mind and has 
become a central pillar of modern day science. For example, scientific classification 
systems generally depend on a dichotomous key, which consists of a list of two 
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mutually exclusive options to identify objects in the natural world. However, the 
world is not always so black and white. As Mottier explains, crisscrossing, mobile 
and permeable boundaries make the construction of order a never-ending process. 
Moreover, “the mechanisms of classification, inclusion and exclusion that construct 
identity can never fully eliminate ambivalence”(1999: 5),51 which is the possibility 
that an object could be assigned to more than one category.  Therefore, “ambivalence 
is the unintended consequence of classification efforts” and ironically calls for more 
classification (1999: 6), resulting in an ongoing war against ambivalence which is 
ultimately non-productive and self-destructive (1999: 6). As Bauman explains:  
Among the multitude of impossible tasks that modernity set itself and that 
made modernity into what it is, the task of order (more precisely and most 
importantly, or order as a task) stands out – as the least possible among the 
impossible and the least disposable among the indispensable.   
             (Bauman in Mottier, 1999: 6) 
 
Rather than going down this rabbit hole of exclusion and inclusion, the world is in 
need of a “new consciousness,” a new way to imagine identity that does not depend 
on dualities and that is comfortable with ambivalence.  
A post-colonial view of identity offers one alternative in the form of a 
reformulated notion of “hybridity.” Omar appropriates this traditionally ‘negative’ 
term and transforms it into a positive sign that recognizes the “hybrid and 
interconnected nature of individual and collective identities” (2009: 13).  As such it 
proposes difference to be seen “as an interactive and dialogical space that could 
prompt exchange and inclusion not exclusion” (2009: 14).  
This idea of “hybridity” also fits with Amin Maalouf’s understanding of 
identity. By considering his own identity, Maalouf concludes that “identity can’t be 
compartmentalized,” which means that people do not have several identities but rather 
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just one made up of many components (2000: 2).  This idea echoes the claim by 
French philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas that diversity and plurality are not something 
outside the ‘self’ but rather a dimension categorically inherent in the self (Behr, 2012: 
243).  While Maalouf acknowledges that different components of our identities can 
vary in importance over time and in different contexts, he does not argue that any of 
these identities are essential or that one is inherently more important than the other. 
Instead Maalouf scours his memory to find “as many ingredients of my identity as I 
can” and then he assembles and arranges them without denying any of them (2000: 
16).   
Conceiving of identity in this plural or hybrid manner opens the door to a 
more inclusive understanding of identity. Rather than by looking for differences to 
separate us, it is possible to use each puzzle piece as a bridge to other identities: 
Through each one of my affiliations, taken separately, I possess a certain 
kinship with a large umber of my fellow human beings; but because of all 
these allegiances, taken together, I possess my own identity, completely 
different from any other. (Maalouf, 2000:19-20)  
 
Therefore, my Swiss identity connects me to other Swiss; as a woman, I can identify 
with other women; as someone raised in the nineties, I am connected to everyone in 
my generation; as a dancer, I can relate to all other dancers; as a lover of Harry Potter, 
I share common ground with millions of fans around the world. Such an inclusive 
understanding of identity is very different from an exclusionary stance which would 
state that if you are not Swiss, and not a woman, and not a dancer, and not from my 
generation, and not a lover of the same books then you are the “other” that needs to be 
excluded from my life.  
 While at a theoretical level this shift is quite easy to make, the reality is a little 
more complicated. As Maalouf explains, “every individual is a meeting ground for 
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many different allegiances, and sometimes these loyalties conflict with one another 
and confront the person who harbours them with difficult choices” (2000: 4). 
Therefore, it is also important to look for tools and concepts to deal with 
contradictions and ambiguities.  
 In the following section I draw on elements of the theoretical and 
philosophical positions of a number of thinkers to find ways to live with these 
ambiguities. These theorists approach the issues of identity and peace from different 
directions and may disagree with each other quite strongly on certain points. 
Nevertheless, in the spirit of looking for points of congruence rather than focusing on 
differences and contradictions, I find that they each make useful contributions to the 
discussion. 
John Paul Lederach presents one possible way to deal with the issue of 
contradictions in his sociological and peace studies principle of paradoxical curiosity. 
As he explains, “the gift of paradox provides an intriguing capacity: It holds together 
seemingly contradictory truths in order to locate a greater truth” (2005: 36). Such a 
stance is fundamentally based on the capacity to mobilize the imagination and calls 
for the suspension of judgment  “in favor of exploring presented contradictions, at 
face and at heart value, for the possibility that there exists a value beyond what is 
currently known that supersedes the contradiction” (2005: 36). He does not suggest 
abandoning opinions or the capacity to assess, but rather proposes that we have to 
simultaneously accept the realness of appearance as well as the realness of the lived 
experience and how perceptions and interpretations may point to hidden realities:  
Suspending judgment refuses to force complex social histories and constructed 
realities into artificial dualistic categories in favor of the seeking of 
understanding that breaks the hold of social polarization. Far from being 
paralyzed by complexity, paradoxical curiosity as a quality of the moral 
imagination relies on complexity as a friend not an enemy, for from 
complexity emerges untold new angles, opportunities, and unexpected 
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potentialities that surpass, replace, and break the shackles of historic and 
current relational patterns of repeated violence. (2005:37) 
 
Lederach developed the idea of paradoxical curiosity as part of his elicitive conflict 
transformation strategy and does not focus exclusively on issues of identity. 
Nevertheless, the idea can easily be applied to expanding our understanding of 
identity and finding ways to imagine something beyond the us/them divide. 
As a lesbian, Chicana, feminist, Gloria Anzaldua experienced personally the 
challenge of living with identities that at times are hostile towards each other.  Her 
idea for a new consciousness is very similar to the idea of hybridity, but is personified 
in the form of la mestiza. Just like Lederach’s paradoxical curiosity, la mestiza is a 
way to transform contradictions and ambiguity into something new:  
The new mestiza copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions, a 
tolerance for ambiguity…. She learns to juggle cultures… She has a plural 
personality, she operates in a pluralistic mode - nothing is thrust out, the good 
the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned. (2007: 79) 
 
Therefore, Anzaldua proposes an integration of all parts in which opposing ideas are 
somehow combined in a creative new whole. In this way “la mestiza is a product of 
the transfer of the cultural and spiritual values of one group to another.” (2007: 78). 
She does not deny or try to eradicate the source of the tension or conflict, but rather 
tries to integrate them into a new consciousness governed by new myths and a new 
culture: “I seek new images of identity, new beliefs about ourselves, our humanity 
and worth no longer in question” (2007: 87).  
La mestiza is predicated on the break down of the “subject-object duality that 
keeps her a prisoner” (2007: 80), which can only be achieved if we recognize that 
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“todos las partes de nostoros valen52” (2007: 88). According to Anzaldua, nothing - 
not the good, the bad, nor the ugly - should be rejected, because these are just 
constructions. Any normative evaluation begs the question: according to whom? 
Which culture gets to define the good and the bad? By not rejecting anything, she is 
taking away the normative power of any one culture. However, contrary to what it 
might initially seem like, she does not advocate for anything goes. Rather, she argues 
that the mestiza’s first step should be to take inventory. In this process, “she puts 
history through a sieve, winnows out the lies…. This step is a conscious rupture with 
all oppressive traditions of all culture and religions” (2007: 82). 
Moreover, Anzaldua does not limit her mestiza consciousness to a single path. 
Her main argument is to move away from a counterstance, which she says “locks one 
in a duel of oppressor and oppressed… [in which] both are reduced to a common 
denominator of violence” (2007: 78). Her first suggestion is that “at some point, on 
our way to a new consciousness, we will have to leave the opposite bank… so that we 
are on both shores at once” (2007: 78). This follows her argument of embracing 
contradictions and ambiguities – of rejecting neither of the sides but learning to 
balance the two and live on both sides simultaneously.  
Anzaldua concludes that “in our very flesh (r)evolution works out the clash of 
cultures… [and] if the center holds, we’ve made some kind of evolutionary step 
forward” (2007: 81). However, the entirety of the new mestiza consciousness is 
dependent on whether this center will hold, which is a challenge given that the 
mestiza needs to hold together a myriad of conflicting and opposing parts. Therefore, 
she needs something universal that ties them all together. It may therefore be useful to 
combine la mestiza with the insights by Jiddu Krishnamurti. 
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 While Anzaluda’s mestiza calls for the integration of all parts, “for 
Krishnamurti, a radical transformation of consciousness/mind requires one to abandon 
one’s identification with a particular culture, system of ideas, religion and with the 
expectations built over a lifetime” (Kumar, 2011: 505). He believes that, religion, 
culture, politics, and nationality are the very factors that divide humanity and are the 
source of conflict and war:  
Humanity… has built images as a fence of security – religious, political and 
personal. These manifest as symbols, ideas, beliefs. The burden of these 
images dominates human’s thinking, his/her relationship, and daily life. These 
images are the causes of our problems for they divide human from human. 
(Kumar, 2011: 505) 
 
Although Krishnamurti did not identify himself with any group or ideology, 
understanding his teachings as simply a call to reject all of our identities greatly 
misrepresents him. As Kumar explains, “his teachings stress universal spiritual 
values, personal insight and autonomous self-knowledge, synthesizing both Indian 
and Western philosophical and psychological thoughts” (2011: 503). Therefore, 
Krishnamurti is not like post-modernists who focus on simply deconstructing 
everything. Rather than making everything relative, he looks for universal truths 
found in lived human experience, rather than in external identities. As Kumar 
expresses, “he believed it was unproductive for life to even acknowledge the 
existence of such borders [as regional and cultural boundaries]” (2011: 505). So while 
he calls on us to abandon these externally constructed identities as unproductive in the 
search for truth, he also believes that there are universal truths found within each of us 
and our lived experience. 
Rather than combining the existing to create something new, he approaches 
the journey “completely denuded, especially of knowledge” for “if you are to discover 
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for yourself what is the new, it is no good carrying the burden of the old, especially 
knowledge - the knowledge of another, however great” (Krishnamurti, 1949). 
Furthermore, he cautions against accepting or rejecting anything too quickly: “as most 
of us are inclined to accept something eagerly, without true understanding there is a 
danger, is there not, that we may accept without thought or investigation, without 
looking deeply into it” (Krishnamurti, 1949). 
        So he believes that there is something to discover, but dismisses knowledge 
and thought as always limited and limiting. Instead, he believes we need to find a 
“totally different kind of energy to comprehend… an energy that is whole, non-
fragmented, not broken up… which is not the energy of conflict, of separateness, of 
division, the energy of the movement of thought” (Krishnamurti, 1975). His answer to 
this difficult question of finding an alternative to knowledge and thought, which he 
believes is inherently divisive, is the idea of attention. According to Krishnamurti, “in 
attention there is no border, there is no centre from which you are aware, from which 
you are attentive” (1975). In paying close attention, there is no division between the 
individual and the response, for the individual is the response. Therefore, the person 
becomes “totally completely aware of the irrationality of thought and the rationality 
of thought and the reality of both” (1975). This awareness and acceptance of multiple 
realities mirrors both Lederach’s paradoxical curiosity and Anzaldua’s tolerance for 
ambiguity. Moreover, this realization of the finiteness and limitedness of thought 
provides the springboard to look for universal truths. And these universal truths 
derived from deep self-reflection and attention are exactly what will allow Anzaldua’s 
mestiza to stand on both shores at once. 
Finally, the concept of trans-rational peaces may offer another way to 
reimagine identity. Rather than focusing on the plurality of identity, a trans-rational 
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approach focuses on the interconnectivity of everything. As I explained in Chapter 
One, a trans-rational approach transgresses “the limits of modernity and post-
modernity by recombining the rational and modern with energetic elements and 
recognizing the importance of energy flow for the perception of peace” (Dietrich, 
2011: 13). Such a conception is based on three key insights: 
a. There are no things but only networks and interrelations. The universe is an 
interwoven net of connectivity 
b. The Cartesian distinction between mind and matter, observe and observed 
is no longer upheld. We can never speak about nature without speaking 
about ourselves.  
c. In nature, no static structure exists. Peaces are a dynamic equilibrium.  
(Dietrich, 2011: 14)  
 In the context of human identity it means that people can no longer be 
understood as distinct entities, but rather as part of a web that connects them to the 
rest of the universe. Moreover, it becomes clear that to speak about the other is to 
speak about the self, thereby breaking down the Cartesian duality. Such an 
understanding of human relations is not just coming out of the field of philosophy and 
peace studies, but is also increasingly a subject of interest in quantum physics. Recent 
experiments and theories seem to indicate that the idea of distinct entities (such as 
organisms, cells, atoms, etc.) may not be able to explain the reality of the universe. 
Instead an understanding of the world based on energy and interconnectivity seems to 
be more accurate.  As O’Murchu explains, “at the heart of the quantum vision is the 
conviction that all life forces are interdependent and interrelated” (1998: 78). This 
goes hand-in-hand with the idea of quantum holism, or the idea that “the world is a 
seamless, indivisible whole” (Rosado, 2003: 9).  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
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 The current trend towards xenophobia and negative messages, which 
undermine a culture of peace, need to be tackled on two levels. At a more superficial 
level, politicians, the media, and the general public should critically engage with the 
concept of national identity by challenging the dominant exclusionary narratives and 
replacing them with more inclusive stories. Beyond that, it is also important to 
question the nationalist framework that the world has been operating in for the past 
centuries. While the nation-state may at one point have been a politically useful 
concept, this does not mean that it is the best option forever. Instead, we need to find 
new ways to imagine our identities that do not lend themselves to discrimination 
against any group. However, it is important that the quest for equality does not lead to 
conformity and homogeneity. Therefore, a central aspect of a new consciousness has 
to be the ability to be comfortable with plurality and ambivalence. Both the concept of 
hybridity and the mestiza offer valuable ideas for reaching this “new consciousness,” 
which has the potential to transform and transcend the current dominant conceptions 
of the nation and the self.  Moreover, the emerging field of quantum theory and trans-
rationality have the potential to help reformulate the current conceptions of identity 
by emphasizing the inherent interconnection between all beings.  
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Conclusion 
Answer to the research question. 
 
 I started this thesis by asking how the hegemonic discourses of a “Swiss” 
identity are mobilized in political debates about immigrants in Switzerland, and how 
these discourses could be transformed to contribute to a culture of “peaces.” In order 
to answer this question, I first had to justify some basic underlying assumptions, most 
importantly the idea that there is such a thing as a “Swiss national identity.” While I 
disagree with scholars who claim that the nation is a primordial or a perennial entity, I 
nevertheless accept that at this point in time the concept of the nation remains very 
powerful and highly relevant in the political decision making process and in everyday 
lives. Therefore, I find Anderson’s (2006) concept of the “imagined community” very 
useful in understanding how the nation is both imagined (i.e. not real) and real at the 
same time.  
Pehrson and others similarly contend that “while noting the historical 
contingency of the nation and the nation-state, we can also acknowledge that nations 
have a reality for the individual” (2009: 25). More importantly, they go on to claim 
that “an account of the social identity processes that operate within this reality is 
important if we are to understand, for example, the implications of identifying with a 
national group for one’s attitudes towards immigrants” (2009: 25).  Pehrson and 
others studied this issue at the international level and concluded that the relationship 
!156!
between national identification and anti-immigration prejudice depends on how 
national groups are defined by their members. However, what has been missing from 
the literature is an in-depth analysis at the country level that explores how the 
discourses on identity affect attitudes toward immigration not only at a theoretical but 
also at a practical level.  
By analyzing the discourse about a Swiss national identity at both the 
official/elite as well as the popular level and by combining my analysis with the 
findings of other scholarly research, I have been able to identify three main 
conceptions of the nation, namely the civic/political nation, the cultural nation, and 
the ethnic nation.  The most popular and least contested of these is the conception of 
Switzerland as a civic nation based on the three institutions of democracy, federalism 
and neutrality. However, in reality cultural elements also play an important part in the 
construction of a “Swiss” national identity. Of particular note is the conception of 
Switzerland as a Sonderfall as well as an understanding of Switzerland as a 
multicultural nation. However, this plurality is generally imagined in limited terms as 
white, central European (mostly in connection with the German, French, and Italian 
language and culture), and Christian. Finally, there are also strong undertones of an 
ethnic conception of the nation. Although in recent years this is rarely stated 
explicitly, the continued importance of an ethnic conception is evident in the 
continued application of jus sanguinis. Besides these three main strands of 
nationalism, the concept of a negative identity defined in opposition to the “other” is 
also crucial in understanding “Swissness.” In particular this negative conception is 
important to a culture of fear that is constantly defining the nation in terms of an 
outside threat.  
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 Understanding these competing discourses regarding a “Swiss” national 
identity then allowed me to analyze how they are linked with attitudes and policies 
regarding immigrants. In general a civic/political conception of the nation is related to 
a more open and positive attitude towards foreigners, while ethno-cultural 
conceptions are linked to more negative attitudes. In the case of Switzerland, the 
political right has been able to exploit this connection by promoting an ethno-cultural 
conception of the nation in order to boost support for exclusionary and xenophobic 
policies. In particular the SPP has successfully used a series of posters using ethno-
cultural symbols to sway public opinion in favor of more restrictive policies regarding 
foreigners.  
 The last part of my thesis is dedicated to exploring ways of transforming these 
discourses. Given the link between conceptions of national identity and attitudes 
towards foreigners, it is logical to conclude that refuting an ethno-cultural conception 
and promoting a more civic conception of the nation should lead to a decrease in 
xenophobia. However, this may only be a superficial solution. Regardless of how it is 
defined, the nation-state is inherently boundary defining and cannot overcome the 
“us” versus “them” mentality. The boundaries can be more liberal or conservative, 
more permeable or restrictive, but without boundaries the nation-state looses all 
meaning.  
 Therefore, it may be time to start considering alternative ways of conceiving 
identity all together. While different scholars have proposed both supra-national and 
regional alternatives, these all simply expand or reduce the frame of reference without 
significantly changing it. Although I have no definite answer, I argue that considering 
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a new consciousness based on paradoxical curiosity, la mestiza, and attention could 
offer a potential alternative to the current hegemonic discourses.  
 
Practical Implications and Future Research 
  
Since the world is currently experiencing an unprecedented movement of 
persons (both voluntary migration as well as forced displacement), my findings can 
potentially be applied in a wide variety of contexts. In the case of Switzerland, it is 
important that those who are working against xenophobia and campaigning for a more 
open-Switzerland understand the power of the rhetoric surrounding national identity 
and that they can strategically apply my findings when designing a political 
campaign. In particular, there is the potential to subvert the discourse portraying 
Switzerland as a multicultural nation and use it to promote a more inclusive 
conception of the nation.  However, before designing such a strategy it would be 
interesting to go beyond my theory-seeking analysis to an empirical study. I think that 
it would be especially interesting to test to what extent emphasizing different 
elements of a national identity can influence attitudes towards immigrants.  
While changing the story of the nation would be a good start, ideally these 
counter narratives would not only promote a more open nation, but eventually serve 
to question the very concept of the nation. While I do not see the nation-state 
disappearing any time soon, I do believe that it is important that it is subject to critical 
analysis and not accepted without question. Since nationality is a privileged identity, 
the study of nationalism could greatly benefit from theories emerging from the fields 
of feminist and critical-race studies. For example, as I mentioned earlier, it would be 
interesting to further analyze the performative nature of national identity. Moreover, 
in my last chapter, I offered one possible alternative for a “new consciousness;” 
! ! !! ! !! ! 159!
however, I am sure that there are numerous other ways of reimagining the framework. 
Therefore, it would be interesting for future research to focus on other post- and trans-
national theories and how they relate to the issue of immigration. 
In this thesis, my goal was to explore how the Swiss imagine themselves as a 
national community and how this impacts policy. However, that leaves out two other 
important dimensions: the construction of the “other” as well as the perspective of the 
“other.” Although I have discussed how the “foreign other” is portrayed in political 
campaigns about immigration, that only shows part of the picture, and I have not 
focused on a deeper analysis of how the “other” is imagined. For example, it would be 
interesting to study how the “other” is represented in the mass media, in popular 
culture and in school curricula. Perhaps even more important would be to study the 
agency of the other. While my research has focused primarily on the Swiss, which 
does not mean that the “others” are not also defining themselves as well as the Swiss. 
In particular, I would be interested in exploring how the “foreigners” in Switzerland 
are mobilizing and appropriating the various nationalist discourses to serve their own 
purpose. Are they trying to define themselves within the discourses of being Swiss? If 
so, are they identifying primarily using a civic-political or cultural conception? And if 
they are engaging with a cultural conception, are they trying to fit into the current 
discourse or are there attempts at reimagining these cultural elements to be more 
inclusive?  
Obviously, there remain a lot of questions regarding the nation, the “Swiss,” 
the “other” and the relationship between them. However, I hope that this thesis can 
provide a solid theoretical foundation for my own future research and others. 
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Moreover, I hope that within Switzerland if not beyond, it will serve as an inspiration 
for a conceptual shift away from a xenophobic conception of the nation.   
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